The "Dark Ironies" At Carruthers Park/Tansy Point

Tansy Point, we all know the name.

Sits right next to Carruthers Park, between Warrenton and Hammond right?

Noted today for being a Log Storage yard, leased from the City of Warrenton by the "Nygaard Family Empire" right?

Not many, if one were to visit it now, associate Tansy Point with the fact that it, along with the property Carruthers Park sits on, was a part of the lands donated by the Carruthers Family to the citizens of Warrenton/Hammond for their benefit and pleasure.

It seems somewhat inappropriate that a "Log Yard" would be the current use for Tansy Point and add to that the prospect that it could, if manipulations go to someone's benefit, be sold?

Become another prospective site for another LNG Termunal?

Quite a dark future, in my view and below look at its bleak past. "Land Takings" all in the interest of greed and profit and displacement of people........

The Anson Dart Treaties

(From Chinook Nation WebSite)

"The first of the treaties were called the Anson Dart Treaties in 1851, and there was a whole series of them written with the different tribes. Each of the five groups that now make up the lower Chinook Indian nation, signed a treaty, and the United States Senate never acted on, or signed or ratified those treaties " (Gary Johnson interview: 2002).

Anson Dart negotiates 19 treaties in August of 1851, on treaty grounds at Tansy Point, on the south shore of the Columbia at the mouth of Lewis & Clark River (see map below). Treaties are drawn up with the Clatsop, Wau-ki-kum, Konnaacc, Kathlamet, Klatskania, Wheelappa, and Lower Chinook bands of the Chinook peoples, as well as the Tillamook and other bands. None of these is ratified by the Senate. (Beckham 1987:7)

Section of 1887 Army Corps ofEngineers map showing location ofTansy Point, 1851 treaty grounds.University of Washington Archives#UW128. -- University of Washington Library Archives Website, 2002

Adapted from portion of 1881 Symonsmap to show approximate boundary ofLower Chinook territory cession,as described in Anson Darttreaty at Tansey Point in 1851.
The geographical area described in the treaty for the cession of the Lower Band of the Chinook Tribe to the United States was as follows:

“Beginning at the mouth of a certain stream entering Gray’s Bay on the north side of the Columbia River which stream forms the western boundary of lands ceded to the United states by the Waukikum band of Chinooks, running thence northeroly on said western boundary to lands of the Wheelappa and of Indians thence westerly along said lands of the Wheelappa band to the Shoalwater Bay, thence southerly and easterly following the Coast of the Pacific Ocean band the northern shore of the Columbia to the place of beginning, the above description is intended to embrace all the lands owned or claimed by said Lower Band of Chinook Indians. [See Chinook Tribe and Bands of Indians v. United States, 6 Ind. Cl. Comm. 177, 184 (1958))]. (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1851: 32-35, Ex. 9). (Beckham 1987:8)

Port Of Astoria Still Floundering In Its Own Sewage Of Dysfunction!

Port fines build tension. Commissioners split on doing a detailed report on all expenses incurred from 2005 violation

If there were ever a call for any of our local "Public Agencies" to submit to a mandatory "Financial and Performance Audit" from the Oregon Secretary of State's Office, this agency, The Port of Astoria, is a prime candidate and immediately so if we want to save this important part of our community's fabric.

Many months after an altered Port Commission takes its seat, nothing but more infighting and continued deterioration, much less a vision of exactly where this facility is headed in its/our future...McGee



By CASSANDRA PROFITA - The Daily Astorian

http://www.dailyastorian.com/Main.asp?SectionID=2&ArticleID=47709



A rift over how to close the book on the Port of Astoria's 2005 dredging violations illustrated a growing divide among Port commissioners Tuesday.At the end of a fairly peaceful board meeting, Commissioner Kathy Sanders raised a new business item that sparked disagreement.Sanders proposed the board direct staff to prepare a detailed written report of all legal expenses and fines incurred as a result of the agency's Clean Water Act violation in 2005. She asked that all charges be categorized and all fees to lawyers be carefully labeled "so it's easily readable."After some debate, the proposal split the board in a 3-2 vote with Commissioners Dan Hess and Bernie Bjork voting no and Commissioners Sanders, Bill Hunsinger and Larry Pfund in support.Sanders said she wants to know how much money the Port has spent and how much the agency owes on what she surmised is a half-million dollars in costs from the violation in addition to the $200,000 fine from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that the Port still hasn't paid.A year ago, former Port Executive Director Peter Gearin said the Port had spent about $300,000 on legal and consulting costs as a result of the violation."I want to start the new year with this done and behind us," Sanders said."It doesn't sound like it," said Commission President Hess."It seems like this dredge violation is the dredge violation that will never go away," said Bjork. "It'll come up every time somebody wants to give the Port a black eye.""I think we're duplicating (our efforts)," said Hess. "I don't know what this is going to accomplish."Sanders said she's noticed an extra $22,500 in violation-related costs since the commission received its last update from staff."I know, Bernie, it seems like this is the thing that will never go away," said Pfund. "But we keep opening up our checkbook and writing more checks. That's the part that doesn't go away, and that's what bothers me."Sanders also requested a report on the Port's proposed supplemental environmental project, which was started in the hopes of reducing the $200,000 fine but hasn't come together. This fall, Port Interim Executive Director Ron Larsen advised the commission to abandon the environmental project because of the unknown costs of following strict Corps regulations on how it would need to be completed. Sanders said she wanted the board to have a written update from staff on the status of the project. The board voted 4-1 to request the report with Bjork voting no. The new commission has been "completely hamstrung for lack of funds" since its inception in July, Sanders said. If the board had money to spend, she said, it would have been able to search nationwide for a new executive director and hire a consultant to begin a strategic planning process.She said she was led to believe the Port had $300,000 in the bank before she was elected, but within a week of being sworn in, she learned the agency "is completely broke.""We spent half a million dollars on legal fees (for the dredging violation), and I feel the public has a right to know," she said.Earlier in the meeting, the board agreed to meet with a Bornstein Seafoods representative in a workshop session to review the company's lease agreement with the Port and look at possible parking arrangements for the company's proposed tourist attraction, the Bornstein Fish Factory.In a letter to the Port dated Dec. 10, the Oregon Department of Justice raised a red flag on a change to the lease that was made in March 2006, saying it doesn't comply with the rules set forward by the Oregon Economic and Community Development Department, which supplied the loan for Bornstein's to build a new fish processing plant at the Port.Later, Sanders criticized Hess and Larsen for signing paperwork related to the Bornstein project on Nov. 28 without consulting the rest of the commission.In other business, the board:• Approved a resolution urging the Oregon Department of Transportation to put a higher priority on the Astoria Bypass and Warrenton Parkway project.• Approved a lease reassignment to Englund-Astoria LLC, the new business name for Englund Marine Supply Co.• Heard a presentation on salmon recovery from John Veenendaal, who explained the role of the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board in improving salmon habitat.

Commisioner Ann Samuelson - No Way! - Transporting And Storing Billions Of Cubic Feet Of LNG Will Cause An Explosion

Clatsop County approves NorthernStar LNG project
Filed from Houston - Energy Current - 12/18/2007 5:32:52 PM GMT
USA: Clatsop County (Oregon) Commissioners tentatively approved in a 4-1 vote last week the land-use changes that would allow Houston-based NorthernStar Natural Gas to construct its proposed Bradwood liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal on the mouth of the Columbia River near Astoria, Ore., according to media reports.
To meet the Clatsop County code, commissioners listed the project as a small- to medium-size facility. The commissioners also voted to allow NorthernStar to dredge part of the river to make way for LNG tankers. A final decision is expected in January.
Earlier this fall, the Clatsop County Planning Commission approved the land-use changes that the facility needs to meet local zoning rules, despite the county staff and an outside consultant advising against it.
Bradwood Landing still needs approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has final say in the project's construction, as well as water and air quality permits from Oregon and Washington.
Under the proposed plan, NorthernStar would build two LNG storage tankers, each 168 feet (51 m) high, across the river from Puget Island. The company also would construct a new pipeline to transport gas from the terminal to markets in the Pacific Northwest.
The company's pipeline would cross Clatsop, Columbia and Cowlitz counties in Oregon and connect with the Williams pipeline near Interstate 5 northeast of Kelso. An additional pipeline, proposed separately, would plug the terminal into gas lines throughout Oregon.
Opponents of the facility have threatened to appeal the county's decision, accusing commissioners of ignoring their constituents' concerns about safety hazards, damage to fish habitat and impact on shipping traffic the terminal would create.
Commissioner Richard Lee said he voted for the proposal because the terminal "fit the bill" for the riverside site, a long-abandoned sawmill, The Daily News reports.

