Pipeline taps residents' fears
Hundreds worry about a gas line's effect on their land and environment
Friday, November 16, 2007
TED SICKINGER The Oregonian
A chorus of concerns rang out this week as landowners along the snaking route of a proposed natural gas pipeline showed signs of organizing to oppose the line and liquefied natural gas terminals along the lower Columbia River.
Several hundred landowners, farmers, advocates and concerned residents aired their complaints at public meetings this week in Maupin, Molalla, McMinnville and, on Thursday, Forest Grove. The towns sit along the proposed route of the Palomar pipeline, which would connect a planned LNG terminal near Astoria with an interstate transmission line that runs through central Oregon to California.
Douglas Sipe, a project manager from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, was the man behind the lectern and thus the stand-in punching bag for both his agency and the private companies that want to build the terminal and pipeline.
Most speakers expressed deep misgivings about the agency's ability to deal with associated threats to people, wildlife, farmland and the environment.
Tuesday night's meeting in Molalla was raucous.
"Emotions were running high," Sipe said. "It was hard for me to say anything to make people happy."
Wednesday's meeting in McMinnville was lower key, if no less heartfelt. Ilsa Perse, a landowner from Carlton, told Sipe that it was increasingly difficult to discriminate between where the federal government ends and private companies begin.
"California told these companies to take a hike, and I find it a little weird that we now get the special privilege" of hosting them in Oregon, Perse said.
The Palomar pipeline is actually a joint venture between Northwest Natural Gas Co., the state's largest gas utility, and TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., which owns an interstate pipeline that runs through central Oregon to California.
Palomar is one of two proposed pipelines that would connect planned LNG terminals on the lower Columbia River to TransCanada's line in central Oregon. The second would connect to the planned Bradwood Landing LNG terminal 20 miles upriver from Astoria. Both pipelines would run through Clatsop, Washington, Yamhill, Marion, Clackamas and Wasco counties. A third LNG terminal is being considered in Coos Bay, with a pipeline that runs to near the California border.
Supporters of the LNG projects and pipelines contend that the new gas supply and pipelines would bolster economic development and protect the region from price shocks as domestic and Canadian gas supplies get tighter.
Yet the California question looms large over all of the projects. Critics say Oregon's gas needs are a fraction of the proposed terminals' capacity. They worry that the state is a back door for shipping foreign fossil fuels to its southern neighbor, where gas prices are higher and citizens have helped block LNG proposals.
Palomar backers and the company bankrolling the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, Houston-based NorthernStar Natural Gas, Inc., don't even like to associate the two projects together in public for fear that opposition to one will infect the other.
NW Natural's rationale for Palomar is to diversify its customers' supply of natural gas. Even if the LNG terminal is never built, the Portland company says it wants to build the section of Palomar that links its distribution hub in Molalla, southeast of Portland, with TransCanada's interstate line in central Oregon.
NW Natural says such a link has been contemplated for the past 15 years. Palomar officials maintain that the company can rationalize extending the pipeline farther west to serve growing areas of Washington County that NW Natural doesn't serve today.
Critics remain skeptical. They contend the local gas monopoly, constrained by the slow growth of its regulated business, wants a piece of the lucrative interstate gas trade, which would complement its growing natural gas storage facilities in Mist, near the LNG terminal.
Opponents of the projects maintain that a high-pressure, 36-inch pipe crossing the Cascades -- one costing hundreds of millions of dollars -- doesn't make economic sense if NW Natural isn't moving vast quantities of gas from an LNG terminal each day.
"There's no credible, straight-faced argument that these projects are being driven by Oregon's needs," said Brent Foster, an advocate with Columbia Riverkeepers.
Sipe, the FERC project manager, acknowledged the concerns over California at the public meetings, but he said the Palomar pipeline and the LNG terminal at Bradwood would be evaluated separately since the owners intend to build them regardless of whether the other project is approved. He also confirmed many landowners' fears when he acknowledged Wednesday night in McMinnville that they "won't necessarily have a vote" on the pipeline, even if it runs across their land.
But Sipe stressed that the public input would help shape the agency's environmental analyses of the project, which is a key piece of its approval process.
Many landowners fear the property and environmental damage that could come with a 50- to 100-foot right-of-way across their property. Their concerns range from the increased risk of wildfire and introduction of noxious weeds to destruction of valuable farm and timberland. Many wonder who will pay their attorneys' fees and the property taxes on land that is no longer productive, or whether they can push the pipeline into existing public right-of-ways.
Landowners along the pipeline route are forming local chapters of a group they call Oregon Citizens Against the Pipeline.
Jody Hawkins, a landowner from Yamhill, told Sipe on Wednesday that his kids play on a baseball diamond 30 feet from the proposed pipeline route and his house sits 200 feet away.
"If a 36-inch gas line (explodes), my house is gone, my kids are gone," Hawkins said.
This week's meetings aren't the only chance for the public to provide input on the project. They can write or provide electronic comments to the agency until Nov 28. FERC will hold another round of hearings after it issues a draft environmental impact statement in June, Sipe said.
"They can think what they want about the federal government," Sipe said. "But we're out there trying to protect the public while providing the infrastructure that the nation needs."
Ted Sickinger: 503-221-8505, tedsickinger@news.oregonian.com
©2007 The Oregonian
"We demand that big business give the people a square deal; in return we must insist that when anyone engaged in big business honestly endeavors to do right he shall himself be given a square deal." Theodore Roosevelt November 15, 1913
Friday, November 16, 2007
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
1000 Friends of Oregon LNG Pipeline and Terminal Position Statement
1000 Friends of Oregon LNG Pipeline and Terminal Position Statement
Liquefied Natural Gas pipelines and terminals threaten livable urban and rural communities, family farms and forests, and natural and scenic areas across Oregon.
Oregon faces an unprecedented number of proposals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals, pipelines, and related facilities. Two terminals are currently proposed for the Columbia River Estuary, and a third terminal is proposed for Coos Bay. Hundreds of miles of pipeline are proposed from the Columbia River terminals to Molalla, from Central Oregon to Molalla, and from Coos Bay to the California border. These pipelines would cut across hundreds of miles of productive farm and forest land to serve utilities in California, where the vast majority of the gas from the three terminals would be used.
1000 Friends of Oregon is opposed to these proposals because the pipelines threaten family farms and forests and the terminals threaten sensitive estuaries and the fisheries that depend on them. Oregon and the Pacific Northwest are already feeling the effects of global warming. Constructing huge facilities to import fossil fuels will worsen these effects and undercut our goals for energy independence.
If the LNG facilities are built, they should be built on Oregon’s terms. The pipelines should follow existing roads and rights-of-way, instead of plowing through the middle of productive farm fields and forest lands that support Oregon families. The terminals should fully comply with Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals without exceptions, including Goal 16, which protects Estuarine Resources.
In the words of 1000 Friends co-founder, Governor Tom McCall:
"Oregon is demure and lovely, and ought to play a little hard to get. And I think you’ll all be just as sick as I am if you find it is nothing but a hungry hussy, throwing herself at every stinking smokestack that’s offered."
Liquefied Natural Gas pipelines and terminals threaten livable urban and rural communities, family farms and forests, and natural and scenic areas across Oregon.
Oregon faces an unprecedented number of proposals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals, pipelines, and related facilities. Two terminals are currently proposed for the Columbia River Estuary, and a third terminal is proposed for Coos Bay. Hundreds of miles of pipeline are proposed from the Columbia River terminals to Molalla, from Central Oregon to Molalla, and from Coos Bay to the California border. These pipelines would cut across hundreds of miles of productive farm and forest land to serve utilities in California, where the vast majority of the gas from the three terminals would be used.
1000 Friends of Oregon is opposed to these proposals because the pipelines threaten family farms and forests and the terminals threaten sensitive estuaries and the fisheries that depend on them. Oregon and the Pacific Northwest are already feeling the effects of global warming. Constructing huge facilities to import fossil fuels will worsen these effects and undercut our goals for energy independence.
If the LNG facilities are built, they should be built on Oregon’s terms. The pipelines should follow existing roads and rights-of-way, instead of plowing through the middle of productive farm fields and forest lands that support Oregon families. The terminals should fully comply with Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals without exceptions, including Goal 16, which protects Estuarine Resources.
In the words of 1000 Friends co-founder, Governor Tom McCall:
"Oregon is demure and lovely, and ought to play a little hard to get. And I think you’ll all be just as sick as I am if you find it is nothing but a hungry hussy, throwing herself at every stinking smokestack that’s offered."
Monday, November 12, 2007
Havens Says Bradwood/Northern Star Misused His Models!!
From: Energy Current - Houston, Texas
LNG expert says vapor model used inaccurately
Filed from Houston 11/12/2007 6:53:51 PM GMT
USA: A chemical engineering professor at the University of Arkansas said that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NorthernStar Natural Gas have misused models he devised to calculate how far a vapor cloud would travel if liquefied natural gas (LNG) spilled from the proposed Bradwood LNG facility on the Columbia River in Oregon, the Longview Daily News reported last week.
Havens also said the data FERC used assumes a relatively small spill, which skews proejcts for how far vapor rising off leading LNG could spread.
Havens testified at a FERC hearing in Astoria, Ore. about NorthernStar's plans to bring LNG tankers up the river to Bradwood, Ore. The company would unload two 168-foot (51-m) tall tanks, regasify and send it to market via a new pipeline spanning Clatsop, Columbia and Cowlitz counties.
FERC is considering whether to issue permits for the proposed terminal and pipeline.
Havens said FERC used two models, both authored by him, to set safety zones for vapor clouds at LNG terminals. If a spill occurs, gas vapor must be projected to stay within the terminal's property, or the terminal cannot be approved.
Haven noted that the size of the projected spill in NorthernStar's data is smaller than spills project in other terminal applications, which suggests the company is cherrypicking data to get the facility approved. NorthernStar said its LNG tanks will be double-lined and that the risk of a spill is minimal.
NorthernStar spokesman Joe Desmond called Havens a "professional opponent" and said the professor has given similar testimony on the applications of 14 different LNG terminals. In each case, Desmond said, Havens' arguments were rebuffed.
Environmental group Columbia Riverkeeper paid Havens' expenses to travel to Astoria, but Havens said he is not employed by the environmental group.
While LNG spills are "highly unlikely," if an LNG fire engulfed the LNG tanker itself, there's a chance the fire could break open other containments on the ship and cause "cascading failures" in which case more LNG would be released, and "the whole thing would burn," The Daily Astorian quoted Havens as saying, citing a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Havens made the statement while addressing Astoria city and county leaders at the Astoria City Hall on Nov. 8.
Havens, who has studied LNG for over 30 years, said with the "feeding frenzy" to get approvals for LNG terminals, companies have incentives to "cut corners" and federal agencies may be under pressure to "grease the wheels."
The GAO report said more research is needed on the issue, and Havens said the result of new research study might result in more new LNG terminals offshore rather than onshore near population centers.
LNG expert says vapor model used inaccurately
Filed from Houston 11/12/2007 6:53:51 PM GMT
USA: A chemical engineering professor at the University of Arkansas said that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NorthernStar Natural Gas have misused models he devised to calculate how far a vapor cloud would travel if liquefied natural gas (LNG) spilled from the proposed Bradwood LNG facility on the Columbia River in Oregon, the Longview Daily News reported last week.
Havens also said the data FERC used assumes a relatively small spill, which skews proejcts for how far vapor rising off leading LNG could spread.
Havens testified at a FERC hearing in Astoria, Ore. about NorthernStar's plans to bring LNG tankers up the river to Bradwood, Ore. The company would unload two 168-foot (51-m) tall tanks, regasify and send it to market via a new pipeline spanning Clatsop, Columbia and Cowlitz counties.
FERC is considering whether to issue permits for the proposed terminal and pipeline.
Havens said FERC used two models, both authored by him, to set safety zones for vapor clouds at LNG terminals. If a spill occurs, gas vapor must be projected to stay within the terminal's property, or the terminal cannot be approved.
Haven noted that the size of the projected spill in NorthernStar's data is smaller than spills project in other terminal applications, which suggests the company is cherrypicking data to get the facility approved. NorthernStar said its LNG tanks will be double-lined and that the risk of a spill is minimal.
NorthernStar spokesman Joe Desmond called Havens a "professional opponent" and said the professor has given similar testimony on the applications of 14 different LNG terminals. In each case, Desmond said, Havens' arguments were rebuffed.
Environmental group Columbia Riverkeeper paid Havens' expenses to travel to Astoria, but Havens said he is not employed by the environmental group.
While LNG spills are "highly unlikely," if an LNG fire engulfed the LNG tanker itself, there's a chance the fire could break open other containments on the ship and cause "cascading failures" in which case more LNG would be released, and "the whole thing would burn," The Daily Astorian quoted Havens as saying, citing a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Havens made the statement while addressing Astoria city and county leaders at the Astoria City Hall on Nov. 8.
Havens, who has studied LNG for over 30 years, said with the "feeding frenzy" to get approvals for LNG terminals, companies have incentives to "cut corners" and federal agencies may be under pressure to "grease the wheels."
The GAO report said more research is needed on the issue, and Havens said the result of new research study might result in more new LNG terminals offshore rather than onshore near population centers.
Friday, November 09, 2007
LNG Speculators: We Got A Little Spat Going On Between Northern Star And Their Ilk?
Malibu Surfside NewsStory Home Page
LNG Firm Wants Coast Guard Concerns Applied to Competitor
• NorthernStar Move Could Be Sign that Offshore Development Options in Southern California Are Dwindling
BY HANS LAETZ
In what may be a case of “corporate tit-for-tat,” the company asking to build one offshore liquefied natural gas terminal near Ventura has demanded that another, competing LNG terminal closer to the Malibu coast address a long list of environmental concerns—concerns originally proposed by the government for the first plant.
Officials for the Woodside Natural Gas LNG terminal, proposed for 21 miles off Malibu’s Point Dume, said they “find it odd” that their competitor filed the letter in the official comment file for Woodside’s proposed OceanWay gas terminal.
The Ventura applicant, NorthernStar Energy, was hit with a list of 396 environmental questions by the U.S. Coast Guard last month, ranging from how LNG tankers will avoid killing whales to whether the Clearwater Port project is needed in the first place.
That list, first revealed in the Malibu Surfside News last week, could delay the NorthernStar terminal for many months, officials said, as they strive to conduct research and compile answers to the 396 items.
Now, NorthernStar has taken the same government list and demands that its competitor meet the same 396 standards.
“It’s just a matter of basic fairness, just to ensure parity,” said NorthernStar vice president Joe Desmond. “We are concerned that different regulatory agencies may apply different criteria to two projects that are very similar.”
Although the Coast Guard is handling both projects, its local partner in Ventura is the California State Lands Commission, which has already addressed LNG issues in its rejection of the BHP Billiton LNG terminal in Malibu. The local partner for the Woodside request off Malibu, is the City of Los Angeles—which has no LNG experience.
Woodside vice president Laura Doll said her company expected some questions to be raised about its proposal, but “we just really didn’t expect it to come from an LNG company.”
Doll said the Woodside’s OceanWay proposal was designed over several years to answer the questions posed in the NorthernStar letter. “We honestly haven’t seen anything filed in the comments yet that would make us think we left something out,” she said.
The Woodside plant in Santa Monica Bay is somewhat different from NorthernStar’s oil rig repurposing project, as Woodside would employ two regasification ships that would alternate cruising out beyond the Channel Islands to accept transfers of LNG cargoes on the high seas from trans-pacific carriers.
At any given time, one of the two carriers would be anchored halfway between Point Dume and Catalina Island, unloading its cargo.
The other ship would be in the designated transfer areas, and the U.S. Navy has voiced opposition that the transfer process would interfere with naval exercises, including live firing of missiles in the Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Range. Several retired admirals have publicly opposed the concept.
Last week, the Navy formally dropped its objections and said it could live with LNG carriers in its missile test range so long as Woodside acknowledged that the Navy has first dibs on the waters, and that the company would schedule its ship movements around Navy exercises.
In other news, last week the Santa Monica City Council formally went on record opposing the Woodside proposal. City council members said the placement of two two-foot-diameter gas pipelines in Santa Monica Bay would be detrimental to marine life.
Los Angeles City Councilmember Bill Rosendahl also came out swinging against the LNG terminal in Santa Monica Bay. He said the terminal and its gas pipeline across Los Angeles International Airport would make LAX a vulnerable terrorism target, and the LNG regasification ships would be targets like the U.S.S. Cole.
Rosendahl also said the project would adversely affect LAX runway relocations, would make extension of the Green Line difficult, and would disrupt environmentally sensitive sand dunes at Dockweiler Beach.
Rosendahl is chair of the LA Airports board, and chair of the L.A. council’s public works committee, both of which have veto over the proposal. The natural gas pipelines would cross his district as they come ashore at LAX and head east.
And the Los Angeles Unified School District said it wants Woodside to explain what safety precautions would be taken at 21 locations where proposed high-pressure, 24-inch gas pipelines would pass within 1500 feet of public schools in Westchester, Watts, South Gate and Cudahy.
Environmental laws provide special protections to low income areas in the interest of economic justice, and community organizers on L.A.’s south side have yet to be heard on this issue.