Un-Freaking-Believeable!!!
Commissioner Ann Samuelson said NorthernStar still must comply with a number of the board's conditions, including offsetting environmental impacts and fixing up a road leading to the site.
However, Samuelson said NorthernStar's executives appear to be open and transparent. "I haven't felt like they were steamrolling us at any point in time. I haven't felt that they were being dishonest."
Samuelson also dismissed claims that transporting and storing billions of cubic feet of superchilled gas could cause an explosion.

The Columbia River Clean Energy Coalition, which opposes the terminal, accused the commissioners of glossing over the public's safety concerns, noting that the county had ignored the advice of its staff, which had recommended against approving the project.
"We are convinced that this decision is incorrect, that no rational agency could believe that this project is safe or beneficial to our community," said Laurie Caplan, an LNG opponent in Astoria.
Opponents also contend that Oregon does not need the gas and is being used as a backdoor to ship gas to California, where several proposed LNG projects have been blocked.
Bradwood Landing is one of three LNG terminals proposed for construction in Oregon, including two near the mouth of the Columbia River and another in Coos Bay.

December 11, 2007 - County Planning Staff Recommendations On Bradwood

County Planning Staff Recommendations On Bradwood

STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OCTOBER 15, 2007 The staff recommends that the county board of commissioners take the following three actions:

And, Obviously, To Hell With A Professional Planning Staff's Wisdom 3-4 Times In A Row, We'll Show These Peons Who's In Charge Here!....Sniff!...What's That Smell?

Excerpted from The Daily Astorian - December 13, 2007

"By a vote of 3-2, with commissioners Patricia Roberts and Sam Patrick against, the board agreed that the Bradwood LNG project, proposed for a site 20 miles east of Astoria on the Columbia River, is "small- to medium-scale" as required by county land-use laws.

With Patrick dissenting, the board voted 4-1 to approve a request to change 46 acres in Clifton Channel from an Aquatic Conservation zone to Aquatic Development.

The board voted unanimously to approve changing 5.35 acres of wetlands at the proposed project site from an Aquatic Natural zone to Marine Industrial.

Roberts added a condition of approval requiring NorthernStar to swap an equivalent area of Marine Industrial zone land on the northwest corner of the site to Aquatic Natural to mitigate the impact to wetlands."


1. Based on the findings in our staff reports of June 28, 2007, and August 23, 2007, and in this report, Deny requests from Bradwood Landing to:
 Issue a conditional use permit for dredging in the Aquatic Conservation 2 (AC-2) Zone in accordance with LWDUO2 3.788(9);
 Re-zone 46.1 acres from AC-2 to Aquatic Development, amend the plan so as to change that area's designation under Goal 16 from “Conservation” to “Development,” and then allow dredging outright per LWDUO 3.744(10);
 Re-zone 5.35 acres of wetlands from Aquatic Natural (AN) to Marine Industrial (MI)), and amend the plan so as to change that area's designation under Goal 16 from “Natural” to “Development”;
 Find the proposed marine industrial development at Bradwood to be a small- to medium-sized development consistent with provisions in the Northeast Community Plan and the Bradwood Subarea Plan to limit the scale of development at Bradwood.
 Amend the Northeast Community Plan and the Bradwood Subarea Plan to delete text specifying that industrial development at Bradwood is limited to small- to medium-sized marine industrial plants.
 Find that the application complies with Statewide Planning Goal 16, Estuarine Resources.
 Find that the application satisfies all applicable standards from the LWDUO and the Clatsop County Standards Document.

2. Accept Bradwood Landing’s request to withdraw elements of the consolidated application requesting permits for soil disposal on-site.

3. Based on the findings adopted by the planning commission on September 28, 2007, approve all elements of the consolidated application from Bradwood not mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, subject to all conditions recommended in the September 28 findings.

Saw It Coming And Still Took It For Granted!!!

Stupid!, Stupid!, Stupid!

Looking at the ominous satellite photo, from The Oregonian, at left and assuming, as usual, a couple hours of inconvenience?

Stupid!, Stupid!, Stupid!

Disabled Ship's 24-Hour Stay At LNG Terminal Raises Security Questions

Published on SavannahNow.com (http://savannahnow.com)
Disabled ship's 24-hour stay at LNG terminal raises security questions
By Mary Landers
Created 2007-12-08 00:30
When a crippled container ship was allowed to dock last week at the liquid natural gas facility on Elba Island, officials there said they were being good neighbors to the river community.
Savannah-based security consultant Chuck Watson offers a different take on it.
"I think in principle, it's a bad idea because it's a secure facility," said Watson, a Savannah-based professional hazards planner who generates security analyses on government and private facilities.
At about 1 a.m. Tuesday, the 796-foot MSC Korea lost power as it was leaving Savannah. The Panamanian-flagged vessel dropped anchor and drifted aground just upstream of Elba Island. The closest berth for the disabled ship was the one where it eventually was towed at the Southern LNG's import terminal on the island.
Watson argues it was too risky to allow the ship to dock so near to the storage of up to 7.3 billion cubic feet of liquid natural gas.
It offered a remote but real risk of a deliberate assault, he said.
"They call it a Trojan horse attack," Watson said. "If somebody wanted to do damage, this is what they would do."
U.S. Coast Guard Cmdr. David Murk, the captain of the port, oversaw the decision-making around the MSC Korea last week. He was awakened at his home and informed of the mishap shortly after it occurred.
He did not have specific concerns about keeping the LNG facility secure, he said.
"It didn't cross my mind that it was an intentional act," Murk said.
Murk's confidence stemmed from security measures to which the ship already had been subjected. It had passed through the Coast Guard's routine security screening procedures on its inbound journey from Freeport, Bahamas.
It also had been inspected by U.S. Customs officials before it discharged 151 containers. Most of those were empty but others contained cotton towels, granite, frozen fruit, sweeteners and tires. It loaded 254 containers, including some with paper, clay and bulk chemicals, at Garden City terminal and set a course for Norfolk.
Nor did anything about the crew's behavior after the ship lost power arouse Murk's suspicions.
"The pilot was prudent and did what he had to do to keep from going hard aground," he said.
The MSC Korea's proximity to the LNG facility was a coincidence, Murk said, and one that he used in getting the disabled vessel clear of the river as quickly as possible so other ships could pass. The other option was to tow the dead ship back to an available berth at Ocean Terminal - a trip that would have entailed first turning it around, then towing it past downtown Savannah and under the Talmadge Bridge.
"It can be done, and it is done. But from a safety aspect, this was the best situation to put the ship," Murk said.
More traffic
Some port watchers say incidents such as the Korea's breakdown are more likely to occur in the future as the port grows and a new Jasper port is built.
"With busy container traffic, more and more things could happen," said Judy Jennings, a Savannahian active with the Sierra Club. "Anything carrying anything can idle up to a facility and quit running, 'accidentally.' "
No LNG ship was discharging when the MSC Korea lost power, but there could have been. And that raises the risk of a fuel spill or a deliberate ramming of an LNG ship. Elba is one of only four U.S. onshore facilities that import LNG, the chilled and compressed form of methane. It was built in the 1970s, then mothballed until 2001.
Recent expansions nearly doubled its storage capacity, and plans call for it to be doubled again by 2012. But it's situated in an area the LNG industry itself would not recommend now, Jennings said.
"The industry's rulebook for siting says avoid siting where there is other harbor traffic," Jennings said. "Back when they built that thing, Savannah was a sleepy little port."
A busier port doesn't worry Murk, who said the safeguards built into the running of the LNG facility and into the ships themselves, such as their double tanks, reduce the risk to a level he's happy with.
"Increased traffic does not concern me from an LNG perspective," he said.
Elba has been criticized for perceived security and safety breaches in the past, including a March 2006 incident when a surge from a passing vessel pulled the LNG tanker Golar Freeze 15 feet from its dock as it discharged its load. Just three months later, a sailboat cruised into one of the interior slips at the facility and dropped anchor.
Murk says LNG is safe, and the problem is largely perception.
"Unfortunately, outreach and education to the public isn't there yet on all these aspects," he said.
Extra security
When the MSC Korea finally docked at Southern LNG's facility about 12 hours after it lost power, two Coast Guard personnel already had boarded it. The container ship's crew was not allowed to leave the vessel.
Mechanics and others who needed to board were escorted to the ship by tug after they were screened. The facility's security measures, such as surveillance cameras, also were double-checked.
The precautions taken were good ones, Watson said, but ultimately, docking there posed an unnecessary risk.
"It would only take one or two people sneaking out with C-4 (plastic explosive) and blowing open the tanks and you'd have a big mess," he said.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which licenses LNG facilities, expects an accident or attack on Elba could result in a fire that "may cost more than $650 million and include severe damage to shore-side facilities; potential total loss of the LNG vessel and cargo; fatalities; and closure of the port for up to 14 days."
Others, including Watson, suggest FERC's estimate is overly optimistic.
DaWayne Penberthy, the marine operations principal at Southern LNG, said it was important to get the MSC Korea off the river so the port could start operating again, but his company was able to accommodate the ship without compromising the plant's security.
Risk cannot be eliminated, he said.
"There's always some probability, however slim," he said. "There are concerns over containers. There's nothing we can do about it."
Watson said there's one thing they could have done: refuse to allow the ship to dock there.
"Either it's a secure facility and you take reasonable measures to protect it, or you're not protecting it," he said. "I'd argue they did not.
"It's a low-probability scenario. But we know al-Qaida and related groups have talked about LNG and hitting ports. It's not a zero probability."
Source URL:http://savannahnow.com//node/412102

LNG: Bradwood/Oregon LNG, Sharing The Same Proposed Palomar Pipeline?

Could it be that we are tuning into the end of a deal of collusion between all that are necessary to make LNG in our community happen no matter how loud anybody squawks.

If this map at left is correct, Bradwood and Oregon LNG are going to tap into the same Palomar NG Pipeline just above Timber, Oregon and this pipeline proposal looks as if the homework and planning have already been done which leads to another point as to all's silence, even the Governor, just beginning to pipe in on the matter with a subtle message to the LNG Specualtors to step up their P.R. efforts to shore-up the rising sentiment of the public that's going to be affected by all this upcoming land takings, by force if necessary, and the FERC autonomy going up against the protectors of all our natural and environmental treasures.

Now, Wait A Minute, Is Somebody Not Building Community Here?

Now, according to KAST-AM this morning, in a communique from "The Betsy", they say she never said any such thing about hand carrying any kind of resolution to State.....

COMMISSIONERS PUSH FOR PROPER STATE PAY FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
Three Clatsop County commissioners are cultivating statewide support for increased state compensation for Oregon district attorneys, including a promise from state Sen. Betsy Johnson to introduce a bill at the Legislature’s next session in February.
Commissioners Richard Lee, Ann Samuelson and Patricia Roberts introduced a resolution at the Association of Oregon Counties annual conference Nov. 12-15 in Portland calling on the governor and Legislature to compensate district attorneys at a level commensurate with the scope and responsibilities of their office.
The commissioners first won unanimous support at from the District 7 Committee, made up of commissioners from Lincoln, Tillamook, Columbia and Clatsop counties, which forward it to the AOC steering committees on public safety and governance for consideration. The commissioners hand-carried the resolution to those two committees, which gave their approval and support. The AOC Legislative Committee, which sets the organization’s legislative agenda, will consider the resolution at its meeting in December.
Meanwhile, Lee, chairperson of the Clatsop County commission, met with Sen. Johnson, who pledged her support and promised to carry the resolution at the Legislative session starting Feb. 4.
The resolution notes that Oregon district attorneys are elected employees of the State of Oregon who enforce the state’s laws, and their salaries and other compensation are the state’s responsibility. The state pays its district attorneys far less than comparable appointed state employees, and some counties have been compelled to provide supplemental compensation.
The resolution mirrors the message of a letter Clatsop County commissioners sent Gov. Kulongoski in September. “The Association of Oregon counties represents all 36 counties in Oregon and is a key player in keeping the counties informed about the Legislature’s activities. Passing this resolution through AOC carries much greater weight than any one county could ever hope to muster,” Roberts said.

LNG: Democratic Central Committee Resolves To Stop LNG In Clatsop County

Resolution from the Clatsop County Democratic Central Committee

Whereas, Northern Star, LLC has proposed a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal and pipeline at Bradwood Landing, 35 miles up the Columbia River; Whereas, six Oregon state agencies[1] have reviewed the draft environmental impact statement prepared by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the Bradwood Landing project and have articulated the following major problems with the proposal:· The FERC has not provided any independent assessment of the demand for LNG to justify the need for the project.
The terminal project would conflict with regional and national efforts to restore the Columbia River and its estuary.
Proposed dredging for the terminal, turning berth and pipeline would significantly damage the watershed, water quality, and sensitive species and habitat.
No commitment has been made for emergency-response resources to operate Bradwood Landing; nor were safety and security implications for the local community adequately assessed.
Significant fish habitat would be lost, and proposed remedies are inadequate.
LNG ships would be very disruptive to commercial and recreational fishing boats.
Air pollution emissions from LNG ships would pose a significant risk to residents of the lower Columbia River area.
The Bradwood Landing site would present severe natural hazards from landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis and flooding.
Whereas, most of these major problems would apply to any LNG import terminal that might be proposed to be located on the Columbia River; and Whereas, importing LNG, a foreign fossil fuel, would not contribute to Oregon’s goal of 25% renewable energy by 2012. Therefore, we, the Clatsop County Democratic Central Committee, call upon Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski, United States Senators Ron Wyden and Gordon Smith, United States Representative David Wu, Oregon State Senator Betsy Johnson and Oregon State Representatives Debbie Boone and Brad Witt, to do everything in their power to stop all LNG import terminal development on the Columbia River.

LNG/NG: Another Fact Overlooked

Did You Know Natural Gas Has Different Quality Levels? Read the link.

http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing_ng.asp

Corrosion on the internal wall of a natural gas pipeline can occur when the pipe wall is exposed to water and contaminants in the gas, such as O2, H2S, CO2, or chlorides. The nature and extent of the corrosion damage that may occur are functions of the concentration and particular combinations of these various corrosive constituents within the pipe, as well as of the operating conditions of the pipeline. For example, gas velocity and temperature in the pipeline play a significant role in determining if and where corrosion damage may occur. In other words, a particular gas composition may cause corrosion under some operating conditions but not others.
Therefore, it would be difficult to develop a precise definition of the term "corrosive gas" that would be universally applicable under all operating conditions. (reference)
Corrosion may also be caused or facilitated by the activity of microorganisms living on the pipe wall. Referred to as microbiologically influenced corrosion, or MIC, this type of corrosion can occur when microbes and nutrients are available and where water, corrosion products, deposits, etc., present on the pipe wall provide sites favorable for the colonization of microbes. Microbial activity, in turn, may create concentration cells or produce organic acids or acid-producing gases, making the environment aggressive for carbon steel. The microbes can also metabolize sulfur or sulfur compounds to produce products that are corrosive to steel or that otherwise accelerate the attack on steel.
Internal corrosion in a gas pipeline may be detected by any of several methods, including visual examination of the inside of a pipeline when it is opened, external measurement of the pipe wall thickness with instruments, evaluation of corrosion coupons or probes placed inside the pipeline, or inspection of the pipe with an in-line inspection tool to identify areas of pitting or metal loss.
Internal corrosion may be kept under control by establishing appropriate pipeline operating conditions and by using corrosion-mitigation techniques. One method for reducing the potential for internal corrosion to occur is to control the quality of gas entering the pipeline. Also, by periodically sampling and analyzing the gas, liquids, and solids removed from the pipeline to detect the presence and concentration of any corrosive contaminants, including bacteria, as well as to detect evidence of corrosion products, a pipeline operator can determine if detrimental corrosion may be occurring, identify the cause(s) of the corrosion, and develop corrosion control measures.

Coos Bay: Little City Big Port - OPB News

Terminal Wins Next Round!!! Here's The Story!!http://www.theworldlink.com/articles/2007/12/05/news/doc475704ac00a0d440627341.txt

Coos Bay: Little City, Big Port

By Chris Lehman
Coos Bay, OR November 14, 2007 2:17 p.m.

Officials want to build a container terminal along the Coos Bay channel

The southern coast of Oregon is one of the most isolated parts of the state. But leaders in one coastal town want to turn the seclusion to their advantage.

As part of our series on Northwest communities re-inventing themselves, correspondent Chris Lehman reports on Coos Bay, a little city with plans for a big port.

To really understand Coos Bay, you have to know its history. And to understand the history, you have to know the geography.

Anne Donnelly: "Essentially the story of all human culture here is told in the topography."
That's Anne Donnelly, director of the Coos Historical and Maritime Museum.