Impetus to build LNG terminals in the coastal waters of California may be affected by two proposals to build new natural gas pipelines into the west from new gas fields in Utah and Wyoming.
Both the Kern River and Spectra gas pipeline companies filed legal notice last week that they plan to add California-bound gas capacity if customers can be found.
If both of these pipelines are built, their capacity would approximately equal the LNG capacity proposed by the Woodside and NorthernStar projects combined.
And finally, a San Diego company that will start up its new LNG import terminal at Ensenada, Mexico announced Thursday it will build a $150 million addition to treat its LNG imports to remove the “hot gas” threat. Sempra officials said they would treat LNG cargoes with nitrogen to lower their burning temperature, thus dramatically decreasing the amount of air pollution that will be caused by burning the natural gas.
Although California regulators have approved the socalled hot gas for use here, smog agencies have filed suits to overturn that because of the large amounts of smog that would be generated.
Neither of the two offshore LNG terminals have plans to limit or treat imports to bring them in line with lower-burning standards.
LNG Firm Wants Coast Guard Concerns Applied to Competitor
• NorthernStar Move Could Be Sign that Offshore Development Options in Southern California Are Dwindling
BY HANS LAETZ
In what may be a case of “corporate tit-for-tat,” the company asking to build one offshore liquefied natural gas terminal near Ventura has demanded that another, competing LNG terminal closer to the Malibu coast address a long list of environmental concerns—concerns originally proposed by the government for the first plant.
Officials for the Woodside Natural Gas LNG terminal, proposed for 21 miles off Malibu’s Point Dume, said they “find it odd” that their competitor filed the letter in the official comment file for Woodside’s proposed OceanWay gas terminal.
The Ventura applicant, NorthernStar Energy, was hit with a list of 396 environmental questions by the U.S. Coast Guard last month, ranging from how LNG tankers will avoid killing whales to whether the Clearwater Port project is needed in the first place.
That list, first revealed in the Malibu Surfside News last week, could delay the NorthernStar terminal for many months, officials said, as they strive to conduct research and compile answers to the 396 items.
Now, NorthernStar has taken the same government list and demands that its competitor meet the same 396 standards.
“It’s just a matter of basic fairness, just to ensure parity,” said NorthernStar vice president Joe Desmond. “We are concerned that different regulatory agencies may apply different criteria to two projects that are very similar.”
Although the Coast Guard is handling both projects, its local partner in Ventura is the California State Lands Commission, which has already addressed LNG issues in its rejection of the BHP Billiton LNG terminal in Malibu. The local partner for the Woodside request off Malibu, is the City of Los Angeles—which has no LNG experience.
Woodside vice president Laura Doll said her company expected some questions to be raised about its proposal, but “we just really didn’t expect it to come from an LNG company.”
Doll said the Woodside’s OceanWay proposal was designed over several years to answer the questions posed in the NorthernStar letter. “We honestly haven’t seen anything filed in the comments yet that would make us think we left something out,” she said.
The Woodside plant in Santa Monica Bay is somewhat different from NorthernStar’s oil rig repurposing project, as Woodside would employ two regasification ships that would alternate cruising out beyond the Channel Islands to accept transfers of LNG cargoes on the high seas from trans-pacific carriers.
At any given time, one of the two carriers would be anchored halfway between Point Dume and Catalina Island, unloading its cargo.
The other ship would be in the designated transfer areas, and the U.S. Navy has voiced opposition that the transfer process would interfere with naval exercises, including live firing of missiles in the Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Range. Several retired admirals have publicly opposed the concept.
Last week, the Navy formally dropped its objections and said it could live with LNG carriers in its missile test range so long as Woodside acknowledged that the Navy has first dibs on the waters, and that the company would schedule its ship movements around Navy exercises.
In other news, last week the Santa Monica City Council formally went on record opposing the Woodside proposal. City council members said the placement of two two-foot-diameter gas pipelines in Santa Monica Bay would be detrimental to marine life.
Los Angeles City Councilmember Bill Rosendahl also came out swinging against the LNG terminal in Santa Monica Bay. He said the terminal and its gas pipeline across Los Angeles International Airport would make LAX a vulnerable terrorism target, and the LNG regasification ships would be targets like the U.S.S. Cole.
Rosendahl also said the project would adversely affect LAX runway relocations, would make extension of the Green Line difficult, and would disrupt environmentally sensitive sand dunes at Dockweiler Beach.
Rosendahl is chair of the LA Airports board, and chair of the L.A. council’s public works committee, both of which have veto over the proposal. The natural gas pipelines would cross his district as they come ashore at LAX and head east.
And the Los Angeles Unified School District said it wants Woodside to explain what safety precautions would be taken at 21 locations where proposed high-pressure, 24-inch gas pipelines would pass within 1500 feet of public schools in Westchester, Watts, South Gate and Cudahy.
Environmental laws provide special protections to low income areas in the interest of economic justice, and community organizers on L.A.’s south side have yet to be heard on this issue.
Impetus to build LNG terminals in the coastal waters of California may be affected by two proposals to build new natural gas pipelines into the west from new gas fields in Utah and Wyoming.
Both the Kern River and Spectra gas pipeline companies filed legal notice last week that they plan to add California-bound gas capacity if customers can be found.
If both of these pipelines are built, their capacity would approximately equal the LNG capacity proposed by the Woodside and NorthernStar projects combined.
And finally, a San Diego company that will start up its new LNG import terminal at Ensenada, Mexico announced Thursday it will build a $150 million addition to treat its LNG imports to remove the “hot gas” threat. Sempra officials said they would treat LNG cargoes with nitrogen to lower their burning temperature, thus dramatically decreasing the amount of air pollution that will be caused by burning the natural gas.
Although California regulators have approved the socalled hot gas for use here, smog agencies have filed suits to overturn that because of the large amounts of smog that would be generated.
Neither of the two offshore LNG terminals have plans to limit or treat imports to bring them in line with lower-burning standards.
Thursday, November 08, 2007
LNG: "Sell It To Us, Lease It To Us Or Lose It To Us!"
Government Abetting Private Property Takings To The Benefit Of Private Industry?
"Sell it to us, lease it to us or lose it to us"
That was the choice Roger Thompson was faced with regarding his family's 132 year ownership of their property in Clatskanie and which just happend to be in the path of Spiro Vassilopoulos's(sp?) proposed "Port Westward LNG Transfer/Storage facility and ironically, in full support and abetted by "The Port of St. Helens".
Fate, Kharma, Destiny intervened in favor of the Thompsn's on that when PWLNG could not muster investors.
Now, with Oregon LNG and its V.P., former employee of now defunct and broke Calpine Energy Group and ex-Enron Clone, Peter Hansen at the helm a bunch of property owners could quite possibly be besieged with likely the same choices and arm twisting, once again abetted by Government as well to the benefit of this one "Private Corporation" bent on selling Natural Gas to California?
Hell! and this is on record, California's Lt. Governor, in a recent speech and I'm paraphrasing, said "California doesn't need to worry about extensive LNG development and speculation because we will get all the, LNG derived, Natural Gas we need from Oregon".
So now, all you property owners in the path of this, in my view, insurrection should be prepared for a, what is it 30" - 36" diammeter pipe, loaded with flowing Natural Gas through your property, whether you want it to or not then be prepared to lose a 125' - 150' wide right of way swathe across your property. Can you live with that?
How long you think it will take to get a good night's sleep?
For us on the coast down here, we'll just be living with the fact that in each one of these LNG Storage Tanks there's 7.6 Million Cubic Feet of boiling Liquefied Natural Gas at -260 degrees just waiting for an opportunity to escape, vaporize and blow a mile, mile and a half in any direction of us off the face of the earth while leaving many more brutally scarred and in terrible misery for the rest of their lives, should they survive but hey! that's just "Fear Mongering" on my part.
Who could have ever believed that someone could actually cammandeer a couple of passenger aircraft and fly them into "The World Trade Center Buildings" and cause them to collapse?
Who could have actually believed that someone could actually maneuver a passenger aircraft through all the security of the mightiest military in the world, to some, and crash it into the base of all that power, "The Pentagon"?
Can you imagine how ludicrous that concept would have registered?
"Sell it to us, lease it to us or lose it to us"
That was the choice Roger Thompson was faced with regarding his family's 132 year ownership of their property in Clatskanie and which just happend to be in the path of Spiro Vassilopoulos's(sp?) proposed "Port Westward LNG Transfer/Storage facility and ironically, in full support and abetted by "The Port of St. Helens".
Fate, Kharma, Destiny intervened in favor of the Thompsn's on that when PWLNG could not muster investors.
Now, with Oregon LNG and its V.P., former employee of now defunct and broke Calpine Energy Group and ex-Enron Clone, Peter Hansen at the helm a bunch of property owners could quite possibly be besieged with likely the same choices and arm twisting, once again abetted by Government as well to the benefit of this one "Private Corporation" bent on selling Natural Gas to California?
Hell! and this is on record, California's Lt. Governor, in a recent speech and I'm paraphrasing, said "California doesn't need to worry about extensive LNG development and speculation because we will get all the, LNG derived, Natural Gas we need from Oregon".
So now, all you property owners in the path of this, in my view, insurrection should be prepared for a, what is it 30" - 36" diammeter pipe, loaded with flowing Natural Gas through your property, whether you want it to or not then be prepared to lose a 125' - 150' wide right of way swathe across your property. Can you live with that?
How long you think it will take to get a good night's sleep?
For us on the coast down here, we'll just be living with the fact that in each one of these LNG Storage Tanks there's 7.6 Million Cubic Feet of boiling Liquefied Natural Gas at -260 degrees just waiting for an opportunity to escape, vaporize and blow a mile, mile and a half in any direction of us off the face of the earth while leaving many more brutally scarred and in terrible misery for the rest of their lives, should they survive but hey! that's just "Fear Mongering" on my part.
Who could have ever believed that someone could actually cammandeer a couple of passenger aircraft and fly them into "The World Trade Center Buildings" and cause them to collapse?
Who could have actually believed that someone could actually maneuver a passenger aircraft through all the security of the mightiest military in the world, to some, and crash it into the base of all that power, "The Pentagon"?
Can you imagine how ludicrous that concept would have registered?
Tuesday, November 06, 2007
LNG: Those Tankers And Bad Siting Are Really A Problem
Fall River / Somerset LNGWhy Take The Risk?
An official from Weaver’s Cove recently told the Fall River City Council that the opponents of siting an LNG facility in a heavily populated area lack the facts concerning LNG. This was far from the truth. The members of the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities have been researching the issue for many months and have discovered that scientific experts, fire officials, public officials have not only spoken against the siting of LNG facilities in populated areas but they have scientific information to back up their opinion.
Professor James Fay of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology created a report on the possible hazards from LNG. In regards to what could happen along the Fall River / Somerset waterfront he said, “A tanker spill fire at any location along this route would have serious consequences for persons and property on the shore adjacent to the stricken vessel.” Moreover Professor Fay stated that, “The magnitude of the resulting liquid cargo pool fires are unprecedented in scale. There is no possibility of ameliorating the fire’s effects, much less extinguishing it, during the short time (several minutes) of burnout.
”Professor Jerry Havens of the University of Arkansas who said, “In my judgment, a large pool fire – on water, and therefore uncontained – is of the highest concern.” “Most predictions suggest that even the largest LNG tankers (typically more than 900 feet in length) might be completely enveloped in a pool fire following a complete spill of a single 6.5 million gallon tank. This raises questions about the vulnerability of the ship and the potential for additional releases. A typical LNG tanker contains as many as five tanks with a combined capacity of 33 million gallons.” In addition Professor Havens has said that safety zones based on the limited, 10-minute spill could not protect the public from the kind of fire that would result from an LNG tanker accident. He also said that the “Hazard Exclusion Zones” might need to extend a mile or more from the LNG terminal.
William Lehr, author of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report due out shortly said, “The maximum emissive power of an LNG pool fire is several times more than we would expect from a regular oil fire. A common danger level for thermal radiation flux in an area of public assembly is 5 kilowatts per square meter. A person exposed to this level would feel considerable pain in a few seconds. A very large unconfined LNG pool fire could possibly produce thermal radiation effects at this level or above for more than a kilometer away from the center of the fire.”When we worry that a mishap or an attack on the LNG tanker could take place we are told that the Coast Guard will handle security.
Here is what Rear Admiral Kevin Eldridge, commander of the U.S. Coast Guard’s 11th District off California had to say when he was asked about the possibility of an attack on U.S. shores. He said, “It’s likely enough for us to put a lot of effort into planning for it. Frankly, if we have a vessel in our port that has a problem, it’s too late.
”William Pope, U.S. State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism said recently, “We have every reason to believe they (terrorists) will also be attracted to one of the softest targets of all, commercial shipping.
”In a recent article from an Australian newspaper, Alexey Muraviev of Curtin University of Technology in Perth, told a maritime security conference that intelligence experts believed ships were far more vulnerable to an al-Qaeda attack than commercial airlines. Targets could include cruise ships, oil supertankers, LNG-carriers and chemical tankers.
In addition Senator Elizabeth Dole had this to say about the U.S. Coast Guard having the responsibility of protecting LNG tankers. She said, “We need to give our Coast Guard more resources right now, not the added responsibility of overseeing tankers bringing dangerous LNG into our ports.”The federal government back in 1979 already knew of the dangers relating to LNG even before there was talk about terrorism.
In 1979 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which acts as the investigative arm of Congress, researched the LNG issue. GAO Director J. Dexter Peach testified before the Senate and said, “We believe remote siting is the primary factor in safety.
”In addition to Mr. Peach speaking before the Senate Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey said recently, “When Congress passed my LNG safety bill back in 1979, it directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) to prescribe standards for the siting of new LNG facilities that were supposed to consider the need to encourage remote siting.”While many have realized that LNG is extremely dangerous the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency in charge of making a decision on the Weaver’s Cove facility, have been touting a report known as the “Quest Study” as evidence that we have little to fear from an LNG spill.
The problem is that the lead scientist on the Quest Study of LNG fires, John Cornwell, said that he did not think the study’s computations were appropriate for many of the things they are being used for.
In addition an article written in the “Mobile Register” said, “Most published scientific studies, including a soon-to-be-released analysis by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, produce estimates of a potential LNG tanker fire that are five to six times larger than the Quest estimate.
”Furthermore the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is headed by Patrick Henry Wood III. Mr. Wood’s agency will be making the decision on whether or not Weaver’s Cove can construct an LNG facility in Fall River.
It is interesting to note the Weaver’s Cove has hired the law firm of Baker & Botts out of Texas to represent them. The Chairman of FERC, Mr. Wood, was employed by Baker & Botts in the past.
Other LNG Sites:There are many other companies looking to place LNG sites throughout the U.S. but they are taking a different approach, unlike Weaver’s Cove.Billiton LNG International, a large energy firm from Australia would like to locate a LNG facility in California. Stephen Billiot, the V.P. had this to say: “We understand California’s concern for its coastline and it communities. Although LNG’s excellent safety record is well documented, we are siting this much needed LNG facility far offshore and away from populated centers to ensure the highest level of protection for the California coast and public safety.
”Cameron Parish La., Cheniere Energy is being supported by the citizens to locate a LNG facility there. The company points out that they have 600 acres for a buffer zone.
Sabine Texas, Golden Pass LNG project being sponsored by Exxon / Mobil. The company is highlighting the fact that they have over 500 acres for a buffer zone.The lack of buffer zones has brought out many communities to be against these dangerous LNG proposals.
Fall River Ma., Mobile Alabama, Harpswell Maine, Vallejo Calif, and other communities in California, the country of Mexico stopped Marathon Oil from building an LNG facility near a city in that country by taking the land over and nationalizing it.
In R.I. a bill has been filed by State Representative Raymond Gallison to ban LNG tankers from using the Sakonnet River or from going under the Mount Hope Bridge.On February 3, 2004, United States Senator John Kerry and others sent a letter to Tom Ridge saying that every time an LNG tanker comes into Boston that the Federal Govt. needs to raise the threat level in Boston to HIGH! Is that what we want in the Fall River area?
September 9, 2003 Congressional Research Service Report“Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack.”Boston Deputy Fire Chief Joseph Fleming presented a report to the Commonwealth. The report contained information from the National Fire Prevention Association handbook: “Contact between water and pooled LNG should be avoided to prevent increased vaporization, unless vapor can be controlled” What will the fire boats that Weaver’s Cove said they would provide do to a LNG fire? According to a fire expert the Weaver’s Cove fire tugs would make the fire even worse!
The Fall River City Council has gone on record 7 to 2 opposing the facility. State Representatives David Sullivan and Mike Rodrigues have gone on record opposing any facility near populated areas.As anyone can plainly see the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities has gathered information from far and wide. We do know the facts. It is foolish to site a dangerous facility in a heavily populated area. Why take the risk?
An official from Weaver’s Cove recently told the Fall River City Council that the opponents of siting an LNG facility in a heavily populated area lack the facts concerning LNG. This was far from the truth. The members of the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities have been researching the issue for many months and have discovered that scientific experts, fire officials, public officials have not only spoken against the siting of LNG facilities in populated areas but they have scientific information to back up their opinion.