Anne Donnelly: "There's a horseshoe of high ridges that surround us to the south, the east and the north. And the only easy way in and out is either by water or by coming along the flat land which is right along the coast."

Despite those restrictions, it actually worked pretty well for moving logs. Ships full of lumber left Coos Bay by the thousand until the timber industry collapsed in the 1990's. Unemployment topped 10 percent. Schools closed as people left town for greener pastures.

Now, officials want to turn that around with a plan to create a new international shipping terminal. Martin Callery is with the Port of Coos Bay.

Mike Callery: "We want to see people be able to keep their kids in this community rather than their kids graduating from high school and having to go away because there arenít decent-paying jobs in this community."
The terminal would be an entry point for goods arriving from the Far East. Containers filled with everything from televisions to toys would be unloaded onto trains and sent all over the United States. The port would be small compared to places like Long Beach or Seattle. But Martin Callery says more imports from Asia could spell success for places like Coos Bay.
Mike Callery: "We've got an under-utilized rail line. We have an under-utilized harbor. And we have an opportunity to put goods into the rail system at a point that's not congested such as LA, Long Beach, or Oakland."

But unlike those places, there's very little infrastructure in place to transport goods inland from Coos Bay. Take the rail system. It's certainly not congested these days.

Chris Lehman: "I'm standing on a set of railroad tracks just outside of Coos Bay. For 91 years, this would have been a dangerous place to be. But the last train left Coos Bay in September, when the Central Oregon and Pacific Railroad closed their route to the coast. And without this rail connection, the container port could be little more than a pipedream. But Martin Callery says the shuttered rail line won't stand in the way."

Mike Callery: "No one has ever denied the fact that the rail line between Eugene and Coos Bay would have to be rehabilitated."

Callery says they're in talks with a larger railroad company that's willing to sink millions of dollars into upgrading the line. But port officials have another project up their sleeves if the container port doesn't pan out.

A liquefied natural gas terminal is on the drawing board. The fuel would be taken off of tanker ships and piped inland.

Both projects have their share of skeptics in the community. Historian Anne Donnelly says whatever direction Coos Bay takes, she's hoping the region doesn't become too dependant on any one thing, like it did in the days of timber.

Anne Donnelly: "Because we did clearly have a lot of eggs in one basket and when that basket broke, so to speak, we're paying the price for that now."

And speaking of price, container terminals don't come cheap. The state legislature pitched in $60 million to fund improvements to the Coos Bay shipping channel. But most of that money can't be spent unless Port officials can convince a shipping company to make Coos Bay the next major west coast port of entry.

States, feds, counties all will have say in LNG's OK, FERC says

States, feds, counties all will have say in LNG's OK, FERC says

By Tony Lystra - The Daily News.com - Longview, Washington

So who has the authority to approve NorthernStar's liquefied natural gas terminal, anyway? Is it the feds?
The counties?
The state agencies?

The answer, according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is all of the above.
NorthernStar Natural Gas's plan to build its LNG import terminal on the Columbia River has triggered a complex array of local and federal laws and processes. FERC, Clatsop and Cowltiz counties, as well as state agencies in Oregon and Washington all are expected to consider permits for the project.

But there has been some confusion about whether FERC will respect the rulings of local agencies.

This week, Clatsop County sent a letter to FERC, asking the agency to clarify its authority in considering the terminal.

County Administrator Scott Derickson wrote that the county's officials were surprised to hear testimony during an Oct. 22 meeting that FERC might be able to "overrule" the county's authority in considering 27 changes in land-use policy to make way for the terminal.

"Does FERC have the authority to invalidate, waive or modify local land-use regulations or local conditions?" the letter asked.

Derickson said in an interview Friday that he could not recall who had made the allegation during the October meeting, but he said county officials are worried that FERC might preempt the county's decisions.

"It is a question about whether local communities are going to have a meaningful opportunity to engage in the siting of energy facilities that can impact their community," he said.
NorthernStar Natural Gas, of Houston, plans to bring LNG carriers 38 miles up the river to Bradwood, Ore., which is in Clatsop County. It would store the superchilled gas in two large tanks across from Puget Island, then revaporize the fuel and pump it to market via a new pipeline crossing Clatsop, Columbia and Cowlitz counties.

NorthernStar spokesman Joe Desmond said in a statement Friday that FERC is "reluctant to preempt local bodies."

"In general, FERC defers to applicants who voluntarily agree to land-use and other conditions," Desmond said.

Paul Friedman, a FERC environmental project manager who is working on the proposal, said the Natural Gas Act and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 give FERC "total authority" to site onshore LNG facilities. In most cases, FERC, he said, can override the decisions made by counties in Washington and Oregon.

However, there are several ways local jurisdictions can exercise their authority in the matter, Friedman said.

FERC cannot override another federal law in considering a terminal, he said, and there are several federal laws the terminal must meet in order to be approved.

The state of Oregon has been charged with ensuring that NorthernStar's facilities meet the requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act, or CZMA. And the state, Friedman said, will look to land-use decisions made by the Clatsop County commissioners in determining whether the terminal meets the act's standards.

If Oregon denied a certificate under the CZMA, NorthernStar could appeal to the U.S. Department of Commerce, not FERC, said Tamara Young-Allen, a FERC spokeswoman.
In addition, the state of Washington has the power under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act to determine whether the terminal and pipeline would be destructive to the state's waterways. Cowlitz County's decisions on whether the terminal and pipeline meet the Washington State Environmental Policy Act will influence whether the state Department of Ecology issues a clean water permit for the facilities.

NorthernStar must also get a clean water permit from the state of Oregon, Friedman said, and for that permit to be issued, Clatsop County will have to issue a so-called "land-use compatibility statement."

"So states do hold some trump cards," Friedman said.

Cowlitz County is expected to consider whether the terminal and its accompanying pipeline meet the requirements of the State Environmental Policy Act, or SEPA. Cowlitz County is also expected to consider shoreline and pipeline permits for the project.

Mike Wojtowicz, the director of the county's building and planning department, said there's no question who really has the authority in Cowlitz County's case: FERC.

"They got it," he said. "My understanding is that both federal law and caselaw render the county's permits moot."

Friedman confirmed that if Cowlitz County denied NorthernStar's permits, the project could still be built per FERC's authority.

So why bother approving permits in Cowlitz County?

"It's a voluntary thing, but we think they should do it," Friedman said of the local process. "It's one way of proving to us that you're going to reduce environmental damage by following local procedures."

The Oregonian:LNG/Natural Gas Pipeline Taps Into Residents Fears

Pipeline taps residents' fears
Hundreds worry about a gas line's effect on their land and environment
Friday, November 16, 2007
TED SICKINGER The Oregonian
A chorus of concerns rang out this week as landowners along the snaking route of a proposed natural gas pipeline showed signs of organizing to oppose the line and liquefied natural gas terminals along the lower Columbia River.
Several hundred landowners, farmers, advocates and concerned residents aired their complaints at public meetings this week in Maupin, Molalla, McMinnville and, on Thursday, Forest Grove. The towns sit along the proposed route of the Palomar pipeline, which would connect a planned LNG terminal near Astoria with an interstate transmission line that runs through central Oregon to California.
Douglas Sipe, a project manager from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, was the man behind the lectern and thus the stand-in punching bag for both his agency and the private companies that want to build the terminal and pipeline.
Most speakers expressed deep misgivings about the agency's ability to deal with associated threats to people, wildlife, farmland and the environment.
Tuesday night's meeting in Molalla was raucous.
"Emotions were running high," Sipe said. "It was hard for me to say anything to make people happy."
Wednesday's meeting in McMinnville was lower key, if no less heartfelt. Ilsa Perse, a landowner from Carlton, told Sipe that it was increasingly difficult to discriminate between where the federal government ends and private companies begin.
"California told these companies to take a hike, and I find it a little weird that we now get the special privilege" of hosting them in Oregon, Perse said.
The Palomar pipeline is actually a joint venture between Northwest Natural Gas Co., the state's largest gas utility, and TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., which owns an interstate pipeline that runs through central Oregon to California.
Palomar is one of two proposed pipelines that would connect planned LNG terminals on the lower Columbia River to TransCanada's line in central Oregon. The second would connect to the planned Bradwood Landing LNG terminal 20 miles upriver from Astoria. Both pipelines would run through Clatsop, Washington, Yamhill, Marion, Clackamas and Wasco counties. A third LNG terminal is being considered in Coos Bay, with a pipeline that runs to near the California border.
Supporters of the LNG projects and pipelines contend that the new gas supply and pipelines would bolster economic development and protect the region from price shocks as domestic and Canadian gas supplies get tighter.
Yet the California question looms large over all of the projects. Critics say Oregon's gas needs are a fraction of the proposed terminals' capacity. They worry that the state is a back door for shipping foreign fossil fuels to its southern neighbor, where gas prices are higher and citizens have helped block LNG proposals.
Palomar backers and the company bankrolling the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, Houston-based NorthernStar Natural Gas, Inc., don't even like to associate the two projects together in public for fear that opposition to one will infect the other.
NW Natural's rationale for Palomar is to diversify its customers' supply of natural gas. Even if the LNG terminal is never built, the Portland company says it wants to build the section of Palomar that links its distribution hub in Molalla, southeast of Portland, with TransCanada's interstate line in central Oregon.
NW Natural says such a link has been contemplated for the past 15 years. Palomar officials maintain that the company can rationalize extending the pipeline farther west to serve growing areas of Washington County that NW Natural doesn't serve today.
Critics remain skeptical. They contend the local gas monopoly, constrained by the slow growth of its regulated business, wants a piece of the lucrative interstate gas trade, which would complement its growing natural gas storage facilities in Mist, near the LNG terminal.
Opponents of the projects maintain that a high-pressure, 36-inch pipe crossing the Cascades -- one costing hundreds of millions of dollars -- doesn't make economic sense if NW Natural isn't moving vast quantities of gas from an LNG terminal each day.
"There's no credible, straight-faced argument that these projects are being driven by Oregon's needs," said Brent Foster, an advocate with Columbia Riverkeepers.
Sipe, the FERC project manager, acknowledged the concerns over California at the public meetings, but he said the Palomar pipeline and the LNG terminal at Bradwood would be evaluated separately since the owners intend to build them regardless of whether the other project is approved. He also confirmed many landowners' fears when he acknowledged Wednesday night in McMinnville that they "won't necessarily have a vote" on the pipeline, even if it runs across their land.
But Sipe stressed that the public input would help shape the agency's environmental analyses of the project, which is a key piece of its approval process.
Many landowners fear the property and environmental damage that could come with a 50- to 100-foot right-of-way across their property. Their concerns range from the increased risk of wildfire and introduction of noxious weeds to destruction of valuable farm and timberland. Many wonder who will pay their attorneys' fees and the property taxes on land that is no longer productive, or whether they can push the pipeline into existing public right-of-ways.
Landowners along the pipeline route are forming local chapters of a group they call Oregon Citizens Against the Pipeline.
Jody Hawkins, a landowner from Yamhill, told Sipe on Wednesday that his kids play on a baseball diamond 30 feet from the proposed pipeline route and his house sits 200 feet away.
"If a 36-inch gas line (explodes), my house is gone, my kids are gone," Hawkins said.
This week's meetings aren't the only chance for the public to provide input on the project. They can write or provide electronic comments to the agency until Nov 28. FERC will hold another round of hearings after it issues a draft environmental impact statement in June, Sipe said.
"They can think what they want about the federal government," Sipe said. "But we're out there trying to protect the public while providing the infrastructure that the nation needs."
Ted Sickinger: 503-221-8505, tedsickinger@news.oregonian.com
©2007 The Oregonian

The U.S.S. Ranger: A History

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Ranger_%28CV-61%29

1000 Friends of Oregon LNG Pipeline and Terminal Position Statement

1000 Friends of Oregon LNG Pipeline and Terminal Position Statement
Liquefied Natural Gas pipelines and terminals threaten livable urban and rural communities, family farms and forests, and natural and scenic areas across Oregon.
Oregon faces an unprecedented number of proposals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminals, pipelines, and related facilities. Two terminals are currently proposed for the Columbia River Estuary, and a third terminal is proposed for Coos Bay. Hundreds of miles of pipeline are proposed from the Columbia River terminals to Molalla, from Central Oregon to Molalla, and from Coos Bay to the California border. These pipelines would cut across hundreds of miles of productive farm and forest land to serve utilities in California, where the vast majority of the gas from the three terminals would be used.
1000 Friends of Oregon is opposed to these proposals because the pipelines threaten family farms and forests and the terminals threaten sensitive estuaries and the fisheries that depend on them. Oregon and the Pacific Northwest are already feeling the effects of global warming. Constructing huge facilities to import fossil fuels will worsen these effects and undercut our goals for energy independence.
If the LNG facilities are built, they should be built on Oregon’s terms. The pipelines should follow existing roads and rights-of-way, instead of plowing through the middle of productive farm fields and forest lands that support Oregon families. The terminals should fully comply with Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals without exceptions, including Goal 16, which protects Estuarine Resources.
In the words of 1000 Friends co-founder, Governor Tom McCall:
"Oregon is demure and lovely, and ought to play a little hard to get. And I think you’ll all be just as sick as I am if you find it is nothing but a hungry hussy, throwing herself at every stinking smokestack that’s offered."

Havens Says Bradwood/Northern Star Misused His Models!!

From: Energy Current - Houston, Texas

LNG expert says vapor model used inaccurately

Filed from Houston 11/12/2007 6:53:51 PM GMT

USA: A chemical engineering professor at the University of Arkansas said that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and NorthernStar Natural Gas have misused models he devised to calculate how far a vapor cloud would travel if liquefied natural gas (LNG) spilled from the proposed Bradwood LNG facility on the Columbia River in Oregon, the Longview Daily News reported last week.

Havens also said the data FERC used assumes a relatively small spill, which skews proejcts for how far vapor rising off leading LNG could spread.

Havens testified at a FERC hearing in Astoria, Ore. about NorthernStar's plans to bring LNG tankers up the river to Bradwood, Ore. The company would unload two 168-foot (51-m) tall tanks, regasify and send it to market via a new pipeline spanning Clatsop, Columbia and Cowlitz counties.

FERC is considering whether to issue permits for the proposed terminal and pipeline.

Havens said FERC used two models, both authored by him, to set safety zones for vapor clouds at LNG terminals. If a spill occurs, gas vapor must be projected to stay within the terminal's property, or the terminal cannot be approved.

Haven noted that the size of the projected spill in NorthernStar's data is smaller than spills project in other terminal applications, which suggests the company is cherrypicking data to get the facility approved. NorthernStar said its LNG tanks will be double-lined and that the risk of a spill is minimal.

NorthernStar spokesman Joe Desmond called Havens a "professional opponent" and said the professor has given similar testimony on the applications of 14 different LNG terminals. In each case, Desmond said, Havens' arguments were rebuffed.

Environmental group Columbia Riverkeeper paid Havens' expenses to travel to Astoria, but Havens said he is not employed by the environmental group.

While LNG spills are "highly unlikely," if an LNG fire engulfed the LNG tanker itself, there's a chance the fire could break open other containments on the ship and cause "cascading failures" in which case more LNG would be released, and "the whole thing would burn," The Daily Astorian quoted Havens as saying, citing a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Havens made the statement while addressing Astoria city and county leaders at the Astoria City Hall on Nov. 8.

Havens, who has studied LNG for over 30 years, said with the "feeding frenzy" to get approvals for LNG terminals, companies have incentives to "cut corners" and federal agencies may be under pressure to "grease the wheels."

The GAO report said more research is needed on the issue, and Havens said the result of new research study might result in more new LNG terminals offshore rather than onshore near population centers.

LNG Speculators: We Got A Little Spat Going On Between Northern Star And Their Ilk?