Professor James Fay of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology created a report on the possible hazards from LNG. In regards to what could happen along the Fall River / Somerset waterfront he said, “A tanker spill fire at any location along this route would have serious consequences for persons and property on the shore adjacent to the stricken vessel.” Moreover Professor Fay stated that, “The magnitude of the resulting liquid cargo pool fires are unprecedented in scale. There is no possibility of ameliorating the fire’s effects, much less extinguishing it, during the short time (several minutes) of burnout.
”Professor Jerry Havens of the University of Arkansas who said, “In my judgment, a large pool fire – on water, and therefore uncontained – is of the highest concern.” “Most predictions suggest that even the largest LNG tankers (typically more than 900 feet in length) might be completely enveloped in a pool fire following a complete spill of a single 6.5 million gallon tank. This raises questions about the vulnerability of the ship and the potential for additional releases. A typical LNG tanker contains as many as five tanks with a combined capacity of 33 million gallons.” In addition Professor Havens has said that safety zones based on the limited, 10-minute spill could not protect the public from the kind of fire that would result from an LNG tanker accident. He also said that the “Hazard Exclusion Zones” might need to extend a mile or more from the LNG terminal.
William Lehr, author of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report due out shortly said, “The maximum emissive power of an LNG pool fire is several times more than we would expect from a regular oil fire. A common danger level for thermal radiation flux in an area of public assembly is 5 kilowatts per square meter. A person exposed to this level would feel considerable pain in a few seconds. A very large unconfined LNG pool fire could possibly produce thermal radiation effects at this level or above for more than a kilometer away from the center of the fire.”When we worry that a mishap or an attack on the LNG tanker could take place we are told that the Coast Guard will handle security.
Here is what Rear Admiral Kevin Eldridge, commander of the U.S. Coast Guard’s 11th District off California had to say when he was asked about the possibility of an attack on U.S. shores. He said, “It’s likely enough for us to put a lot of effort into planning for it. Frankly, if we have a vessel in our port that has a problem, it’s too late.
”William Pope, U.S. State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism said recently, “We have every reason to believe they (terrorists) will also be attracted to one of the softest targets of all, commercial shipping.
”In a recent article from an Australian newspaper, Alexey Muraviev of Curtin University of Technology in Perth, told a maritime security conference that intelligence experts believed ships were far more vulnerable to an al-Qaeda attack than commercial airlines. Targets could include cruise ships, oil supertankers, LNG-carriers and chemical tankers.
In addition Senator Elizabeth Dole had this to say about the U.S. Coast Guard having the responsibility of protecting LNG tankers. She said, “We need to give our Coast Guard more resources right now, not the added responsibility of overseeing tankers bringing dangerous LNG into our ports.”The federal government back in 1979 already knew of the dangers relating to LNG even before there was talk about terrorism.
In 1979 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which acts as the investigative arm of Congress, researched the LNG issue. GAO Director J. Dexter Peach testified before the Senate and said, “We believe remote siting is the primary factor in safety.
”In addition to Mr. Peach speaking before the Senate Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey said recently, “When Congress passed my LNG safety bill back in 1979, it directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) to prescribe standards for the siting of new LNG facilities that were supposed to consider the need to encourage remote siting.”While many have realized that LNG is extremely dangerous the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency in charge of making a decision on the Weaver’s Cove facility, have been touting a report known as the “Quest Study” as evidence that we have little to fear from an LNG spill.
The problem is that the lead scientist on the Quest Study of LNG fires, John Cornwell, said that he did not think the study’s computations were appropriate for many of the things they are being used for.
In addition an article written in the “Mobile Register” said, “Most published scientific studies, including a soon-to-be-released analysis by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, produce estimates of a potential LNG tanker fire that are five to six times larger than the Quest estimate.
”Furthermore the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is headed by Patrick Henry Wood III. Mr. Wood’s agency will be making the decision on whether or not Weaver’s Cove can construct an LNG facility in Fall River.
It is interesting to note the Weaver’s Cove has hired the law firm of Baker & Botts out of Texas to represent them. The Chairman of FERC, Mr. Wood, was employed by Baker & Botts in the past.
Other LNG Sites:There are many other companies looking to place LNG sites throughout the U.S. but they are taking a different approach, unlike Weaver’s Cove.Billiton LNG International, a large energy firm from Australia would like to locate a LNG facility in California. Stephen Billiot, the V.P. had this to say: “We understand California’s concern for its coastline and it communities. Although LNG’s excellent safety record is well documented, we are siting this much needed LNG facility far offshore and away from populated centers to ensure the highest level of protection for the California coast and public safety.
”Cameron Parish La., Cheniere Energy is being supported by the citizens to locate a LNG facility there. The company points out that they have 600 acres for a buffer zone.
Sabine Texas, Golden Pass LNG project being sponsored by Exxon / Mobil. The company is highlighting the fact that they have over 500 acres for a buffer zone.The lack of buffer zones has brought out many communities to be against these dangerous LNG proposals.
Fall River Ma., Mobile Alabama, Harpswell Maine, Vallejo Calif, and other communities in California, the country of Mexico stopped Marathon Oil from building an LNG facility near a city in that country by taking the land over and nationalizing it.
In R.I. a bill has been filed by State Representative Raymond Gallison to ban LNG tankers from using the Sakonnet River or from going under the Mount Hope Bridge.On February 3, 2004, United States Senator John Kerry and others sent a letter to Tom Ridge saying that every time an LNG tanker comes into Boston that the Federal Govt. needs to raise the threat level in Boston to HIGH! Is that what we want in the Fall River area?
September 9, 2003 Congressional Research Service Report“Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack.”Boston Deputy Fire Chief Joseph Fleming presented a report to the Commonwealth. The report contained information from the National Fire Prevention Association handbook: “Contact between water and pooled LNG should be avoided to prevent increased vaporization, unless vapor can be controlled” What will the fire boats that Weaver’s Cove said they would provide do to a LNG fire? According to a fire expert the Weaver’s Cove fire tugs would make the fire even worse!
The Fall River City Council has gone on record 7 to 2 opposing the facility. State Representatives David Sullivan and Mike Rodrigues have gone on record opposing any facility near populated areas.As anyone can plainly see the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities has gathered information from far and wide. We do know the facts. It is foolish to site a dangerous facility in a heavily populated area. Why take the risk?
Monday, November 05, 2007
Bradwood: Way Too Many Unanswered Questions...Read This Thing!!!
PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT1.0IntroductionPBS&J has been contracted by Clatsop County, Oregon, to conduct a public safety assessment for the proposed Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas LNG project. The major component of the public safety assessment was to analyze and evaluate the Water Safety Report (WSR) (See Appendix A)and the draft Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The WSR deals with matters related to the transport ofLNG on the Columbia River. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2.2National Incident Management System Compliance The procedures documented in NIMS must be incorporated into all Emergency Operations Plans(EOPs). NIMS was created so first responders from various jurisdictions and disciplines can work together in a variety of emergency response scenarios. NIMS concepts and procedures establish a unified approach to incident management; standard command and management structures; andemphasize preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. To establish compliance withNIMS procedures, all levels of government, private sector organizations, and nongovernmentalagencies must be prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide spectrum of major events that exceed the capabilities of any single entity. These hazard responses require a unified and coordinated national approach to planning and domestic incident management. To address this need, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of DomesticIncidents (HSPD-5) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) establish the following national initiatives that serve to establish a common approachto preparedness and response. a) HSPD-5 identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. It requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to establish a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System. b) HSPD-8 describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare forincidents. It requires DHS to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to develop a National Preparedness Goal. 3.0Methodology After completing scope items 1–2, the draft Emergency Response Plan for the Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas LNG Facility (February 2007), was reviewed to identify “gaps” betweenthe requirements for a FERC- and NIMS-compliant ERP and the draft ERP. This effort is referred to as a “gap analysis.” Specifically, PBS&J staff with expertise in emergency management, emergency response,emergency planning, disaster recovery, public safety, hazardous materials, navigation, security, and geological hazards conducted the gap analysis. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT2
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTThe following tasks were conducted: 1. Met with Clatsop County Manager Scott Derickson to review the terms and objectives of this project. 2. Developed an understanding of and fluency with relevant regulatory and agency guidance andadopted standards, including (but not limited to): Title 33 CFR 127, Title 49 CFR 193, NVIC 05-05, NVIC 09-02, NVIC 11-02, and National Fire Protection Association Standard 59a, FERC Draft Guidance for Emergency Response Plans (Revision 4, September 2006) and the ClatsopCounty Emergency Management Plan. 3. Analyzed and evaluated the FERC project description and WSA/WSR and the draft ERP. 4. Visited the proposed LNG site and populated areas along the Columbia River navigation channel between the Columbia River Bar and the site, and interviewed key Clatsop County staff (including first responders), as well as Bradwood Landing, LLC staff, and consultants to answer questions about the scope of the project. 5. Evaluated and confirmed that existing assets and personnel related to or having responsibility forthe LNG project security, safety, and navigation (plus the incremental assets mandated by WSR)are or are not sufficient to provide adequate mitigation and response capabilities related to the risk probability introduced by the LNG operation. 6. Determined whether additional safety and security resources or measures would be required inaddition to those defined by the Coast Guard in the WSR, identified these resources and measures, and provided rationale for such additional requirements. 7. Provided a written report to Clatsop County regarding the above issues (by July 31, 2007), and agreed to participate in a follow-up conference to discuss the results of the report. A gap analysis of the draft ERP has been conducted to determine whether the draft ERP met FERC requirements and was NIMS-compliant. Additionally, the analysis was performed to determine whetherthe draft ERP is operationally feasible based upon response guidance, response plans, and response principles developed by the National Fire Protection Association(NFPA), Environmental Protection PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT3
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAgency, (EPA), etc., as well as professional emergency management judgment and experience. The PBS&J emergency management planners have more than 73 combined years of experience in emergencyplanning, preparedness, response, and recovery. Gaps were expected, because the ERP is a draft. The gap analysis was consolidated and discussed with the Clatsop County Community Development Director, County Manager, county first responders and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff. PBS&J personnel met with local, county, State, and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff on July 9 and July 11, 2007, in Clatsop County (See Appendix B: Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees). In addition, data collection for the draft ERP review was received during several meetings (See Appendix C: ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees). Several meetings took place during the review process. A site visit to the proposed Terminal was hosted by Bradwood Landing LLC and included a question-and-answer session. Clatsop County hosted a group meeting with a cross section of local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, the Oregon Department of Energy, and the WahkiakumCounty Sheriff’s office. Following the group meeting, PBS&J conducted additional individual meetings with local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, and the Wahkiakum County Sheriff’s office. Lastly, PBS&J attended a County Emergency Managers meeting held in Seaside, Oregon, and conducted a group interview session. 4.0Gap Analysis The findings of the gap analysis are presented from two perspectives—a county perspective and an ERP-execution perspective, as follows: 4.1Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Local Counties a) Not all county and local agencies that might provide support or respond to an event onsite are listed on the draft ERP Distribution List. As a significant component of the LNG certification process, an ERP is under Sensitive Security Information (SSI)rules until the ERP is published. The following organizations are not included in thedraft Distribution List: 1. Columbia Memorial Hospital (Astoria, Ore.) PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT4
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2. Seaside Providence Hospital (Seaside, Ore.) 3. St. John Medical Center (Longview, Wash.) 4. Medix Ambulance Service (Astoria, Ore.) 5. Clakestine Rural Fire Department (Clakestine, Ore.) b) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are directly downwind (east ofthe Terminal). According to the Oregon Climate Service, the downwind determination is based on the westerly prevailing wind patterns throughout the year. The downwind counties could be within the potential plume, should a release occur.(A plume is a visible or measurable discharge of a contaminant from a given point oforigin. A plume is visible in the air, such as a plume of smoke.) The area downwind is that area that could be dangerous for those exposed to leaking fumes. However,Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are not listed in the draft ERP. c) Currently, the draft ERP has no interoperable communications plan and the draft ERP does not provide for redundant communications to report an onsite incident, emergency, or disaster. The only method of communicating an emergency is via the landline, by calling 911. There is currently no cell phone coverage available at the proposed LNG Terminal site. d) The draft ERP does not provide for alternate methods of evacuation for employees, and visitors. Currently, the draft ERP utilizes vehicles to evacuate personnel heading north on Clifton Road, before proceeding east or west on Highway 30. Tugboatscould be used, but only when they are available. e) The draft ERP does not clearly specify what sequence of siren blasts identifies apossible danger, as opposed to an actual incident, emergency, or disaster. f) The draft ERP does not provide a means of onsite sheltering in place for employeesand visitors who are not able to evacuate if an emergency develops at the Terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT5
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTg) The Emergency training, drills, and exercises contained in Annex F of the draft ERP does not include joint training with local responders. h) The planned exercises are not planned for multi-agency response in concert with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. Currently, the planned exercises are only for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. 4.2Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Execution of the Plan a) The draft ERP is in the National Response Plan (NRP). This format is widely used atthe Federal level to respond to disasters involving the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and is not used the local county level. Local first responders are used following the Clatsop County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) format. The current version of the ERP is difficult to read and understand. b) The three zones of potential hazard do not coincide with the USDOT Emergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). c) The exposure amounts of LNG (as shown in Section 4.7.4 of the draft ERP) are different from those used by first responders. The draft ERP does not explain themethodology used to calculate the exposure limits (e.g., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®)). d) There should be one Incident Command System (ICS) organizational chart in the ERP, as opposed to multiple organization charts. e) The draft ERP should contain ICS terms, but not terms specific to Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT6
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTf) The annexes should provide more detail or specificity for particular sections notfound in the draft ERP. The annexes should not be the basis for the ERP. g) The ERP should demonstrate a clear understanding of the emergency response cycle. As an ERP, it should cover preparedness as it relates to the response portion of the plan, but not necessarily discuss recovery and mitigation efforts. h) All emergency responses should tie back to the basic response conditions: incident, emergency, and disaster (per Section 4.7.3 of the draft ERP). i) Triggers need to be developed that clearly delineate what will cause the ERP to be activated. j) The draft ERP is not NIMS-compliant. k) The draft ERP does not mention having an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) with an ambulance onsite. l) The draft ERP does not mention having a Trauma Tent/Building onsite. m) The draft ERP does not mention having fire suppression equipment onsite. n) The draft ERP does not mention having a helispot (helipad) identified for life-flight operations. o) The ERP does not define roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions for fire responsethroughout the entire vessel berthing and LNG off-loading process at the Terminal. 5.0Preliminary Recommendations In reviewing the ERP, PBS&J determined that the Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas draft ERP fulfills some of the requirements from the FERC ERP guidance. However, the current draftERP would be difficult to read or execute because it is confusing and not concise. Information in the draft ERP is redundant (i.e., located in multiple sections and annexes). Information about the three non-PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT7
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTresponse phases of emergency management (i.e., preparedness, mitigation, and recovery) are included in the draft ERP, but this extra information makes it difficult to find the response procedures quickly. The following preliminary recommendations by PBS&J are provided to improve emergency response operations: 5.1Recommendations to Improve ERP Execution a) The ERP should be written in a format that is used and understood by local first responders. The plan should be consistent and follow a logical response format. PBS&J recommends that the ERP be reformatted to place all like information into one section. The following is a recommended ERP format: 1. The table of contents should be located at the beginning of the ERP. Currently, it is located on page 28 (xxviii). 2. Chapter 1 should outline the purpose, scope, authorities, and references for the implementation, development methodology, and planning assumptions of the ERP. 3. Chapter 2 should identify the hazards (i.e., triggers) that may require ERP implementation, site description, organization, and critical emergencypreparedness and response procedures. 4. Chapter 3 should discuss the concept of operations for an ERP event, preparedness actions, general responsibilities, and evacuation measures. 5. Chapter 4 should explain (in detail) the communication plan, notificationprocedures, and interoperable communications. 6. Chapter 5 should cover the ERP training and exercise plan, which includes drills, functional exercises, tabletop exercises, and full-scale exercises. 7. Chapter 6 should provide ERP maintenance procedures. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT8
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTb) Make the ERP NIMS-compliant by following the proposed chapter outline andcontent discussed above. c) The ERP should have one standard organization chart that is NIMS- and ICS-compliant for use throughout the plan. The organization chart should have titles, names and phone numbers, and be updated as those names and contact data change. d) The Concept of Operations section should have a Notification flowchart. e) Standard NIMS and ICS terms should be incorporated into the plan. f) Ideally, the ERP should be 40 to 50 pages long, and should not exceed 100 pages.This proposed length will enhance the ability of Terminal staff and emergencyresponders to quickly and easily find information and implement the plan during anemergency. g) The ERP should reference or explain in greater detail how hazard zones weredeveloped and provide a crosswalk that explains the differences from USDOTEmergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). h) The ERP should explain in detail the derivation of the different exposure limits (i.e., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health(NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference ofGovernmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®),etc.) and how they are used to determine the different zones. i) Re-evaluate the need for all of the annexes. If annexes are needed, then they should provide additional information not found in the base ERP. Annexes should be nomore than 1 to 2 pages long and describe in detail the concept of operations for thatannex. Annexes should have checklists. The ERP includes the base plan, annexes, PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT9