Malibu Surfside NewsStory Home Page
LNG Firm Wants Coast Guard Concerns Applied to Competitor
• NorthernStar Move Could Be Sign that Offshore Development Options in Southern California Are Dwindling
BY HANS LAETZ
In what may be a case of “corporate tit-for-tat,” the company asking to build one offshore liquefied natural gas terminal near Ventura has demanded that another, competing LNG terminal closer to the Malibu coast address a long list of environmental concerns—concerns originally proposed by the government for the first plant.
Officials for the Woodside Nat­ural Gas LNG terminal, proposed for 21 miles off Malibu’s Point Dume, said they “find it odd” that their competitor filed the letter in the official comment file for Wood­side’s proposed OceanWay gas terminal.
The Ventura applicant, North­ern­Star Energy, was hit with a list of 396 environmental questions by the U.S. Coast Guard last month, ranging from how LNG tankers will avoid killing whales to whether the Clearwater Port project is needed in the first place.
That list, first revealed in the Malibu Surfside News last week, could delay the NorthernStar terminal for many months, officials said, as they strive to conduct research and compile answers to the 396 items.
Now, NorthernStar has taken the same government list and demands that its competitor meet the same 396 standards.
“It’s just a matter of basic fairness, just to ensure parity,” said NorthernStar vice president Joe Desmond. “We are concerned that different regulatory agencies may apply different criteria to two projects that are very similar.”
Although the Coast Guard is handling both projects, its local partner in Ventura is the Cali­for­nia State Lands Commission, which has already addressed LNG issues in its rejection of the BHP Billiton LNG terminal in Malibu. The local partner for the Woodside request off Malibu, is the City of Los Angeles—which has no LNG experience.
Woodside vice president Laura Doll said her company expected some questions to be raised about its proposal, but “we just really didn’t expect it to come from an LNG company.”
Doll said the Woodside’s OceanWay proposal was de­signed over several years to an­swer the questions posed in the NorthernStar letter. “We honestly haven’t seen anything filed in the comments yet that would make us think we left something out,” she said.
The Woodside plant in Santa Monica Bay is somewhat different from NorthernStar’s oil rig re­purposing project, as Woodside would employ two regasification ships that would alternate cruising out beyond the Channel Islands to accept transfers of LNG cargoes on the high seas from trans-pacific carriers.
At any given time, one of the two carriers would be anchored halfway between Point Dume and Catalina Island, unloading its cargo.
The other ship would be in the designated transfer areas, and the U.S. Navy has voiced opposition that the transfer process would interfere with naval exercises, including live firing of missiles in the Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Range. Several retired admirals have publicly opposed the concept.
Last week, the Navy formally dropped its objections and said it could live with LNG carriers in its missile test range so long as Woodside acknowledged that the Navy has first dibs on the waters, and that the company would schedule its ship movements around Navy exercises.
In other news, last week the Santa Monica City Council formally went on record opposing the Woodside proposal. City council members said the placement of two two-foot-diameter gas pipe­lines in Santa Monica Bay would be detrimental to marine life.
Los Angeles City Councilmem­ber Bill Rosendahl also came out swinging against the LNG terminal in Santa Monica Bay. He said the terminal and its gas pipeline across Los Angeles International Airport would make LAX a vulnerable terrorism target, and the LNG regasification ships would be targets like the U.S.S. Cole.
Rosendahl also said the project would adversely affect LAX runway relocations, would make extension of the Green Line difficult, and would disrupt environmentally sensitive sand dunes at Dockweiler Beach.
Rosendahl is chair of the LA Airports board, and chair of the L.A. council’s public works committee, both of which have veto over the proposal. The natural gas pipelines would cross his district as they come ashore at LAX and head east.
And the Los Angeles Unified School District said it wants Woodside to explain what safety precautions would be taken at 21 locations where proposed high-pressure, 24-inch gas pipelines would pass within 1500 feet of public schools in Westchester, Watts, South Gate and Cudahy.
Environmental laws provide special protections to low income areas in the interest of economic justice, and community organizers on L.A.’s south side have yet to be heard on this issue.
Impetus to build LNG terminals in the coastal waters of California may be affected by two proposals to build new natural gas pipelines into the west from new gas fields in Utah and Wyoming.
Both the Kern River and Spec­tra gas pipe­line companies filed legal notice last week that they plan to add California-bound gas capacity if customers can be found.
If both of these pipelines are built, their capacity would approximately equal the LNG ca­pacity proposed by the Woodside and NorthernStar projects combined.
And finally, a San Diego company that will start up its new LNG import terminal at Ensen­ada, Mexico announced Thursday it will build a $150 million addition to treat its LNG imports to remove the “hot gas” threat. Sempra officials said they would treat LNG cargoes with nitrogen to lower their burning temperature, thus dramatically decreasing the amount of air pollution that will be caused by burning the natural gas.
Although California regulators have approved the socalled hot gas for use here, smog agencies have filed suits to overturn that because of the large amounts of smog that would be generated.
Neither of the two offshore LNG terminals have plans to limit or treat imports to bring them in line with lower-burning standards.

LNG: "Sell It To Us, Lease It To Us Or Lose It To Us!"

Government Abetting Private Property Takings To The Benefit Of Private Industry?

"Sell it to us, lease it to us or lose it to us"

That was the choice Roger Thompson was faced with regarding his family's 132 year ownership of their property in Clatskanie and which just happend to be in the path of Spiro Vassilopoulos's(sp?) proposed "Port Westward LNG Transfer/Storage facility and ironically, in full support and abetted by "The Port of St. Helens".

Fate, Kharma, Destiny intervened in favor of the Thompsn's on that when PWLNG could not muster investors.

Now, with Oregon LNG and its V.P., former employee of now defunct and broke Calpine Energy Group and ex-Enron Clone, Peter Hansen at the helm a bunch of property owners could quite possibly be besieged with likely the same choices and arm twisting, once again abetted by Government as well to the benefit of this one "Private Corporation" bent on selling Natural Gas to California?

Hell! and this is on record, California's Lt. Governor, in a recent speech and I'm paraphrasing, said "California doesn't need to worry about extensive LNG development and speculation because we will get all the, LNG derived, Natural Gas we need from Oregon".

So now, all you property owners in the path of this, in my view, insurrection should be prepared for a, what is it 30" - 36" diammeter pipe, loaded with flowing Natural Gas through your property, whether you want it to or not then be prepared to lose a 125' - 150' wide right of way swathe across your property. Can you live with that?

How long you think it will take to get a good night's sleep?

For us on the coast down here, we'll just be living with the fact that in each one of these LNG Storage Tanks there's 7.6 Million Cubic Feet of boiling Liquefied Natural Gas at -260 degrees just waiting for an opportunity to escape, vaporize and blow a mile, mile and a half in any direction of us off the face of the earth while leaving many more brutally scarred and in terrible misery for the rest of their lives, should they survive but hey! that's just "Fear Mongering" on my part.

Who could have ever believed that someone could actually cammandeer a couple of passenger aircraft and fly them into "The World Trade Center Buildings" and cause them to collapse?

Who could have actually believed that someone could actually maneuver a passenger aircraft through all the security of the mightiest military in the world, to some, and crash it into the base of all that power, "The Pentagon"?

Can you imagine how ludicrous that concept would have registered?

LNG: Those Tankers And Bad Siting Are Really A Problem

Fall River / Somerset LNGWhy Take The Risk?
An official from Weaver’s Cove recently told the Fall River City Council that the opponents of siting an LNG facility in a heavily populated area lack the facts concerning LNG. This was far from the truth. The members of the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities have been researching the issue for many months and have discovered that scientific experts, fire officials, public officials have not only spoken against the siting of LNG facilities in populated areas but they have scientific information to back up their opinion.

Professor James Fay of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology created a report on the possible hazards from LNG. In regards to what could happen along the Fall River / Somerset waterfront he said, “A tanker spill fire at any location along this route would have serious consequences for persons and property on the shore adjacent to the stricken vessel.” Moreover Professor Fay stated that, “The magnitude of the resulting liquid cargo pool fires are unprecedented in scale. There is no possibility of ameliorating the fire’s effects, much less extinguishing it, during the short time (several minutes) of burnout.

”Professor Jerry Havens of the University of Arkansas who said, “In my judgment, a large pool fire – on water, and therefore uncontained – is of the highest concern.” “Most predictions suggest that even the largest LNG tankers (typically more than 900 feet in length) might be completely enveloped in a pool fire following a complete spill of a single 6.5 million gallon tank. This raises questions about the vulnerability of the ship and the potential for additional releases. A typical LNG tanker contains as many as five tanks with a combined capacity of 33 million gallons.” In addition Professor Havens has said that safety zones based on the limited, 10-minute spill could not protect the public from the kind of fire that would result from an LNG tanker accident. He also said that the “Hazard Exclusion Zones” might need to extend a mile or more from the LNG terminal.

William Lehr, author of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report due out shortly said, “The maximum emissive power of an LNG pool fire is several times more than we would expect from a regular oil fire. A common danger level for thermal radiation flux in an area of public assembly is 5 kilowatts per square meter. A person exposed to this level would feel considerable pain in a few seconds. A very large unconfined LNG pool fire could possibly produce thermal radiation effects at this level or above for more than a kilometer away from the center of the fire.”When we worry that a mishap or an attack on the LNG tanker could take place we are told that the Coast Guard will handle security.

Here is what Rear Admiral Kevin Eldridge, commander of the U.S. Coast Guard’s 11th District off California had to say when he was asked about the possibility of an attack on U.S. shores. He said, “It’s likely enough for us to put a lot of effort into planning for it. Frankly, if we have a vessel in our port that has a problem, it’s too late.