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTand appendices. If annexes are needed, they should provide additional informationthat is not included in the body of the document. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas must: (1) identify all categories of events reasonably likely to occur; (2) classify each potential event as “incident,” “emergency,” or “disaster;” (3) describe what measures will be taken by Bradwood Landing to deal with them; and (4) describe what actions would be required of other emergency services. k) The ERP should discuss the triggers identified in the Clatsop County CEMP and identify other site-specific triggers. l) The ERP should plan for the worst events, even if the probability of their occurrence seems low. Clatsop County residents need to be assured that appropriate measurescan and will be taken to deal with catastrophic events (such as a major explosion) ifthere is credible evidence that such an event could occur. m) The signature page of the ERP should include the Clatsop County Administrator,Clatsop County Emergency Manager, Clatsop County Sheriff, Astoria Police Chief, Astoria Fire Chief, Knappa Fire Chief, County EMS, and all others who will support the ERP. n) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties need to be added to the ERP in all places where Clatsop County is listed. o) The ERP should list alternative communication procedures, (e.g, satellite phones,800-MHz or VHF radios with repeaters) that can reach first responders. p) The ERP should have an alternate evacuation plan for employees and visitors. Thealternate evacuation method should consider evacuation of people upwind, via the Columbia River. q) The ERP should have a system of siren blasts with voice announcements that clearlylet anyone onsite know whether there is a potential problem or an actual emergency.PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT10
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTIf there is an actual emergency, the warning system should indicate whether an employee or visitor should evacuate or shelter in-place. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar should contact chemical plants and other industrial plants that may have the same type of hazards, in order to review their warning systems.. r) The functional (or full-scale) exercises should be evaluated by a third party observer that is not Clatsop County, Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas, or the developer of the ERP. The third-party observer will ensure the exercises meet the stated objectives, and will develop corrective actions if it is found that the objectives have not been met. The corrective actions developed by the third-party observer should detail outstanding issues, deficiencies and/or gaps, then conduct briefings about these for local officials from the affected counties and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. s) A third party should conduct a review of the ERP annually to ensure all corrective actions have been captured in the ERP. 5.2Recommendations for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to Provide Financial and Equipment Support for Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia,Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties (Cost Share: Bradwood 100 percent and Counties 0percent) a) Due to the long response times for first responders, Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should hire a full time EMT with an ambulance and have it stationed onsite. This will be accomplished by having a full-time staff member that is cross-trained and certified as an EMT. Bradwood should also have a medical/trauma clinic onsite with a registered nurse (RN) or physician’s assistant(PA) to treat minor injuries and care for an injured employee until they can be safely transported to appropriate medical facilities. The EMT and RN or PA must meet allcertification and licensing requirements of the State of Oregon. b) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct two helispot(helipad) (one at the terminal and one at the intersection of Highway 30 and Clifton PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT11
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTRoad) to accommodate life-flight helicopters for transport of seriously injured peopleto trauma centers. c) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should have two to four trained firefighters onsite to operate fire equipment (brush truck and a dry chemical trailer) and respond to fires or other emergencies (e.g., confined space, HazMat, etc.). This will be accomplished by having full-time staff members that are cross-trained and certified as firefighters. The firefighters must meet all meet all certification and licensing requirements of the NFPA and the State of Oregon. d) The Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should install a Reverse 911 system in Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties to communicate an emergency onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should be a designated user of the Reverse 911 system. In addition, Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties should work with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to develop a site-specific call-down list for site emergencies. e) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase and maintain a mobile command center that includes the following components and requirements: 1. Satellite phones; 2. Eight to ten 800-MHz multi-channel radios or VHF radios for first responders to use onsite during an event;3. A base station (VHF or 800-MHz radios) with repeaters to communicate withthe handheld radios referenced in Point 2 (above); and,4. The mobile command vehicle should be stationed onsite, remainoperationally ready, and should be used to run the incident. f) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase an all-weather boat capable of holding 7 to 14 people. This boat is in addition to the three tugs PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT12
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTrequired for operations. The boat should be permanently stored onsite. The tugs are only onsite when they are bringing an LNG vessel to the Terminal.g) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct a reverse-pressurized, self-contained (separate power, communication lines and Heating Ventilation and Cooling (HVAC)) facility that is upwind of the prevailing winds. The facility should be used to allow employees or visitors to shelter in-place if a gas release occurs onsite. h) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide joint emergencytraining for local first responders and Bradwood Landing, LLC staff on ERP implementation, LNG hazards and protocols. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should also provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the training session. Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties and the surrounding fire districts have limited budgets to meet the current required training. As such, they will not have sufficient funds to pay for any additional training that is required by the Terminal. i) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop multi-agencytabletop exercise(s) to flush out issues that could occur when responding to anincident, emergency, or disaster onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the tabletop exercise. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop and conduct anannual functional exercise with all of the first responders. The objective of the exercise would be to test and validate all of the response procedures for an emergency onsite and to provide continuity for changes in staff and the communication of new standards, technology, and procedures. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the functional exercise. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT13
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTk) The resource list previously provided by Clatsop County emergency responders (titled, “Discussion of Resources of Existing LNG Receiving Facilities as Relates to Clatsop County Joint Report of November 2006”) should be cross-referenced with PBS&J’s recommendations in this report to avoid duplication of services and equipment. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT14
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix A – Water Safety Report On February 28, 2007, the USCG completed a review of the WSA for Bradwood Landing LNG Terminal project submitted by NorthernStar Natural Gas, LLC, in May of 2006. The following items are a list of specific mitigation measures that must be put into place to responsibly manage the safety and security risks of this project. Navigational Measures: Safety/Security Zone • A moving safety/security zone of 500 yards around the vessel, but ending at the shoreline. No vessel may enter the zone without USCG permission. • Escort resources will be used to contact and control vessel movements in order that the LNG Carrier is protected. • A moored LNG vessel at the facility shall have a 200-yard security zone around the vessel. • A 50-yard security zone around the LNG facility shall be observed when there is not a vessel at the dock. Escort resources (three 60-ton pull tugs) are addressed on page 10 of the ERP. The ERP does not specifically address the security and safety zones. The Declaration of Security is mentioned on page 6E. A moored vessel will be located approximately 350 yards from the west of the Columbia River Channel. I see no issues for the County. Bradwood Landing would provide and operate the tug boats. Vessel Traffic Management • A Transit Management Plan will be developed in coordination with the River Pilots, Bar Pilots, Escort Tug Operators, Security Assets and the USCG, prior to the first transit. • A Vessel Transit Management Plan must be approved by the COTP at least 30 days prior to the first arrival. The issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County would likely need to attend the meetings. Vessel Traffic Information System/Vessel Traffic System • The current Vessel Traffic Information System on the Columbia River is limited to AIS receivers and a handful of cameras. In order to ensure vessel safety and security, this capability will need to be augmented with a robust camera system capable of monitoring the entire transit route. Due to weather concerns, these cameras must be equipped with PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT15
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTdetectors capable of monitoring vessel traffic in wind, rain, and fog conditions common on the river. In addition, this capability may need to be augmented in the future with additional command and control capability and the establishment of a full Columbia River VTS. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The issue of who would pay for and operate it has not been addressed. This could be an issue for the County or the State. Tug Escorts and Docking Assist • Each LNG Carrier must be escorted by two tugs; at least one of which must be a tractor tug, which join the vessel as soon as it is safe to do so. The primary tug will be tethered at the direction of the pilot. A third tug will be required to assist with turning and mooring. • All three tugs will be at least 60-ton Astern Bollard Pull or larger and equipped with Class 1 firefighting equipment. Vessels will be limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less. Extreme wind or weather conditions may require a third tug to escort the LNG vessel. While unloading, all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departure procedures. Annex E – Emergency LNG Carrier Departure and Unexpected Disconnects does mention the use of Tug Boats and pilots in an emergency (page 7E). The Annex, however, does not specifically state that all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departures. The ERP does not address vessels being limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less or that a third tug would have to be used during extreme wind or weather conditions. The ERP does address having three 60-ton tugs available for escorting operations. I do not see these issues affecting the County. Navigational Aids LNG Carrier Familiarization Training for Pilots and Tug Operators Dynamic Under-keel Clearance System • An immersion study of deep draft LNG vessels transiting the bar during summer and winter conditions is required within the first 12 months. Not sure who would be responsible for these items. They are not addressed in the ERP. Safety Measures Vessel and Facility Inspections • LNG tankers and facility subject to annual inspection by the USCG. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT16
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT• LNG vessels and facilities are typically required to undergo a pre-arrival inspection, and transfer monitoring. The USCG states that they would need an additional USCG Facility and Vessel Inspectors. I believe the USCG request for an additional facility asks a bit much. Under MTSA, regulated facilities and vessels undergo annual compliance audits. I am not sure why the USCG would need to inspect every LNG vessel and LNG facility before each arrival. I can see doing so on the first few deliveries. I can’t see the USCG conducting such inspections (123 LNG vessels and the same facility 123 times per year). The USCG used the phrase “typically required to conduct pre-arrival inspections.” I am not sure what the USCG means by “typically.”Shore-side Fire Fighting • Firefighting capability is extremely limited along the entire transit route. Shore-side firefighting resources and training need to be augmented in order to provide basic protection services to the facility, as well as the communities along the transit route. The ERP discusses onsite firefighting equipment and detectors 6H, 6I, 6J, 6K, 6L, 6M, 6N, 6O, 6P. Facility and Offsite Fire Plan is shown on page 4. The tug boats will also have firefighting capability. The ERP does not discuss firefighting for other communities. The County could be impacted by sharing costs associated with developing adequate emergency response capability. Prior to the approval of the Emergency Response Plan, adequate cost-sharing arrangements for project-related training, equipment, maintenance, and staffing will need to be addressed for all of the communities impacted by the project. In-transit Firefighting • Significant resource and jurisdictional issues exist in any marine fire incident on an underway vessel in the Columbia River. Current planning and preparedness efforts focus on a shore-based response to a vessel moored at the facility. The USCG will require a concrete plan for managing underway firefighting, including provisionsfor command and control of tactical firefighting decisions, as well as financial arrangements for provisions of mutual aid and the identification of suitable locations for conducting firefighting operations that are critical to ensuring the safety of the port and securing the waterway. These costs could greatly impact the County. The assets and resources to meet the issues described above are currently not available. The ERP primary discusses onsite fires and offsite fires (outside the fence) in the Facility and Offsite Fire Plan Section. In-transit firefighting is not addressed. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT17
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTPublic Notification System and Procedures • Adequate means to notify the public along the transit route (including ongoing public education campaigns, emergency notification systems, and adequate drills and training) are required. Education programs must be tailored to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Annex A – Warning and Notifications (page 5A) seem to focus on facility-based emergencies. It does not appear to consider in-transit emergencies. The ERP does not address tailored educational programs to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Current public notification capabilities vary greatly, and as part of the ERP process, a comprehensive notification system (including the deployment of associated equipment and training) will need to be developed. Bradwood Landing, in its Warning and Notifications Annex, depends heavily on the Reverse 911 systems. The local counties may have to come up with the resources to update their 911 systems. Gas-detection Capability • Emergency response personnel (both police and fire) require appropriate gas-detection equipment, maintenance, and training. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County could be stuck with the cost. Communication System and Protocols • Inter-agency communication poses a significant obstacle to joint operations. Deployment of a Regional Communication Plan and associated equipment is required to ensure that the facility, associated command centers, emergency responders, USCG, tug operators, escort vessels, and pilots communicate in an effective manner. The system must provide for monitoring and communicating on both secure and unsecure channels, as well as sending and receiving both speech and data. Interoperability of communication systems does not currently exist in the area. There are significant costs involved in building the system that USCG describes. The ERP’s Annex B – Communications does not address the USCG concerns regarding inter-agency communications. Significant cost to the community to up-build an inter-agency communication system. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT18
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTSecurity Measures Security Boardings, Waterway Monitoring, Shoreline Patrols, and Vessel Escorts • Extensive security measures will be required to provide adequate protection for LNG vessel while transiting the Columbia River and being moored at the facility. This information is SSI. The local counties could have significant short- and long-term law enforcement and security costs associated with this project. Additional Measures While a Cruise Ship is in Port • While cruise ships are moored or anchored at the Port of Astoria, cruse ships will also be required to have separate waterside security, during the LNG Transit. The USCG and local law enforcement would have to be sufficient to provide adequate and independent security for both vessels. These services would add significant costs to the County. This is not addressed in the ERP. According to the USCG, in the absence of the measures described by the USCG, the Columbia River would be considered unsuitable for the LNG marine traffic associated with the Bradwood LNG terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT19
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix B – Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees Name AgencyPaul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Ed Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works and Community Development Scott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Deanna HenryOregon Dept of EnergyMitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Garry Coppedge Bradwood Landing, LLC David Glessner Bradwood Landing, LLC Michelle Rudd Bradwood Landing, LLC Michael Sparks Bradwood Landing, LLC PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT20
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix C – ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees Name AgencyDeanna HenryOregon Department of EnergyChristine LolichColumbia Memorial Hospital Rich MaysCity of Cannon Beach Gene Halliburton City of Cannon Beach Duane MullinsMedix Ambulance Paul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Mike Jackson Astoria Fire Department Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Dan BardsleyWahkiakum County Sheriff’s Office Duane Stanton Oregon State Police Richard Long Clatskanie Rural Fire District Ted Ames Warrenton Fire Department Rob Deu Pree Astoria Police Department Paul Benoit City of Astoria, City Manager Gene Strong Clatsop County, Emergency MgrEd Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works/CDScott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Mitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Neil Daniell PBS&J Saundra Hinsley PBS&J Kari Sutton PBS&J Ed Hauer Clatsop County, EMA Bill Davidson AFD/CERT Dorthy Davidson AFD/CERT Bob Maxfield Warrenton Police Department Jeff Holwege Seaside (Providence Seaside Hospital volunteer) Paulina CockrumProvidence Seaside Hospital Brad Guileff Providence Seaside Hospital Lt. Mark Heussner Group AIRSTA/Astoria Lt. Bryan Burkhalter Group AIRSTA/Astoria Cal Brady9-4-9 / AM 840 Cleve Roper Cannon Beach RFPD Hal Nauman Clatsop County Health and Human Services Deb Treusdale City of Seaside / Tsunami Professor Tom Bergin Clatsop County Sheriff’s Department Margo Lalich RN MPH Clatsop County Public Health Patrick CorcoranOregon State University Clatsop County Extension Tad Pedersen Office of the State Fire Marshal Ron Tyson Olney Walluski Fire and RescuePROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT21
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2.2National Incident Management System Compliance The procedures documented in NIMS must be incorporated into all Emergency Operations Plans(EOPs). NIMS was created so first responders from various jurisdictions and disciplines can work together in a variety of emergency response scenarios. NIMS concepts and procedures establish a unified approach to incident management; standard command and management structures; andemphasize preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. To establish compliance withNIMS procedures, all levels of government, private sector organizations, and nongovernmentalagencies must be prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide spectrum of major events that exceed the capabilities of any single entity. These hazard responses require a unified and coordinated national approach to planning and domestic incident management. To address this need, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of DomesticIncidents (HSPD-5) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) establish the following national initiatives that serve to establish a common approachto preparedness and response. a) HSPD-5 identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. It requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to establish a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System. b) HSPD-8 describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare forincidents. It requires DHS to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to develop a National Preparedness Goal. 3.0Methodology After completing scope items 1–2, the draft Emergency Response Plan for the Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas LNG Facility (February 2007), was reviewed to identify “gaps” betweenthe requirements for a FERC- and NIMS-compliant ERP and the draft ERP. This effort is referred to as a “gap analysis.” Specifically, PBS&J staff with expertise in emergency management, emergency response,emergency planning, disaster recovery, public safety, hazardous materials, navigation, security, and geological hazards conducted the gap analysis. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT2
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTThe following tasks were conducted: 1. Met with Clatsop County Manager Scott Derickson to review the terms and objectives of this project. 2. Developed an understanding of and fluency with relevant regulatory and agency guidance andadopted standards, including (but not limited to): Title 33 CFR 127, Title 49 CFR 193, NVIC 05-05, NVIC 09-02, NVIC 11-02, and National Fire Protection Association Standard 59a, FERC Draft Guidance for Emergency Response Plans (Revision 4, September 2006) and the ClatsopCounty Emergency Management Plan. 3. Analyzed and evaluated the FERC project description and WSA/WSR and the draft ERP. 4. Visited the proposed LNG site and populated areas along the Columbia River navigation channel between the Columbia River Bar and the site, and interviewed key Clatsop County staff (including first responders), as well as Bradwood Landing, LLC staff, and consultants to answer questions about the scope of the project. 5. Evaluated and confirmed that existing assets and personnel related to or having responsibility forthe LNG project security, safety, and navigation (plus the incremental assets mandated by WSR)are or are not sufficient to provide adequate mitigation and response capabilities related to the risk probability introduced by the LNG operation. 6. Determined whether additional safety and security resources or measures would be required inaddition to those defined by the Coast Guard in the WSR, identified these resources and measures, and provided rationale for such additional requirements. 7. Provided a written report to Clatsop County regarding the above issues (by July 31, 2007), and agreed to participate in a follow-up conference to discuss the results of the report. A gap analysis of the draft ERP has been conducted to determine whether the draft ERP met FERC requirements and was NIMS-compliant. Additionally, the analysis was performed to determine whetherthe draft ERP is operationally feasible based upon response guidance, response plans, and response principles developed by the National Fire Protection Association(NFPA), Environmental Protection PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT3
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAgency, (EPA), etc., as well as professional emergency management judgment and experience. The PBS&J emergency management planners have more than 73 combined years of experience in emergencyplanning, preparedness, response, and recovery. Gaps were expected, because the ERP is a draft. The gap analysis was consolidated and discussed with the Clatsop County Community Development Director, County Manager, county first responders and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff. PBS&J personnel met with local, county, State, and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff on July 9 and July 11, 2007, in Clatsop County (See Appendix B: Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees). In addition, data collection for the draft ERP review was received during several meetings (See Appendix C: ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees). Several meetings took place during the review process. A site visit to the proposed Terminal was hosted by Bradwood Landing LLC and included a question-and-answer session. Clatsop County hosted a group meeting with a cross section of local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, the Oregon Department of Energy, and the WahkiakumCounty Sheriff’s office. Following the group meeting, PBS&J conducted additional individual meetings with local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, and the Wahkiakum County Sheriff’s office. Lastly, PBS&J attended a County Emergency Managers meeting held in Seaside, Oregon, and conducted a group interview session. 4.0Gap Analysis The findings of the gap analysis are presented from two perspectives—a county perspective and an ERP-execution perspective, as follows: 4.1Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Local Counties a) Not all county and local agencies that might provide support or respond to an event onsite are listed on the draft ERP Distribution List. As a significant component of the LNG certification process, an ERP is under Sensitive Security Information (SSI)rules until the ERP is published. The following organizations are not included in thedraft Distribution List: 1. Columbia Memorial Hospital (Astoria, Ore.) PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT4
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2. Seaside Providence Hospital (Seaside, Ore.) 3. St. John Medical Center (Longview, Wash.) 4. Medix Ambulance Service (Astoria, Ore.) 5. Clakestine Rural Fire Department (Clakestine, Ore.) b) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are directly downwind (east ofthe Terminal). According to the Oregon Climate Service, the downwind determination is based on the westerly prevailing wind patterns throughout the year. The downwind counties could be within the potential plume, should a release occur.(A plume is a visible or measurable discharge of a contaminant from a given point oforigin. A plume is visible in the air, such as a plume of smoke.) The area downwind is that area that could be dangerous for those exposed to leaking fumes. However,Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are not listed in the draft ERP. c) Currently, the draft ERP has no interoperable communications plan and the draft ERP does not provide for redundant communications to report an onsite incident, emergency, or disaster. The only method of communicating an emergency is via the landline, by calling 911. There is currently no cell phone coverage available at the proposed LNG Terminal site. d) The draft ERP does not provide for alternate methods of evacuation for employees, and visitors. Currently, the draft ERP utilizes vehicles to evacuate personnel heading north on Clifton Road, before proceeding east or west on Highway 30. Tugboatscould be used, but only when they are available. e) The draft ERP does not clearly specify what sequence of siren blasts identifies apossible danger, as opposed to an actual incident, emergency, or disaster. f) The draft ERP does not provide a means of onsite sheltering in place for employeesand visitors who are not able to evacuate if an emergency develops at the Terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT5
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTg) The Emergency training, drills, and exercises contained in Annex F of the draft ERP does not include joint training with local responders. h) The planned exercises are not planned for multi-agency response in concert with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. Currently, the planned exercises are only for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. 4.2Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Execution of the Plan a) The draft ERP is in the National Response Plan (NRP). This format is widely used atthe Federal level to respond to disasters involving the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and is not used the local county level. Local first responders are used following the Clatsop County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) format. The current version of the ERP is difficult to read and understand. b) The three zones of potential hazard do not coincide with the USDOT Emergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). c) The exposure amounts of LNG (as shown in Section 4.7.4 of the draft ERP) are different from those used by first responders. The draft ERP does not explain themethodology used to calculate the exposure limits (e.g., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®)). d) There should be one Incident Command System (ICS) organizational chart in the ERP, as opposed to multiple organization charts. e) The draft ERP should contain ICS terms, but not terms specific to Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT6
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTf) The annexes should provide more detail or specificity for particular sections notfound in the draft ERP. The annexes should not be the basis for the ERP. g) The ERP should demonstrate a clear understanding of the emergency response cycle. As an ERP, it should cover preparedness as it relates to the response portion of the plan, but not necessarily discuss recovery and mitigation efforts. h) All emergency responses should tie back to the basic response conditions: incident, emergency, and disaster (per Section 4.7.3 of the draft ERP). i) Triggers need to be developed that clearly delineate what will cause the ERP to be activated. j) The draft ERP is not NIMS-compliant. k) The draft ERP does not mention having an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) with an ambulance onsite. l) The draft ERP does not mention having a Trauma Tent/Building onsite. m) The draft ERP does not mention having fire suppression equipment onsite. n) The draft ERP does not mention having a helispot (helipad) identified for life-flight operations. o) The ERP does not define roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions for fire responsethroughout the entire vessel berthing and LNG off-loading process at the Terminal. 5.0Preliminary Recommendations In reviewing the ERP, PBS&J determined that the Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas draft ERP fulfills some of the requirements from the FERC ERP guidance. However, the current draftERP would be difficult to read or execute because it is confusing and not concise. Information in the draft ERP is redundant (i.e., located in multiple sections and annexes). Information about the three non-PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT7
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTresponse phases of emergency management (i.e., preparedness, mitigation, and recovery) are included in the draft ERP, but this extra information makes it difficult to find the response procedures quickly. The following preliminary recommendations by PBS&J are provided to improve emergency response operations: 5.1Recommendations to Improve ERP Execution a) The ERP should be written in a format that is used and understood by local first responders. The plan should be consistent and follow a logical response format. PBS&J recommends that the ERP be reformatted to place all like information into one section. The following is a recommended ERP format: 1. The table of contents should be located at the beginning of the ERP. Currently, it is located on page 28 (xxviii). 2. Chapter 1 should outline the purpose, scope, authorities, and references for the implementation, development methodology, and planning assumptions of the ERP. 3. Chapter 2 should identify the hazards (i.e., triggers) that may require ERP implementation, site description, organization, and critical emergencypreparedness and response procedures. 4. Chapter 3 should discuss the concept of operations for an ERP event, preparedness actions, general responsibilities, and evacuation measures. 5. Chapter 4 should explain (in detail) the communication plan, notificationprocedures, and interoperable communications. 6. Chapter 5 should cover the ERP training and exercise plan, which includes drills, functional exercises, tabletop exercises, and full-scale exercises. 7. Chapter 6 should provide ERP maintenance procedures. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT8
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTb) Make the ERP NIMS-compliant by following the proposed chapter outline andcontent discussed above. c) The ERP should have one standard organization chart that is NIMS- and ICS-compliant for use throughout the plan. The organization chart should have titles, names and phone numbers, and be updated as those names and contact data change. d) The Concept of Operations section should have a Notification flowchart. e) Standard NIMS and ICS terms should be incorporated into the plan. f) Ideally, the ERP should be 40 to 50 pages long, and should not exceed 100 pages.This proposed length will enhance the ability of Terminal staff and emergencyresponders to quickly and easily find information and implement the plan during anemergency. g) The ERP should reference or explain in greater detail how hazard zones weredeveloped and provide a crosswalk that explains the differences from USDOTEmergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). h) The ERP should explain in detail the derivation of the different exposure limits (i.e., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health(NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference ofGovernmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®),etc.) and how they are used to determine the different zones. i) Re-evaluate the need for all of the annexes. If annexes are needed, then they should provide additional information not found in the base ERP. Annexes should be nomore than 1 to 2 pages long and describe in detail the concept of operations for thatannex. Annexes should have checklists. The ERP includes the base plan, annexes, PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT9
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTand appendices. If annexes are needed, they should provide additional informationthat is not included in the body of the document. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas must: (1) identify all categories of events reasonably likely to occur; (2) classify each potential event as “incident,” “emergency,” or “disaster;” (3) describe what measures will be taken by Bradwood Landing to deal with them; and (4) describe what actions would be required of other emergency services. k) The ERP should discuss the triggers identified in the Clatsop County CEMP and identify other site-specific triggers. l) The ERP should plan for the worst events, even if the probability of their occurrence seems low. Clatsop County residents need to be assured that appropriate measurescan and will be taken to deal with catastrophic events (such as a major explosion) ifthere is credible evidence that such an event could occur. m) The signature page of the ERP should include the Clatsop County Administrator,Clatsop County Emergency Manager, Clatsop County Sheriff, Astoria Police Chief, Astoria Fire Chief, Knappa Fire Chief, County EMS, and all others who will support the ERP. n) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties need to be added to the ERP in all places where Clatsop County is listed. o) The ERP should list alternative communication procedures, (e.g, satellite phones,800-MHz or VHF radios with repeaters) that can reach first responders. p) The ERP should have an alternate evacuation plan for employees and visitors. Thealternate evacuation method should consider evacuation of people upwind, via the Columbia River. q) The ERP should have a system of siren blasts with voice announcements that clearlylet anyone onsite know whether there is a potential problem or an actual emergency.PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT10
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTIf there is an actual emergency, the warning system should indicate whether an employee or visitor should evacuate or shelter in-place. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar should contact chemical plants and other industrial plants that may have the same type of hazards, in order to review their warning systems.. r) The functional (or full-scale) exercises should be evaluated by a third party observer that is not Clatsop County, Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas, or the developer of the ERP. The third-party observer will ensure the exercises meet the stated objectives, and will develop corrective actions if it is found that the objectives have not been met. The corrective actions developed by the third-party observer should detail outstanding issues, deficiencies and/or gaps, then conduct briefings about these for local officials from the affected counties and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. s) A third party should conduct a review of the ERP annually to ensure all corrective actions have been captured in the ERP. 5.2Recommendations for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to Provide Financial and Equipment Support for Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia,Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties (Cost Share: Bradwood 100 percent and Counties 0percent) a) Due to the long response times for first responders, Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should hire a full time EMT with an ambulance and have it stationed onsite. This will be accomplished by having a full-time staff member that is cross-trained and certified as an EMT. Bradwood should also have a medical/trauma clinic onsite with a registered nurse (RN) or physician’s assistant(PA) to treat minor injuries and care for an injured employee until they can be safely transported to appropriate medical facilities. The EMT and RN or PA must meet allcertification and licensing requirements of the State of Oregon. b) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct two helispot(helipad) (one at the terminal and one at the intersection of Highway 30 and Clifton PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT11
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTRoad) to accommodate life-flight helicopters for transport of seriously injured peopleto trauma centers. c) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should have two to four trained firefighters onsite to operate fire equipment (brush truck and a dry chemical trailer) and respond to fires or other emergencies (e.g., confined space, HazMat, etc.). This will be accomplished by having full-time staff members that are cross-trained and certified as firefighters. The firefighters must meet all meet all certification and licensing requirements of the NFPA and the State of Oregon. d) The Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should install a Reverse 911 system in Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties to communicate an emergency onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should be a designated user of the Reverse 911 system. In addition, Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties should work with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to develop a site-specific call-down list for site emergencies. e) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase and maintain a mobile command center that includes the following components and requirements: 1. Satellite phones; 2. Eight to ten 800-MHz multi-channel radios or VHF radios for first responders to use onsite during an event;3. A base station (VHF or 800-MHz radios) with repeaters to communicate withthe handheld radios referenced in Point 2 (above); and,4. The mobile command vehicle should be stationed onsite, remainoperationally ready, and should be used to run the incident. f) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase an all-weather boat capable of holding 7 to 14 people. This boat is in addition to the three tugs PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT12
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTrequired for operations. The boat should be permanently stored onsite. The tugs are only onsite when they are bringing an LNG vessel to the Terminal.g) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct a reverse-pressurized, self-contained (separate power, communication lines and Heating Ventilation and Cooling (HVAC)) facility that is upwind of the prevailing winds. The facility should be used to allow employees or visitors to shelter in-place if a gas release occurs onsite. h) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide joint emergencytraining for local first responders and Bradwood Landing, LLC staff on ERP implementation, LNG hazards and protocols. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should also provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the training session. Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties and the surrounding fire districts have limited budgets to meet the current required training. As such, they will not have sufficient funds to pay for any additional training that is required by the Terminal. i) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop multi-agencytabletop exercise(s) to flush out issues that could occur when responding to anincident, emergency, or disaster onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the tabletop exercise. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop and conduct anannual functional exercise with all of the first responders. The objective of the exercise would be to test and validate all of the response procedures for an emergency onsite and to provide continuity for changes in staff and the communication of new standards, technology, and procedures. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the functional exercise. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT13
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTk) The resource list previously provided by Clatsop County emergency responders (titled, “Discussion of Resources of Existing LNG Receiving Facilities as Relates to Clatsop County Joint Report of November 2006”) should be cross-referenced with PBS&J’s recommendations in this report to avoid duplication of services and equipment. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT14
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix A – Water Safety Report On February 28, 2007, the USCG completed a review of the WSA for Bradwood Landing LNG Terminal project submitted by NorthernStar Natural Gas, LLC, in May of 2006. The following items are a list of specific mitigation measures that must be put into place to responsibly manage the safety and security risks of this project. Navigational Measures: Safety/Security Zone • A moving safety/security zone of 500 yards around the vessel, but ending at the shoreline. No vessel may enter the zone without USCG permission. • Escort resources will be used to contact and control vessel movements in order that the LNG Carrier is protected. • A moored LNG vessel at the facility shall have a 200-yard security zone around the vessel. • A 50-yard security zone around the LNG facility shall be observed when there is not a vessel at the dock. Escort resources (three 60-ton pull tugs) are addressed on page 10 of the ERP. The ERP does not specifically address the security and safety zones. The Declaration of Security is mentioned on page 6E. A moored vessel will be located approximately 350 yards from the west of the Columbia River Channel. I see no issues for the County. Bradwood Landing would provide and operate the tug boats. Vessel Traffic Management • A Transit Management Plan will be developed in coordination with the River Pilots, Bar Pilots, Escort Tug Operators, Security Assets and the USCG, prior to the first transit. • A Vessel Transit Management Plan must be approved by the COTP at least 30 days prior to the first arrival. The issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County would likely need to attend the meetings. Vessel Traffic Information System/Vessel Traffic System • The current Vessel Traffic Information System on the Columbia River is limited to AIS receivers and a handful of cameras. In order to ensure vessel safety and security, this capability will need to be augmented with a robust camera system capable of monitoring the entire transit route. Due to weather concerns, these cameras must be equipped with PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT15
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTdetectors capable of monitoring vessel traffic in wind, rain, and fog conditions common on the river. In addition, this capability may need to be augmented in the future with additional command and control capability and the establishment of a full Columbia River VTS. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The issue of who would pay for and operate it has not been addressed. This could be an issue for the County or the State. Tug Escorts and Docking Assist • Each LNG Carrier must be escorted by two tugs; at least one of which must be a tractor tug, which join the vessel as soon as it is safe to do so. The primary tug will be tethered at the direction of the pilot. A third tug will be required to assist with turning and mooring. • All three tugs will be at least 60-ton Astern Bollard Pull or larger and equipped with Class 1 firefighting equipment. Vessels will be limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less. Extreme wind or weather conditions may require a third tug to escort the LNG vessel. While unloading, all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departure procedures. Annex E – Emergency LNG Carrier Departure and Unexpected Disconnects does mention the use of Tug Boats and pilots in an emergency (page 7E). The Annex, however, does not specifically state that all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departures. The ERP does not address vessels being limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less or that a third tug would have to be used during extreme wind or weather conditions. The ERP does address having three 60-ton tugs available for escorting operations. I do not see these issues affecting the County. Navigational Aids LNG Carrier Familiarization Training for Pilots and Tug Operators Dynamic Under-keel Clearance System • An immersion study of deep draft LNG vessels transiting the bar during summer and winter conditions is required within the first 12 months. Not sure who would be responsible for these items. They are not addressed in the ERP. Safety Measures Vessel and Facility Inspections • LNG tankers and facility subject to annual inspection by the USCG. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT16
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT• LNG vessels and facilities are typically required to undergo a pre-arrival inspection, and transfer monitoring. The USCG states that they would need an additional USCG Facility and Vessel Inspectors. I believe the USCG request for an additional facility asks a bit much. Under MTSA, regulated facilities and vessels undergo annual compliance audits. I am not sure why the USCG would need to inspect every LNG vessel and LNG facility before each arrival. I can see doing so on the first few deliveries. I can’t see the USCG conducting such inspections (123 LNG vessels and the same facility 123 times per year). The USCG used the phrase “typically required to conduct pre-arrival inspections.” I am not sure what the USCG means by “typically.”Shore-side Fire Fighting • Firefighting capability is extremely limited along the entire transit route. Shore-side firefighting resources and training need to be augmented in order to provide basic protection services to the facility, as well as the communities along the transit route. The ERP discusses onsite firefighting equipment and detectors 6H, 6I, 6J, 6K, 6L, 6M, 6N, 6O, 6P. Facility and Offsite Fire Plan is shown on page 4. The tug boats will also have firefighting capability. The ERP does not discuss firefighting for other communities. The County could be impacted by sharing costs associated with developing adequate emergency response capability. Prior to the approval of the Emergency Response Plan, adequate cost-sharing arrangements for project-related training, equipment, maintenance, and staffing will need to be addressed for all of the communities impacted by the project. In-transit Firefighting • Significant resource and jurisdictional issues exist in any marine fire incident on an underway vessel in the Columbia River. Current planning and preparedness efforts focus on a shore-based response to a vessel moored at the facility. The USCG will require a concrete plan for managing underway firefighting, including provisionsfor command and control of tactical firefighting decisions, as well as financial arrangements for provisions of mutual aid and the identification of suitable locations for conducting firefighting operations that are critical to ensuring the safety of the port and securing the waterway. These costs could greatly impact the County. The assets and resources to meet the issues described above are currently not available. The ERP primary discusses onsite fires and offsite fires (outside the fence) in the Facility and Offsite Fire Plan Section. In-transit firefighting is not addressed. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT17
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTPublic Notification System and Procedures • Adequate means to notify the public along the transit route (including ongoing public education campaigns, emergency notification systems, and adequate drills and training) are required. Education programs must be tailored to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Annex A – Warning and Notifications (page 5A) seem to focus on facility-based emergencies. It does not appear to consider in-transit emergencies. The ERP does not address tailored educational programs to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Current public notification capabilities vary greatly, and as part of the ERP process, a comprehensive notification system (including the deployment of associated equipment and training) will need to be developed. Bradwood Landing, in its Warning and Notifications Annex, depends heavily on the Reverse 911 systems. The local counties may have to come up with the resources to update their 911 systems. Gas-detection Capability • Emergency response personnel (both police and fire) require appropriate gas-detection equipment, maintenance, and training. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County could be stuck with the cost. Communication System and Protocols • Inter-agency communication poses a significant obstacle to joint operations. Deployment of a Regional Communication Plan and associated equipment is required to ensure that the facility, associated command centers, emergency responders, USCG, tug operators, escort vessels, and pilots communicate in an effective manner. The system must provide for monitoring and communicating on both secure and unsecure channels, as well as sending and receiving both speech and data. Interoperability of communication systems does not currently exist in the area. There are significant costs involved in building the system that USCG describes. The ERP’s Annex B – Communications does not address the USCG concerns regarding inter-agency communications. Significant cost to the community to up-build an inter-agency communication system. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT18
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTSecurity Measures Security Boardings, Waterway Monitoring, Shoreline Patrols, and Vessel Escorts • Extensive security measures will be required to provide adequate protection for LNG vessel while transiting the Columbia River and being moored at the facility. This information is SSI. The local counties could have significant short- and long-term law enforcement and security costs associated with this project. Additional Measures While a Cruise Ship is in Port • While cruise ships are moored or anchored at the Port of Astoria, cruse ships will also be required to have separate waterside security, during the LNG Transit. The USCG and local law enforcement would have to be sufficient to provide adequate and independent security for both vessels. These services would add significant costs to the County. This is not addressed in the ERP. According to the USCG, in the absence of the measures described by the USCG, the Columbia River would be considered unsuitable for the LNG marine traffic associated with the Bradwood LNG terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT19
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix B – Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees Name AgencyPaul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Ed Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works and Community Development Scott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Deanna HenryOregon Dept of EnergyMitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Garry Coppedge Bradwood Landing, LLC David Glessner Bradwood Landing, LLC Michelle Rudd Bradwood Landing, LLC Michael Sparks Bradwood Landing, LLC PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT20
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix C – ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees Name AgencyDeanna HenryOregon Department of EnergyChristine LolichColumbia Memorial Hospital Rich MaysCity of Cannon Beach Gene Halliburton City of Cannon Beach Duane MullinsMedix Ambulance Paul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Mike Jackson Astoria Fire Department Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Dan BardsleyWahkiakum County Sheriff’s Office Duane Stanton Oregon State Police Richard Long Clatskanie Rural Fire District Ted Ames Warrenton Fire Department Rob Deu Pree Astoria Police Department Paul Benoit City of Astoria, City Manager Gene Strong Clatsop County, Emergency MgrEd Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works/CDScott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Mitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Neil Daniell PBS&J Saundra Hinsley PBS&J Kari Sutton PBS&J Ed Hauer Clatsop County, EMA Bill Davidson AFD/CERT Dorthy Davidson AFD/CERT Bob Maxfield Warrenton Police Department Jeff Holwege Seaside (Providence Seaside Hospital volunteer) Paulina CockrumProvidence Seaside Hospital Brad Guileff Providence Seaside Hospital Lt. Mark Heussner Group AIRSTA/Astoria Lt. Bryan Burkhalter Group AIRSTA/Astoria Cal Brady9-4-9 / AM 840 Cleve Roper Cannon Beach RFPD Hal Nauman Clatsop County Health and Human Services Deb Treusdale City of Seaside / Tsunami Professor Tom Bergin Clatsop County Sheriff’s Department Margo Lalich RN MPH Clatsop County Public Health Patrick CorcoranOregon State University Clatsop County Extension Tad Pedersen Office of the State Fire Marshal Ron Tyson Olney Walluski Fire and RescuePROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT21
Friday, October 26, 2007
Did Commissioner Hazen Forget To Tell Us Something When They Asked: "Are There Any Ex Parte Contacts Or Conflicts Of Interest You Wish To Report?"
From Willamette Week Article: "Welcome To "Gastoria""
Story Forum Archive writes on Sep 30th, 2005 12:00amComment 9 | Respond
I would like to see a ruling by Clatsop County Counsel on this as it could certainly impact impartial deliberation and judgement on Hazen's part on the issue of Bradwood LNG's project in my view.
LNG is welcome in Warrenton
The majority of people that I have spoken with in Warrenton are in favor of the Calpine proposal to locate a LNG facility here. We have seen the decline of jobs in the fishing and wood products industry. The economic impact of having a facility that provides family wage jobs is tremendous for our town of just over 4200 people. Warrenton has long been business friendly and we welcome the addition of this facility. LNG has been safely handled for decades. One should not be influenced by the opponents "the sky is falling" arguments that siting a facility here will result in a fiery inferno. As with other industries, there are risks. However, modern day engineering provides for facilies that are designed to be safe. Controls are in place to ensure the safety of the facility and the area surrounding it. Others will accuse me of being a "paid lackey" for Calpine, but I am just a concerned citizen looking to the future economic well being of our town.
—Jeff Hazen
Story Forum Archive writes on Sep 30th, 2005 12:00amComment 9 | Respond
I would like to see a ruling by Clatsop County Counsel on this as it could certainly impact impartial deliberation and judgement on Hazen's part on the issue of Bradwood LNG's project in my view.
LNG is welcome in Warrenton
The majority of people that I have spoken with in Warrenton are in favor of the Calpine proposal to locate a LNG facility here. We have seen the decline of jobs in the fishing and wood products industry. The economic impact of having a facility that provides family wage jobs is tremendous for our town of just over 4200 people. Warrenton has long been business friendly and we welcome the addition of this facility. LNG has been safely handled for decades. One should not be influenced by the opponents "the sky is falling" arguments that siting a facility here will result in a fiery inferno. As with other industries, there are risks. However, modern day engineering provides for facilies that are designed to be safe. Controls are in place to ensure the safety of the facility and the area surrounding it. Others will accuse me of being a "paid lackey" for Calpine, but I am just a concerned citizen looking to the future economic well being of our town.
—Jeff Hazen
Recall!-Would You Entertain Such A Prospect?-Paisley, Oregon Did!
Paisley votes down big change
A recall election pits small-town tradition against councilors working for growth
Friday, October 26, 2007
MATTHEW PREUSCH - The Oregonian
You can gripe about the price of hay or worry on the drought; heck, even take a dig at those city folks from Bend. But talk up big change in little Paisley and you've stepped in it, alright.
That's what three city councilors from the remote southeast Oregon town learned this week when voters recalled them after less than a year in office. The problem: advocating new development.
Nearly 83 percent of the city's voters, about 160 people, participated, and all three councilors were recalled by about a 3-2 ratio.
"The three individuals were trying to change everything, and when you get into a small town and try to change everything, you are going to have a lot of backfire," said Bob Davis, one of two remaining councilors, both of whom supported the recall.
The circumstance that led to the divisive vote are familiar ones in rural Oregon: The last mill is long gone, the good jobs left with it and what's left is a community struggling to hold on to what was while fearing what may come.
Since the late 1990s, when the population peaked at about 350, people have seeped away from the Chewaucan Valley just as sure as the waters of Summer Lake recede every August, leaving a cracked white playa that sends up boiling clouds of alkali dust.
At the center of town is a bluish, two-story stucco building that most agree is all that holds Paisley together. Paisley School's student-run radio station provides the only decent signal in the valley. And on winter nights, residents fill the old gym to see the Broncos run the parquet, their squeaking sneakers echoing in the wooden rafters.
But the school has fewer than 80 students and risks closing. The district currently has 13 tuition-paying students from across the globe -- Haiti, Mongolia, Ecuador -- to boost enrollment.
"Our eight-man football team hasn't played for two years now. Not enough students," said Ken Hamlington, one of the three recalled councilors.
If the school closes, students would have to be bused to Lakeview or Christmas Valley, each more than 60 miles away.
Hamlington and the other two -- Rose Bagley and Larry Duckworth -- took office less than a year ago with a promise to add at least 150 residents and 40 students to the town.
"We ran on a platform of economic development, creating jobs, bringing people into the community, and apparently I got voted out for the same reason," Duckworth said Thursday.
But the three rubbed many the wrong way for advocating controversial ideas -- such as the city taking over the nearby airport operated by Lake County -- in the face of public outcry. They also tossed around ideas like an assisted living facility, equestrian center, mini-mall, an RV park and an industrial park.
"It aggravated enough people that they said, 'This is bull.' And I agree with them," said Davis, who owns the Chewaucan Garage.
Those sort of plain-spoken opinions have led to some uncomfortable moments when folks gather for pizza at The Pioneer Saloon, with its 102-year-old bar shipped around Cape Horn, or pass through the squeaky screen door of the Paisley Mercantile for coffee or movie rentals.
"It's kind of like a dysfunctional family," Duckworth said. "You've got to live with them no matter what's going on."
Matthew Preusch: 541-382-2006; preusch@bendbroadband.com
©2007 The Oregonian
A recall election pits small-town tradition against councilors working for growth
Friday, October 26, 2007
MATTHEW PREUSCH - The Oregonian
You can gripe about the price of hay or worry on the drought; heck, even take a dig at those city folks from Bend. But talk up big change in little Paisley and you've stepped in it, alright.
That's what three city councilors from the remote southeast Oregon town learned this week when voters recalled them after less than a year in office. The problem: advocating new development.
Nearly 83 percent of the city's voters, about 160 people, participated, and all three councilors were recalled by about a 3-2 ratio.
"The three individuals were trying to change everything, and when you get into a small town and try to change everything, you are going to have a lot of backfire," said Bob Davis, one of two remaining councilors, both of whom supported the recall.
The circumstance that led to the divisive vote are familiar ones in rural Oregon: The last mill is long gone, the good jobs left with it and what's left is a community struggling to hold on to what was while fearing what may come.
Since the late 1990s, when the population peaked at about 350, people have seeped away from the Chewaucan Valley just as sure as the waters of Summer Lake recede every August, leaving a cracked white playa that sends up boiling clouds of alkali dust.
At the center of town is a bluish, two-story stucco building that most agree is all that holds Paisley together. Paisley School's student-run radio station provides the only decent signal in the valley. And on winter nights, residents fill the old gym to see the Broncos run the parquet, their squeaking sneakers echoing in the wooden rafters.
But the school has fewer than 80 students and risks closing. The district currently has 13 tuition-paying students from across the globe -- Haiti, Mongolia, Ecuador -- to boost enrollment.
"Our eight-man football team hasn't played for two years now. Not enough students," said Ken Hamlington, one of the three recalled councilors.
If the school closes, students would have to be bused to Lakeview or Christmas Valley, each more than 60 miles away.
Hamlington and the other two -- Rose Bagley and Larry Duckworth -- took office less than a year ago with a promise to add at least 150 residents and 40 students to the town.
"We ran on a platform of economic development, creating jobs, bringing people into the community, and apparently I got voted out for the same reason," Duckworth said Thursday.
But the three rubbed many the wrong way for advocating controversial ideas -- such as the city taking over the nearby airport operated by Lake County -- in the face of public outcry. They also tossed around ideas like an assisted living facility, equestrian center, mini-mall, an RV park and an industrial park.
"It aggravated enough people that they said, 'This is bull.' And I agree with them," said Davis, who owns the Chewaucan Garage.
Those sort of plain-spoken opinions have led to some uncomfortable moments when folks gather for pizza at The Pioneer Saloon, with its 102-year-old bar shipped around Cape Horn, or pass through the squeaky screen door of the Paisley Mercantile for coffee or movie rentals.
"It's kind of like a dysfunctional family," Duckworth said. "You've got to live with them no matter what's going on."
Matthew Preusch: 541-382-2006; preusch@bendbroadband.com
©2007 The Oregonian
The D.A. - Is It Simply About Money?
I tried to ask Tom Freel yesterday what it would take to settle this issue between Clatsop County District Attorney and CCBofC and he says it's an H.R.-Commission issue and could not offer anything.
I tried to ask Carrie Bartoldus, an Antiu-Measure 4-123 organizer and she pretty much said the same thing.
I even emailed the same question with request for an itemized list to County Manager, Scott Dersickson and as of the momnet I have no response.
So, we're still in stalemate but, one thing seems to be coming very clear and that is the breech between Marquis and CCBofC is his resistance to pumping up the amount of convictions to generate more revenue to Clatsop County whether justified or not.
Do you think this is what is all about, really?
I tried to ask Carrie Bartoldus, an Antiu-Measure 4-123 organizer and she pretty much said the same thing.
I even emailed the same question with request for an itemized list to County Manager, Scott Dersickson and as of the momnet I have no response.
So, we're still in stalemate but, one thing seems to be coming very clear and that is the breech between Marquis and CCBofC is his resistance to pumping up the amount of convictions to generate more revenue to Clatsop County whether justified or not.
Do you think this is what is all about, really?
Saturday, October 06, 2007
To The Clatsop County Board Of Commissioners
October 6, 2007
Board of County Commissioners for Clatsop County
800 Exchange Street, Suite 100
Astoria, Oregon 97103
Re: Consolidated Land Use Application from Bradwood Landing LLC
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Commission;
Below is a comment, obviously from someone who, it seems, believes that LNG in Clatsop County is the right thing for us and that anybody against LNG in Clatsop County is against development and growth in our community and that concerns about our "Public Safety", "Well Being" and its "Dangers" is frivolous in light of the magnitude of what you five are about to commit us to, one way or the other on the issue of this one Energy Speculation and Development Corporation, Bradwood Landing/Northern Star Natural Gas.
“And since there are hundreds of LNG facilities all over the world and not a one has been bombed or a tanker destroyed, that tells me that the whole “Terrorist Target” idea is simply another scare tactic by the anti-LNG, anti-progress, anti-development of any kind crowd.”
Considering the fact a cell group of "Al Qaeda Terrorists" could establish themselves in, presumably, the “Mightiest Nation in the World”, The United States of America, and commandeer 4 Commercial passenger aircraft, have enough skill to fly two of them into the World Trade Center, the symbol of Imperialist World Trade and Commerce in the U.S., circumvent all security of, supposedly, the "Mightiest Military in the World" and fly one directly into the symbol of all that power, "The Pentagon" and almost, as theorized but, thwarted, make a successful attempt at driving another plane into the symbol of, supposedly, "The Most Powerful Government in the World", The Nation's Capital or The White House; what makes anyone, even here in lowly little old Clatsop County, so naive as to think that a well trained and skilled "Terrorist Group" could not, on the high seas, commandeer just one LNG Tanker in transit to the mouth of the Columbia River, off the crew and all on board (These tankers operate with a minimal crew and whatever passengers may be onboard), approach the mouth, take on a Bar Pilot, who would likely not know the difference or expect anything suspicious of the crew, likely from some third world nation as seems prevalent in ship crews these days, operating the ship as usual, pass off to the River Pilot about the waterfront of Astoria or under the Meglar Bridge, a symbol of our lifeline between the two states, and trigger the release of three full tanks, about 36 million gallons of gasifying LNG and then light her up?
How long would it take USCG, Clatsop County Sheriff, Oregon State Police, Astoria Police, Warrenton Police, The Members of The Clatsop County Board of Commissioners to pack their bags, all involved, to figure out something was deathly wrong before anybody could react?
Of course this would never happen right because it has never happened before because this is the U.S.of A.
You think we are merely providing Al Qaeda a new and effective weapon to use against us? After all, the key advantage of Terrorism is “Time”.
All this negative potential for 3 to 5 years of a Construction Phase for each one of these kind of projects with intense profiteering for all the “Local Players” in on the opportunity and then an unspecified number of “End-Jobs” and a projected, flashy, Property Tax Revenue that, when diluted, really will have no significant punch, weighed against the, still unknown, Cost of Security with no current clarity at all of who will pay the guestimate of $8-10 Million a year and finally, decades of enslavement of our Community Infrastructure to these Corporation for decades to come?
I don't envy your position because of the weightiness of the decision that will impact all 5 of your lives for years to come and still there are way too many unanswered questions out there and in this application that, in my, view need to be specifically satisfied before any further movement at all on this project.
Now, "Development" and "Growth" in "Our Community" is a good thing as long as it is sensitive to the betterment to all that live in it and provides to all the "Maximum Opportunity" to the best, long-term Life Quality and Security possible. I do not believe this project, Bradwood Landing/Northern Star Natural Gas or any other competing development, of this sort, is the right thing for us on both sides of The Columbia River and I think in your own hearts you know it also, it's just common sense.
When Coos Bay, Oregon can entertain the prospect of a "New Mega-Port Facility", Costing $700 Million (A $100 Million less than the projections of this Bradwood Project in question) with the opportunity of 2500 family wage,end jobs(Working Taxpayers,all) and a spin-off of 10,000 more, it certainly makes me wonder if you should not table this current scheme confronting you, in
our trust, step back, take that $200,000 we get a year for Economic Development, mount-up a Task Force to explore our options before we move forward with anymore of this LNG Speculation.
I encourage you all to refuse and reverse this "Consolidated Land Use Application" across the board in support of Staff's original Findings of Fact at the least.
I also request County Counsel to review and rule on Commissioner Hazen's position in these deliberations on the grounds of possible "Prejudicial Bias" in support of LNG Development as publicly expressed in the Rezoning Hearings for Skipnanon Peninsula's proposed LNG Transfer Facility sometime back. I would also like to request review and ruling on all the Commission's potential Ex Parte and Conflicts of Interest conduct prior to any deliberations on this Application.
Thank you and best of luck,
Patrick McGee
697 34th Street
Astoria, Oregon 97103.
Board of County Commissioners for Clatsop County
800 Exchange Street, Suite 100
Astoria, Oregon 97103
Re: Consolidated Land Use Application from Bradwood Landing LLC
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Commission;
Below is a comment, obviously from someone who, it seems, believes that LNG in Clatsop County is the right thing for us and that anybody against LNG in Clatsop County is against development and growth in our community and that concerns about our "Public Safety", "Well Being" and its "Dangers" is frivolous in light of the magnitude of what you five are about to commit us to, one way or the other on the issue of this one Energy Speculation and Development Corporation, Bradwood Landing/Northern Star Natural Gas.
“And since there are hundreds of LNG facilities all over the world and not a one has been bombed or a tanker destroyed, that tells me that the whole “Terrorist Target” idea is simply another scare tactic by the anti-LNG, anti-progress, anti-development of any kind crowd.”
Considering the fact a cell group of "Al Qaeda Terrorists" could establish themselves in, presumably, the “Mightiest Nation in the World”, The United States of America, and commandeer 4 Commercial passenger aircraft, have enough skill to fly two of them into the World Trade Center, the symbol of Imperialist World Trade and Commerce in the U.S., circumvent all security of, supposedly, the "Mightiest Military in the World" and fly one directly into the symbol of all that power, "The Pentagon" and almost, as theorized but, thwarted, make a successful attempt at driving another plane into the symbol of, supposedly, "The Most Powerful Government in the World", The Nation's Capital or The White House; what makes anyone, even here in lowly little old Clatsop County, so naive as to think that a well trained and skilled "Terrorist Group" could not, on the high seas, commandeer just one LNG Tanker in transit to the mouth of the Columbia River, off the crew and all on board (These tankers operate with a minimal crew and whatever passengers may be onboard), approach the mouth, take on a Bar Pilot, who would likely not know the difference or expect anything suspicious of the crew, likely from some third world nation as seems prevalent in ship crews these days, operating the ship as usual, pass off to the River Pilot about the waterfront of Astoria or under the Meglar Bridge, a symbol of our lifeline between the two states, and trigger the release of three full tanks, about 36 million gallons of gasifying LNG and then light her up?
How long would it take USCG, Clatsop County Sheriff, Oregon State Police, Astoria Police, Warrenton Police, The Members of The Clatsop County Board of Commissioners to pack their bags, all involved, to figure out something was deathly wrong before anybody could react?
Of course this would never happen right because it has never happened before because this is the U.S.of A.
You think we are merely providing Al Qaeda a new and effective weapon to use against us? After all, the key advantage of Terrorism is “Time”.
All this negative potential for 3 to 5 years of a Construction Phase for each one of these kind of projects with intense profiteering for all the “Local Players” in on the opportunity and then an unspecified number of “End-Jobs” and a projected, flashy, Property Tax Revenue that, when diluted, really will have no significant punch, weighed against the, still unknown, Cost of Security with no current clarity at all of who will pay the guestimate of $8-10 Million a year and finally, decades of enslavement of our Community Infrastructure to these Corporation for decades to come?
I don't envy your position because of the weightiness of the decision that will impact all 5 of your lives for years to come and still there are way too many unanswered questions out there and in this application that, in my, view need to be specifically satisfied before any further movement at all on this project.
Now, "Development" and "Growth" in "Our Community" is a good thing as long as it is sensitive to the betterment to all that live in it and provides to all the "Maximum Opportunity" to the best, long-term Life Quality and Security possible. I do not believe this project, Bradwood Landing/Northern Star Natural Gas or any other competing development, of this sort, is the right thing for us on both sides of The Columbia River and I think in your own hearts you know it also, it's just common sense.
When Coos Bay, Oregon can entertain the prospect of a "New Mega-Port Facility", Costing $700 Million (A $100 Million less than the projections of this Bradwood Project in question) with the opportunity of 2500 family wage,end jobs(Working Taxpayers,all) and a spin-off of 10,000 more, it certainly makes me wonder if you should not table this current scheme confronting you, in
our trust, step back, take that $200,000 we get a year for Economic Development, mount-up a Task Force to explore our options before we move forward with anymore of this LNG Speculation.
I encourage you all to refuse and reverse this "Consolidated Land Use Application" across the board in support of Staff's original Findings of Fact at the least.
I also request County Counsel to review and rule on Commissioner Hazen's position in these deliberations on the grounds of possible "Prejudicial Bias" in support of LNG Development as publicly expressed in the Rezoning Hearings for Skipnanon Peninsula's proposed LNG Transfer Facility sometime back. I would also like to request review and ruling on all the Commission's potential Ex Parte and Conflicts of Interest conduct prior to any deliberations on this Application.
Thank you and best of luck,
Patrick McGee
697 34th Street
Astoria, Oregon 97103.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Octber 22, 2007: A Day OF Reckoning For Clatsop County And You Damned Well Need To Show Up!
Ocrober 22, 2007 is the day Clastop County Board of Commissioners will sit in session and rule on a critical and controversial decision by Clatsop County Planning Commission to continue to smooth the way for Bradwood Landing/Northern Star Natural Gas' proposed Liquefied Natural Gas Transfer/Storage facility at a critical bottleneck in the shipping channel of The Columbia River at Puget Island, twenty-plus miles upriver from The Columbia Bar as if you did not already know.
The decision these five people, The Clatsop County Board of Commissioners, along with their colluding staff, will make could quite possibly drive another nail in the coffin of our lives in this community for many, many decades to come of enslavement to one, just one, of these "Private" Energy Speculators, setting a precedent, as it seems happens in situations like, for more in other areas of our community. Even Oregon LNG, the recipient of the benefits of a bonehead deal between and now defunct Calpine Energy Group and our own Port of Astoria, led at the time by Former Port Director Peter Gearin, is already flaunting a facility on The Skipanon Peninsula of 3 LNG Storage Tanks in lieu of the 2 they claim originally and Bradwood or not they plan to move ahead adding to the deal a multi-County 36" diameter Natural Gas Pipeline.
The way I see it we, the citizens of Clatsop County, no matter how complacent or apathetic any of us may be, cannot afford to sit home on this one.
The last County Census showed a population of around 33,660 citizens in total and minus these players in the decision making that we, presumably, put there to represent our interests, all need to show up that day without exception to the man, woman, child. Its that important to our futures and cannot be ignored and these people need to be held accountable.
We need to fill the hall where that meeting is being held, flow out to the sidewalks, up and down the street in a quiet and orderly vigil, all holding an 8 1/2" x 11" piece of paper with two opitonal words, boldly in Red, depending on your viewpoint, "Yes" or "No".
I am confident the majority will write the word "NO!!!" and some will write "YES" but, no matter the view and to show our strength in unity, the indiviual views should be respected, no matter.
I'm going to be there and if you've never stood up for anything in your lives, now is the time to do so, man, woman, child, business owner, worker, student, fisherman, logger, carpenter, all, you need to be there.
Hold these people accountable, for putting the lives and life quality of us all on the line based on, yet, unfounded hype and critial questions still unanswered.
The decision these five people, The Clatsop County Board of Commissioners, along with their colluding staff, will make could quite possibly drive another nail in the coffin of our lives in this community for many, many decades to come of enslavement to one, just one, of these "Private" Energy Speculators, setting a precedent, as it seems happens in situations like, for more in other areas of our community. Even Oregon LNG, the recipient of the benefits of a bonehead deal between and now defunct Calpine Energy Group and our own Port of Astoria, led at the time by Former Port Director Peter Gearin, is already flaunting a facility on The Skipanon Peninsula of 3 LNG Storage Tanks in lieu of the 2 they claim originally and Bradwood or not they plan to move ahead adding to the deal a multi-County 36" diameter Natural Gas Pipeline.
The way I see it we, the citizens of Clatsop County, no matter how complacent or apathetic any of us may be, cannot afford to sit home on this one.
The last County Census showed a population of around 33,660 citizens in total and minus these players in the decision making that we, presumably, put there to represent our interests, all need to show up that day without exception to the man, woman, child. Its that important to our futures and cannot be ignored and these people need to be held accountable.
We need to fill the hall where that meeting is being held, flow out to the sidewalks, up and down the street in a quiet and orderly vigil, all holding an 8 1/2" x 11" piece of paper with two opitonal words, boldly in Red, depending on your viewpoint, "Yes" or "No".
I am confident the majority will write the word "NO!!!" and some will write "YES" but, no matter the view and to show our strength in unity, the indiviual views should be respected, no matter.
I'm going to be there and if you've never stood up for anything in your lives, now is the time to do so, man, woman, child, business owner, worker, student, fisherman, logger, carpenter, all, you need to be there.
Hold these people accountable, for putting the lives and life quality of us all on the line based on, yet, unfounded hype and critial questions still unanswered.
Friday, September 07, 2007
LNG Tankers and their risks
Homeland Insecurity: Floating Targets An attack on a liquefied natural gas tanker could cause a massive explosion.
Is enough being done to protect American ports from this devastating risk? Second in a seven-part series on the lessons of 9/11.
James Ridgeway September 06 , 2007
The attacks of September 11, 2001, came from the sky, but the next terrorist attack on the United States could come from the sea in the form of a small-boat strike—like the one on the USS Cole in October 2000—against an enormous liquefied natural gas tanker. While the discussion of potentially dangerous shipping cargo has focused largely on hidden nuclear devices in shipping containers, LNG is perhaps the single most dangerous substance routinely plying our coastal waters and coming into our ports.
On land, most natural gas is transported by pipeline, but to ship it by sea, it first must be chilled into a liquid form that takes up 600 times less space than gas and can be carried, like oil, in tankers. Natural gas accounts for 22 percent of all energy consumed in the United States, and as domestic natural gas production slows, LNG promises to provide even more of our energy. There currently are six LNG terminals in the country, in Everett, Massachusetts; Cove Point, Maryland; Elba Island, Georgia; Lake Charles, Louisiana; Kenai, Alaska; and Peñuelas, Puerto Rico. Around 29 additional facilities are in the planning stages; 14 more have been proposed. Several of the new facilities would be near urban areas, including Long Island, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The facilities would receive gas shipments from West Africa—primarily Nigeria—as well as from Qatar, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago. Australia and Indonesia also supply LNG, and Russia is expected to become an important exporter in Asia within a year or so.
An exploding LNG tanker would be devastating—by some estimates, it would incinerate everything within a one-mile radius or beyond. Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, once speculated that an LNG tanker explosion could rival that of a nuclear bomb. Others have compared such an explosion to the devastating 1883 Krakatoa volcanic eruption in Indonesia, which generated the loudest sound ever recorded.
Once LNG tankers are in port, they are sitting ducks, susceptible to being bombed from the air, rammed—like the Cole—with an explosive-laden boat, or hijacked. A 2004 study by the Sandia National Laboratory made it clear that an attack on an LNG tanker could puncture its tanks, causing their cold liquid contents to spray into the atmosphere, where they could ignite. "The fire from such a spill would be very large... perhaps up to half a mile in diameter, or larger if more of the containment system fails," Jerry Havens, a former officer in the Army's chemical weapons division, told the Associated Press. In March, the Government Accountability Office issued a report calling for the Department of Energy to conduct further research on the effects of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. "The GAO found that there are widely conflicting estimates regarding the worst-case consequences of a terrorist attack on LNG tankers," said Democratic Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey, whose district includes the nation's only urban LNG import facility. "Given the fact that LNG is being transported into Boston harbor every several days on the way to the Everett terminal, it is very troubling that knowledge about potential public safety consequences of a terrorist attack on these vessels is not better," he said.
But strengthening safeguards against an attack on LNG vessels and facilities is difficult without support of the industry, which is dominated by international companies such as ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell. In 2006, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the oil and gas industry gave federal candidates $19 million, with 82 percent of that going to Republicans. In 2005, ExxonMobil made $7.14 million in political contributions. Even small firms banking their futures on the LNG trade are actively courting Washington; Cheniere Energy, a Houston-based firm, has spent $320,000 on lobbying. So far, the Bush administration has been reluctant to review the current regulations. In a 2004 letter to Markey, Homeland Security assistant secretary for legislative affairs Pamela Turner wrote that "there is no economically feasible engineering or design solution that could mitigate the consequences of a large scale LNG release on the vessel's hull." In other words, safer tankers are too expensive.
LNG ships are built according to standards by the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization. Ship owners also must meet design specifications and other requirements set by various private organizations, whose approval is needed to obtain insurance. The ships' containers are surrounded by insulation. During construction, this insulation has caught fire, leading to questions about its safety. The LNG industry dismisses such fears, citing its long safety record. Indeed, the precautions already taken are elaborate: LNG tankers must provide 96 hours' notice before approaching the American coast, and a small flotilla of tugs, choppers, firefighters, police, and divers must be assembled to escort them. Bridges along the way are closed, private boats are warned away, and the tankers are inspected and screened for explosives before they are allowed to approach land. Tanker crews also must pass security checks.
Many consider these safeguards inadequate. Rep. Markey has been a leading congressional critic of the current policy. He says that LNG terminals should not be based near urban centers; some experts have even suggested that they should only be sited offshore. He has suggested that regulations could require improvements in tanker design and construction, in particular a ban on flammable insulation. Additionally, maritime security risks such as LNG tankers have prompted calls to strengthen the Coast Guard. However, the Coast Guard's modernization program to replace its old cutters and other ships has been caught up in a construction scandal. Should the Coast Guard have to defend against a terrorist attack in the open ocean with its current fleet of cutters, there is concern that its aged ships are not up to the task.
James Ridgeway is Mother Jones' senior correspondent.
Is enough being done to protect American ports from this devastating risk? Second in a seven-part series on the lessons of 9/11.
James Ridgeway September 06 , 2007
The attacks of September 11, 2001, came from the sky, but the next terrorist attack on the United States could come from the sea in the form of a small-boat strike—like the one on the USS Cole in October 2000—against an enormous liquefied natural gas tanker. While the discussion of potentially dangerous shipping cargo has focused largely on hidden nuclear devices in shipping containers, LNG is perhaps the single most dangerous substance routinely plying our coastal waters and coming into our ports.
On land, most natural gas is transported by pipeline, but to ship it by sea, it first must be chilled into a liquid form that takes up 600 times less space than gas and can be carried, like oil, in tankers. Natural gas accounts for 22 percent of all energy consumed in the United States, and as domestic natural gas production slows, LNG promises to provide even more of our energy. There currently are six LNG terminals in the country, in Everett, Massachusetts; Cove Point, Maryland; Elba Island, Georgia; Lake Charles, Louisiana; Kenai, Alaska; and Peñuelas, Puerto Rico. Around 29 additional facilities are in the planning stages; 14 more have been proposed. Several of the new facilities would be near urban areas, including Long Island, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The facilities would receive gas shipments from West Africa—primarily Nigeria—as well as from Qatar, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago. Australia and Indonesia also supply LNG, and Russia is expected to become an important exporter in Asia within a year or so.
An exploding LNG tanker would be devastating—by some estimates, it would incinerate everything within a one-mile radius or beyond. Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, once speculated that an LNG tanker explosion could rival that of a nuclear bomb. Others have compared such an explosion to the devastating 1883 Krakatoa volcanic eruption in Indonesia, which generated the loudest sound ever recorded.
Once LNG tankers are in port, they are sitting ducks, susceptible to being bombed from the air, rammed—like the Cole—with an explosive-laden boat, or hijacked. A 2004 study by the Sandia National Laboratory made it clear that an attack on an LNG tanker could puncture its tanks, causing their cold liquid contents to spray into the atmosphere, where they could ignite. "The fire from such a spill would be very large... perhaps up to half a mile in diameter, or larger if more of the containment system fails," Jerry Havens, a former officer in the Army's chemical weapons division, told the Associated Press. In March, the Government Accountability Office issued a report calling for the Department of Energy to conduct further research on the effects of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. "The GAO found that there are widely conflicting estimates regarding the worst-case consequences of a terrorist attack on LNG tankers," said Democratic Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey, whose district includes the nation's only urban LNG import facility. "Given the fact that LNG is being transported into Boston harbor every several days on the way to the Everett terminal, it is very troubling that knowledge about potential public safety consequences of a terrorist attack on these vessels is not better," he said.
But strengthening safeguards against an attack on LNG vessels and facilities is difficult without support of the industry, which is dominated by international companies such as ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell. In 2006, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the oil and gas industry gave federal candidates $19 million, with 82 percent of that going to Republicans. In 2005, ExxonMobil made $7.14 million in political contributions. Even small firms banking their futures on the LNG trade are actively courting Washington; Cheniere Energy, a Houston-based firm, has spent $320,000 on lobbying. So far, the Bush administration has been reluctant to review the current regulations. In a 2004 letter to Markey, Homeland Security assistant secretary for legislative affairs Pamela Turner wrote that "there is no economically feasible engineering or design solution that could mitigate the consequences of a large scale LNG release on the vessel's hull." In other words, safer tankers are too expensive.
LNG ships are built according to standards by the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization. Ship owners also must meet design specifications and other requirements set by various private organizations, whose approval is needed to obtain insurance. The ships' containers are surrounded by insulation. During construction, this insulation has caught fire, leading to questions about its safety. The LNG industry dismisses such fears, citing its long safety record. Indeed, the precautions already taken are elaborate: LNG tankers must provide 96 hours' notice before approaching the American coast, and a small flotilla of tugs, choppers, firefighters, police, and divers must be assembled to escort them. Bridges along the way are closed, private boats are warned away, and the tankers are inspected and screened for explosives before they are allowed to approach land. Tanker crews also must pass security checks.
Many consider these safeguards inadequate. Rep. Markey has been a leading congressional critic of the current policy. He says that LNG terminals should not be based near urban centers; some experts have even suggested that they should only be sited offshore. He has suggested that regulations could require improvements in tanker design and construction, in particular a ban on flammable insulation. Additionally, maritime security risks such as LNG tankers have prompted calls to strengthen the Coast Guard. However, the Coast Guard's modernization program to replace its old cutters and other ships has been caught up in a construction scandal. Should the Coast Guard have to defend against a terrorist attack in the open ocean with its current fleet of cutters, there is concern that its aged ships are not up to the task.
James Ridgeway is Mother Jones' senior correspondent.
Thursday, August 23, 2007
"The Jail": A Practical Solution Versus Three Or Four Egos Maybe?
This is a look back to a News Release From Clatsop County Commission regarding Sheriff Tom Bergin's workable proposal, in my view, for a practical retro-fit to the existing jail and a resolution to adequate bed space so badly needed, even now.
The incumbent members of the CCBofC at the time just could not leave well enough alone and made it very clear that they were not too happy about what appeared so obvious: Clearly being one-upped by the Sheriff on this important issue.
And what did CCBof C do?
Initiated a $96,000.00 study by the socalled "EXPERTS" from out of area, The National Institute of Corrections in lieu of a local study by those in the know and intimate with the situation.
"Wednesday, January 31, 2007
COUNTY TO BE THOROUGH, DILIGENT IN EVALUATING JAIL OPTIONS
As Clatsop County moves forward with efforts to resolve local jail capacity problems, the county commissioners want to thoroughly study all possibilities and their costs.
The county is taking the next step in evaluating Sheriff Tom Bergin’s proposal to retrofit and expand the existing jail, Chairperson Richard Lee explained.
“We think the sheriff’s proposal has merit and we applaud Sheriff Tom Bergin for his innovation and ingenuity in bringing this option to the table,” Lee said. “We’re taking the next step by having the county manager and sheriff work together to analyze the potential impacts of the proposal on operating and other ongoing costs.”
The scope of the favorable feasibility study of expanding the existing jail was limited to structural issues. DLR Group indicated that the existing building could be expanded within the second floor overhang to increase inmate capacity. Its study included a geotechnical analysis of existing soils and a structural engineering evaluation of the existing structure’s pile systems for bearing and lateral resistance capacities.
As part of the decision-making process, the Board of Commissioners wants to be able to compare the retrofit with any other potential solutions, which could include renting beds at another facility on a larger scale and on a long-term basis or building a new jail locally or with a neighboring county.
To gather the information, County Manager Scott Derickson has contacted the National Institute of Corrections, which sponsored an earlier study of the current jail operations, for recommendations of experts who can help with the analysis.
Various studies that the county commissioned before bringing the failed jail bond measure to voters in 2002 need to be updated to reflect current conditions. The makeup of the type of offenders in the jail has changed. The 30-bed transition center opened last year. Settlement of wetlands issues with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could open new sites for a new facility.
“We want to be diligent and make sure we identify all options and know all the costs so we can weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each before we determine the best solution if we have to make a major investment of the taxpayers’ money,” Lee said. “We believe this is the responsible way to go.”"
The incumbent members of the CCBofC at the time just could not leave well enough alone and made it very clear that they were not too happy about what appeared so obvious: Clearly being one-upped by the Sheriff on this important issue.
And what did CCBof C do?
Initiated a $96,000.00 study by the socalled "EXPERTS" from out of area, The National Institute of Corrections in lieu of a local study by those in the know and intimate with the situation.
"Wednesday, January 31, 2007
COUNTY TO BE THOROUGH, DILIGENT IN EVALUATING JAIL OPTIONS
As Clatsop County moves forward with efforts to resolve local jail capacity problems, the county commissioners want to thoroughly study all possibilities and their costs.
The county is taking the next step in evaluating Sheriff Tom Bergin’s proposal to retrofit and expand the existing jail, Chairperson Richard Lee explained.
“We think the sheriff’s proposal has merit and we applaud Sheriff Tom Bergin for his innovation and ingenuity in bringing this option to the table,” Lee said. “We’re taking the next step by having the county manager and sheriff work together to analyze the potential impacts of the proposal on operating and other ongoing costs.”
The scope of the favorable feasibility study of expanding the existing jail was limited to structural issues. DLR Group indicated that the existing building could be expanded within the second floor overhang to increase inmate capacity. Its study included a geotechnical analysis of existing soils and a structural engineering evaluation of the existing structure’s pile systems for bearing and lateral resistance capacities.
As part of the decision-making process, the Board of Commissioners wants to be able to compare the retrofit with any other potential solutions, which could include renting beds at another facility on a larger scale and on a long-term basis or building a new jail locally or with a neighboring county.
To gather the information, County Manager Scott Derickson has contacted the National Institute of Corrections, which sponsored an earlier study of the current jail operations, for recommendations of experts who can help with the analysis.
Various studies that the county commissioned before bringing the failed jail bond measure to voters in 2002 need to be updated to reflect current conditions. The makeup of the type of offenders in the jail has changed. The 30-bed transition center opened last year. Settlement of wetlands issues with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could open new sites for a new facility.
“We want to be diligent and make sure we identify all options and know all the costs so we can weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each before we determine the best solution if we have to make a major investment of the taxpayers’ money,” Lee said. “We believe this is the responsible way to go.”"
Sunday, August 05, 2007
From Daily"A" LTE: The Port: Learn From The Past
Letter: Pray to God the new Port of Astoria commissioners take their seats before "the incumbents" let the next batch of riff raff schemes in the back door ("Time for skepticism at Port of Astoria," The Daily Astorian, June 14).And by the way, who is it who gave Leucadia (Oregon LNG) free rein to move ahead with, of all things now, a pipeline starting in Warrenton and going through six Oregon counties to Molalla to tie into Canada's pipeline there on its way to those folks down in California? Was anybody planning to involve the citizens of Clatsop County this time around? It doesn't seem so does it?As far as I'm concerned this company should have to start out from "dead zero." This project was bought from Calpine, which still has its stink on it, and Peter Hansen is at the helm of this next "insurgent foray" of LNG profiteering in our community. It was totally bad faith. There was a failure to follow through, along with the failure of our incumbent Port commission to honor the people who elected them, to fight to withdraw the dirty lease to begin with at notification of Calpine insolvency.I hope the new Port commission will wisely learn from their predecessors' mistakes, and halt the nonsense perpetrated upon them by Peter Gearin, his posse of devoted staff and totally compliant and subservient commissioners.This should never be allowed to happen again.
Monday, July 23, 2007
Even Polls Should Have Some Integrity?
I truly thought this Poll on 'The D.A.'s Stipend' was straight-up but, it wasn't and it sure as hell doesn't help my cause any to allow it to continue when those more creative than the rest of us can, essentially, vote as many times as they want to.
I apologize to all for the inconvenience.
I will try to find a poll program that will actually allow, only one vote per person forever or until the poll ends.
I apologize to all for the inconvenience.
I will try to find a poll program that will actually allow, only one vote per person forever or until the poll ends.
Thursday, July 05, 2007
You Want Affordable Housing?
Become an "Alchoholic Transient" or, pretend to be one, move to Seattle where they will provide you with a cozy, cute little subsidized apartment and encourage you to hole-up, sit around and drink all day to your hearts content just to keep you off the streets.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Bradwood LNG Threatens Our Economy
From "The Daily Astorian" Letters To The Editor
LNG actually threatens local, state economyBy Robert Stang and Don WestFor The Daily AstorianLast Wednesday the CEO of Northewrn Star Natural Gas shared his response to the U.S. Coast Guard's assessment of Columbia River security issues concerning the proposed liquefied national gas terminal at Bradwood Landing. Today a recently formed group of LNG opponents offers its thoughts on the issue.The Texas energy speculators and their public relations staff at Northern Star must think that the local business community in Astoria just fell off the turnip truck. They have to believe that the communities around the Columbia Estuary are too "small town," un-educated, or gullible to question their almost silly editorial claim that bringing LNG tankers into the Columbia would somehow "benefit ship traffic" and "improve safety" for our community.George Orwell would be proud of Northern Star's editorial spin, but it lacks any basis in reality. It's easy to understand Northern Star's interest in trying to put a positive glow on the U.S. Coast Guard's recent report which found allowing LNG tankers into the Columbia would require serious restrictions on Columbia River ship traffic and fundamentally change life on the Columbia as we now know it. But claiming that bringing high-risk LNG tankers and the intense security measures that surround them would somehow benefit ship traffic or public safety is an insult to the intelligence of our community. The findings of the report summary, and the majority of the report which were not public, were so serious that even U.S. Rep. Brian Baird, who had only said positive things about the project for the last year, is now against Northern Star's project and threatening to withhold funding from the Coast Guard and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission if necessary to stop the project.The portion of the Coast Guard's waterway suitability report that was made publicly available made a number of things clear about how LNG tankers would threaten our local economy and use and travel on the Columbia River.As LNG opponents have claimed would occur, the Coast Guard explained that "Due to a narrow shipping channel, numerous navigational hazards and the proximity to populated areas," the Coast Guard would require a 1,500 foot wide security zone around any LNG tanker in the estuary. Because the Columbia shipping channel is only 600 feet wide at best, this exclusion zone would effectively shut the Columbia down to one-way river traffic when LNG tankers were in the river and effectively force other boaters, fisherman and shippers to margins of the river or off it all together.The Coast Guard identified only four specific sections of the Columbia where other commercial ships could pass oncoming LNG tankers, but even in these locations it said "meeting situations will be closely controlled" and allowed only on a "case-by-case basis" by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also said it would prohibit all ships from passing slow-moving LNG tankers from behind. While this makes sense from a safety perspective, it would create a daily bottle-neck in Columbia River traffic that would seriously impact all river users, since with several inbound and outbound tanker trips a week LNG tankers would be a dominant new feature on the river. What the Coast Guard report made clear was that free passage on the Columbia would come to an end with the arrival of LNG tankers. While this may benefit some of the river pilots, who could prosper from the chaos of sending high risk LNG tankers up the narrow Columbia shipping channel; commercial and recreational fisherman, recreational boaters, and commercial river traffic would be hard hit. The Coast Guard report also specifically acknowledged the obvious conflict between LNG tankers and cruise ships and requires that if LNG tankers were allowed into the Columbia "cruise ships will require separate waterside security" and will be prohibited from ever passing LNG tankers. How much would this new security cost? How many times would cruise ships be forced to wait outside the bar while priority LNG tankers move up-river? How long would it be before cruise lines take their business elsewhere?But the extent to which the whole feel of our community would change if we became a high-security LNG highway was highlighted by the Coast Guard's requirement for Northern Star to establish 24-hour a day "camera system with complete coverage of the entire transit route." The Coast Guard estimated it would take 20 people to operate this massive new camera system. So much for a private day of fishing with your family.Finally, the Coast Guard recognized that there were not adequate existing security, fire, or emergency response capabilities, but offered no suggestions as to how cash-strapped local communities, state agencies or even the Coast Guard could afford to maintain the massive security infrastructure necessary to protect the public from LNG.While the Californians who would end up with the gas imported through our backyards may enjoy benefits from Northern Star's project, the recent Coast Guard report is just the latest sign that our economy and community will not.
Robert Stang is Columbia River Business Alliance president and Don West is vice-president
LNG actually threatens local, state economyBy Robert Stang and Don WestFor The Daily AstorianLast Wednesday the CEO of Northewrn Star Natural Gas shared his response to the U.S. Coast Guard's assessment of Columbia River security issues concerning the proposed liquefied national gas terminal at Bradwood Landing. Today a recently formed group of LNG opponents offers its thoughts on the issue.The Texas energy speculators and their public relations staff at Northern Star must think that the local business community in Astoria just fell off the turnip truck. They have to believe that the communities around the Columbia Estuary are too "small town," un-educated, or gullible to question their almost silly editorial claim that bringing LNG tankers into the Columbia would somehow "benefit ship traffic" and "improve safety" for our community.George Orwell would be proud of Northern Star's editorial spin, but it lacks any basis in reality. It's easy to understand Northern Star's interest in trying to put a positive glow on the U.S. Coast Guard's recent report which found allowing LNG tankers into the Columbia would require serious restrictions on Columbia River ship traffic and fundamentally change life on the Columbia as we now know it. But claiming that bringing high-risk LNG tankers and the intense security measures that surround them would somehow benefit ship traffic or public safety is an insult to the intelligence of our community. The findings of the report summary, and the majority of the report which were not public, were so serious that even U.S. Rep. Brian Baird, who had only said positive things about the project for the last year, is now against Northern Star's project and threatening to withhold funding from the Coast Guard and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission if necessary to stop the project.The portion of the Coast Guard's waterway suitability report that was made publicly available made a number of things clear about how LNG tankers would threaten our local economy and use and travel on the Columbia River.As LNG opponents have claimed would occur, the Coast Guard explained that "Due to a narrow shipping channel, numerous navigational hazards and the proximity to populated areas," the Coast Guard would require a 1,500 foot wide security zone around any LNG tanker in the estuary. Because the Columbia shipping channel is only 600 feet wide at best, this exclusion zone would effectively shut the Columbia down to one-way river traffic when LNG tankers were in the river and effectively force other boaters, fisherman and shippers to margins of the river or off it all together.The Coast Guard identified only four specific sections of the Columbia where other commercial ships could pass oncoming LNG tankers, but even in these locations it said "meeting situations will be closely controlled" and allowed only on a "case-by-case basis" by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also said it would prohibit all ships from passing slow-moving LNG tankers from behind. While this makes sense from a safety perspective, it would create a daily bottle-neck in Columbia River traffic that would seriously impact all river users, since with several inbound and outbound tanker trips a week LNG tankers would be a dominant new feature on the river. What the Coast Guard report made clear was that free passage on the Columbia would come to an end with the arrival of LNG tankers. While this may benefit some of the river pilots, who could prosper from the chaos of sending high risk LNG tankers up the narrow Columbia shipping channel; commercial and recreational fisherman, recreational boaters, and commercial river traffic would be hard hit. The Coast Guard report also specifically acknowledged the obvious conflict between LNG tankers and cruise ships and requires that if LNG tankers were allowed into the Columbia "cruise ships will require separate waterside security" and will be prohibited from ever passing LNG tankers. How much would this new security cost? How many times would cruise ships be forced to wait outside the bar while priority LNG tankers move up-river? How long would it be before cruise lines take their business elsewhere?But the extent to which the whole feel of our community would change if we became a high-security LNG highway was highlighted by the Coast Guard's requirement for Northern Star to establish 24-hour a day "camera system with complete coverage of the entire transit route." The Coast Guard estimated it would take 20 people to operate this massive new camera system. So much for a private day of fishing with your family.Finally, the Coast Guard recognized that there were not adequate existing security, fire, or emergency response capabilities, but offered no suggestions as to how cash-strapped local communities, state agencies or even the Coast Guard could afford to maintain the massive security infrastructure necessary to protect the public from LNG.While the Californians who would end up with the gas imported through our backyards may enjoy benefits from Northern Star's project, the recent Coast Guard report is just the latest sign that our economy and community will not.
Robert Stang is Columbia River Business Alliance president and Don West is vice-president
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