”William Pope, U.S. State Department Deputy Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism said recently, “We have every reason to believe they (terrorists) will also be attracted to one of the softest targets of all, commercial shipping.

”In a recent article from an Australian newspaper, Alexey Muraviev of Curtin University of Technology in Perth, told a maritime security conference that intelligence experts believed ships were far more vulnerable to an al-Qaeda attack than commercial airlines. Targets could include cruise ships, oil supertankers, LNG-carriers and chemical tankers.

In addition Senator Elizabeth Dole had this to say about the U.S. Coast Guard having the responsibility of protecting LNG tankers. She said, “We need to give our Coast Guard more resources right now, not the added responsibility of overseeing tankers bringing dangerous LNG into our ports.”The federal government back in 1979 already knew of the dangers relating to LNG even before there was talk about terrorism.

In 1979 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which acts as the investigative arm of Congress, researched the LNG issue. GAO Director J. Dexter Peach testified before the Senate and said, “We believe remote siting is the primary factor in safety.

”In addition to Mr. Peach speaking before the Senate Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey said recently, “When Congress passed my LNG safety bill back in 1979, it directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) to prescribe standards for the siting of new LNG facilities that were supposed to consider the need to encourage remote siting.”While many have realized that LNG is extremely dangerous the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency in charge of making a decision on the Weaver’s Cove facility, have been touting a report known as the “Quest Study” as evidence that we have little to fear from an LNG spill.

The problem is that the lead scientist on the Quest Study of LNG fires, John Cornwell, said that he did not think the study’s computations were appropriate for many of the things they are being used for.

In addition an article written in the “Mobile Register” said, “Most published scientific studies, including a soon-to-be-released analysis by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, produce estimates of a potential LNG tanker fire that are five to six times larger than the Quest estimate.

”Furthermore the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is headed by Patrick Henry Wood III. Mr. Wood’s agency will be making the decision on whether or not Weaver’s Cove can construct an LNG facility in Fall River.

It is interesting to note the Weaver’s Cove has hired the law firm of Baker & Botts out of Texas to represent them. The Chairman of FERC, Mr. Wood, was employed by Baker & Botts in the past.

Other LNG Sites:There are many other companies looking to place LNG sites throughout the U.S. but they are taking a different approach, unlike Weaver’s Cove.Billiton LNG International, a large energy firm from Australia would like to locate a LNG facility in California. Stephen Billiot, the V.P. had this to say: “We understand California’s concern for its coastline and it communities. Although LNG’s excellent safety record is well documented, we are siting this much needed LNG facility far offshore and away from populated centers to ensure the highest level of protection for the California coast and public safety.

”Cameron Parish La., Cheniere Energy is being supported by the citizens to locate a LNG facility there. The company points out that they have 600 acres for a buffer zone.

Sabine Texas, Golden Pass LNG project being sponsored by Exxon / Mobil. The company is highlighting the fact that they have over 500 acres for a buffer zone.The lack of buffer zones has brought out many communities to be against these dangerous LNG proposals.

Fall River Ma., Mobile Alabama, Harpswell Maine, Vallejo Calif, and other communities in California, the country of Mexico stopped Marathon Oil from building an LNG facility near a city in that country by taking the land over and nationalizing it.

In R.I. a bill has been filed by State Representative Raymond Gallison to ban LNG tankers from using the Sakonnet River or from going under the Mount Hope Bridge.On February 3, 2004, United States Senator John Kerry and others sent a letter to Tom Ridge saying that every time an LNG tanker comes into Boston that the Federal Govt. needs to raise the threat level in Boston to HIGH! Is that what we want in the Fall River area?

September 9, 2003 Congressional Research Service Report“Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack.”Boston Deputy Fire Chief Joseph Fleming presented a report to the Commonwealth. The report contained information from the National Fire Prevention Association handbook: “Contact between water and pooled LNG should be avoided to prevent increased vaporization, unless vapor can be controlled” What will the fire boats that Weaver’s Cove said they would provide do to a LNG fire? According to a fire expert the Weaver’s Cove fire tugs would make the fire even worse!

The Fall River City Council has gone on record 7 to 2 opposing the facility. State Representatives David Sullivan and Mike Rodrigues have gone on record opposing any facility near populated areas.As anyone can plainly see the Coalition for the Responsible Siting of LNG Facilities has gathered information from far and wide. We do know the facts. It is foolish to site a dangerous facility in a heavily populated area. Why take the risk?

Bradwood: Way Too Many Unanswered Questions...Read This Thing!!!

PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT1.0IntroductionPBS&J has been contracted by Clatsop County, Oregon, to conduct a public safety assessment for the proposed Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas LNG project. The major component of the public safety assessment was to analyze and evaluate the Water Safety Report (WSR) (See Appendix A)and the draft Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The WSR deals with matters related to the transport ofLNG on the Columbia River. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2.2National Incident Management System Compliance The procedures documented in NIMS must be incorporated into all Emergency Operations Plans(EOPs). NIMS was created so first responders from various jurisdictions and disciplines can work together in a variety of emergency response scenarios. NIMS concepts and procedures establish a unified approach to incident management; standard command and management structures; andemphasize preparedness, mutual aid, and resource management. To establish compliance withNIMS procedures, all levels of government, private sector organizations, and nongovernmentalagencies must be prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide spectrum of major events that exceed the capabilities of any single entity. These hazard responses require a unified and coordinated national approach to planning and domestic incident management. To address this need, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of DomesticIncidents (HSPD-5) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) establish the following national initiatives that serve to establish a common approachto preparedness and response. a) HSPD-5 identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. It requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to establish a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System. b) HSPD-8 describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare forincidents. It requires DHS to coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments to develop a National Preparedness Goal. 3.0Methodology After completing scope items 1–2, the draft Emergency Response Plan for the Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas LNG Facility (February 2007), was reviewed to identify “gaps” betweenthe requirements for a FERC- and NIMS-compliant ERP and the draft ERP. This effort is referred to as a “gap analysis.” Specifically, PBS&J staff with expertise in emergency management, emergency response,emergency planning, disaster recovery, public safety, hazardous materials, navigation, security, and geological hazards conducted the gap analysis. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT2
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTThe following tasks were conducted: 1. Met with Clatsop County Manager Scott Derickson to review the terms and objectives of this project. 2. Developed an understanding of and fluency with relevant regulatory and agency guidance andadopted standards, including (but not limited to): Title 33 CFR 127, Title 49 CFR 193, NVIC 05-05, NVIC 09-02, NVIC 11-02, and National Fire Protection Association Standard 59a, FERC Draft Guidance for Emergency Response Plans (Revision 4, September 2006) and the ClatsopCounty Emergency Management Plan. 3. Analyzed and evaluated the FERC project description and WSA/WSR and the draft ERP. 4. Visited the proposed LNG site and populated areas along the Columbia River navigation channel between the Columbia River Bar and the site, and interviewed key Clatsop County staff (including first responders), as well as Bradwood Landing, LLC staff, and consultants to answer questions about the scope of the project. 5. Evaluated and confirmed that existing assets and personnel related to or having responsibility forthe LNG project security, safety, and navigation (plus the incremental assets mandated by WSR)are or are not sufficient to provide adequate mitigation and response capabilities related to the risk probability introduced by the LNG operation. 6. Determined whether additional safety and security resources or measures would be required inaddition to those defined by the Coast Guard in the WSR, identified these resources and measures, and provided rationale for such additional requirements. 7. Provided a written report to Clatsop County regarding the above issues (by July 31, 2007), and agreed to participate in a follow-up conference to discuss the results of the report. A gap analysis of the draft ERP has been conducted to determine whether the draft ERP met FERC requirements and was NIMS-compliant. Additionally, the analysis was performed to determine whetherthe draft ERP is operationally feasible based upon response guidance, response plans, and response principles developed by the National Fire Protection Association(NFPA), Environmental Protection PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT3
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAgency, (EPA), etc., as well as professional emergency management judgment and experience. The PBS&J emergency management planners have more than 73 combined years of experience in emergencyplanning, preparedness, response, and recovery. Gaps were expected, because the ERP is a draft. The gap analysis was consolidated and discussed with the Clatsop County Community Development Director, County Manager, county first responders and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff. PBS&J personnel met with local, county, State, and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas staff on July 9 and July 11, 2007, in Clatsop County (See Appendix B: Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees). In addition, data collection for the draft ERP review was received during several meetings (See Appendix C: ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees). Several meetings took place during the review process. A site visit to the proposed Terminal was hosted by Bradwood Landing LLC and included a question-and-answer session. Clatsop County hosted a group meeting with a cross section of local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, the Oregon Department of Energy, and the WahkiakumCounty Sheriff’s office. Following the group meeting, PBS&J conducted additional individual meetings with local emergency response stakeholders, emergency medical services, and the Wahkiakum County Sheriff’s office. Lastly, PBS&J attended a County Emergency Managers meeting held in Seaside, Oregon, and conducted a group interview session. 4.0Gap Analysis The findings of the gap analysis are presented from two perspectives—a county perspective and an ERP-execution perspective, as follows: 4.1Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Local Counties a) Not all county and local agencies that might provide support or respond to an event onsite are listed on the draft ERP Distribution List. As a significant component of the LNG certification process, an ERP is under Sensitive Security Information (SSI)rules until the ERP is published. The following organizations are not included in thedraft Distribution List: 1. Columbia Memorial Hospital (Astoria, Ore.) PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT4
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT2. Seaside Providence Hospital (Seaside, Ore.) 3. St. John Medical Center (Longview, Wash.) 4. Medix Ambulance Service (Astoria, Ore.) 5. Clakestine Rural Fire Department (Clakestine, Ore.) b) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are directly downwind (east ofthe Terminal). According to the Oregon Climate Service, the downwind determination is based on the westerly prevailing wind patterns throughout the year. The downwind counties could be within the potential plume, should a release occur.(A plume is a visible or measurable discharge of a contaminant from a given point oforigin. A plume is visible in the air, such as a plume of smoke.) The area downwind is that area that could be dangerous for those exposed to leaking fumes. However,Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties are not listed in the draft ERP. c) Currently, the draft ERP has no interoperable communications plan and the draft ERP does not provide for redundant communications to report an onsite incident, emergency, or disaster. The only method of communicating an emergency is via the landline, by calling 911. There is currently no cell phone coverage available at the proposed LNG Terminal site. d) The draft ERP does not provide for alternate methods of evacuation for employees, and visitors. Currently, the draft ERP utilizes vehicles to evacuate personnel heading north on Clifton Road, before proceeding east or west on Highway 30. Tugboatscould be used, but only when they are available. e) The draft ERP does not clearly specify what sequence of siren blasts identifies apossible danger, as opposed to an actual incident, emergency, or disaster. f) The draft ERP does not provide a means of onsite sheltering in place for employeesand visitors who are not able to evacuate if an emergency develops at the Terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT5
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTg) The Emergency training, drills, and exercises contained in Annex F of the draft ERP does not include joint training with local responders. h) The planned exercises are not planned for multi-agency response in concert with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. Currently, the planned exercises are only for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. 4.2Gaps in the Draft ERP that Impact the Execution of the Plan a) The draft ERP is in the National Response Plan (NRP). This format is widely used atthe Federal level to respond to disasters involving the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and is not used the local county level. Local first responders are used following the Clatsop County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) format. The current version of the ERP is difficult to read and understand. b) The three zones of potential hazard do not coincide with the USDOT Emergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). c) The exposure amounts of LNG (as shown in Section 4.7.4 of the draft ERP) are different from those used by first responders. The draft ERP does not explain themethodology used to calculate the exposure limits (e.g., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®)). d) There should be one Incident Command System (ICS) organizational chart in the ERP, as opposed to multiple organization charts. e) The draft ERP should contain ICS terms, but not terms specific to Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT6
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTf) The annexes should provide more detail or specificity for particular sections notfound in the draft ERP. The annexes should not be the basis for the ERP. g) The ERP should demonstrate a clear understanding of the emergency response cycle. As an ERP, it should cover preparedness as it relates to the response portion of the plan, but not necessarily discuss recovery and mitigation efforts. h) All emergency responses should tie back to the basic response conditions: incident, emergency, and disaster (per Section 4.7.3 of the draft ERP). i) Triggers need to be developed that clearly delineate what will cause the ERP to be activated. j) The draft ERP is not NIMS-compliant. k) The draft ERP does not mention having an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) with an ambulance onsite. l) The draft ERP does not mention having a Trauma Tent/Building onsite. m) The draft ERP does not mention having fire suppression equipment onsite. n) The draft ERP does not mention having a helispot (helipad) identified for life-flight operations. o) The ERP does not define roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions for fire responsethroughout the entire vessel berthing and LNG off-loading process at the Terminal. 5.0Preliminary Recommendations In reviewing the ERP, PBS&J determined that the Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas draft ERP fulfills some of the requirements from the FERC ERP guidance. However, the current draftERP would be difficult to read or execute because it is confusing and not concise. Information in the draft ERP is redundant (i.e., located in multiple sections and annexes). Information about the three non-PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT7
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTresponse phases of emergency management (i.e., preparedness, mitigation, and recovery) are included in the draft ERP, but this extra information makes it difficult to find the response procedures quickly. The following preliminary recommendations by PBS&J are provided to improve emergency response operations: 5.1Recommendations to Improve ERP Execution a) The ERP should be written in a format that is used and understood by local first responders. The plan should be consistent and follow a logical response format. PBS&J recommends that the ERP be reformatted to place all like information into one section. The following is a recommended ERP format: 1. The table of contents should be located at the beginning of the ERP. Currently, it is located on page 28 (xxviii). 2. Chapter 1 should outline the purpose, scope, authorities, and references for the implementation, development methodology, and planning assumptions of the ERP. 3. Chapter 2 should identify the hazards (i.e., triggers) that may require ERP implementation, site description, organization, and critical emergencypreparedness and response procedures. 4. Chapter 3 should discuss the concept of operations for an ERP event, preparedness actions, general responsibilities, and evacuation measures. 5. Chapter 4 should explain (in detail) the communication plan, notificationprocedures, and interoperable communications. 6. Chapter 5 should cover the ERP training and exercise plan, which includes drills, functional exercises, tabletop exercises, and full-scale exercises. 7. Chapter 6 should provide ERP maintenance procedures. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT8
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTb) Make the ERP NIMS-compliant by following the proposed chapter outline andcontent discussed above. c) The ERP should have one standard organization chart that is NIMS- and ICS-compliant for use throughout the plan. The organization chart should have titles, names and phone numbers, and be updated as those names and contact data change. d) The Concept of Operations section should have a Notification flowchart. e) Standard NIMS and ICS terms should be incorporated into the plan. f) Ideally, the ERP should be 40 to 50 pages long, and should not exceed 100 pages.This proposed length will enhance the ability of Terminal staff and emergencyresponders to quickly and easily find information and implement the plan during anemergency. g) The ERP should reference or explain in greater detail how hazard zones weredeveloped and provide a crosswalk that explains the differences from USDOTEmergency Response Guidebook (Guide 115). h) The ERP should explain in detail the derivation of the different exposure limits (i.e., Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) toxicological profile; risk analysis; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health(NIOSH) Recommended Exposure Limits (NIOSH RELs); NIOSH Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health values (NIOSH IDLHs); and American Conference ofGovernmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®),etc.) and how they are used to determine the different zones. i) Re-evaluate the need for all of the annexes. If annexes are needed, then they should provide additional information not found in the base ERP. Annexes should be nomore than 1 to 2 pages long and describe in detail the concept of operations for thatannex. Annexes should have checklists. The ERP includes the base plan, annexes, PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT9
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTand appendices. If annexes are needed, they should provide additional informationthat is not included in the body of the document. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas must: (1) identify all categories of events reasonably likely to occur; (2) classify each potential event as “incident,” “emergency,” or “disaster;” (3) describe what measures will be taken by Bradwood Landing to deal with them; and (4) describe what actions would be required of other emergency services. k) The ERP should discuss the triggers identified in the Clatsop County CEMP and identify other site-specific triggers. l) The ERP should plan for the worst events, even if the probability of their occurrence seems low. Clatsop County residents need to be assured that appropriate measurescan and will be taken to deal with catastrophic events (such as a major explosion) ifthere is credible evidence that such an event could occur. m) The signature page of the ERP should include the Clatsop County Administrator,Clatsop County Emergency Manager, Clatsop County Sheriff, Astoria Police Chief, Astoria Fire Chief, Knappa Fire Chief, County EMS, and all others who will support the ERP. n) Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties need to be added to the ERP in all places where Clatsop County is listed. o) The ERP should list alternative communication procedures, (e.g, satellite phones,800-MHz or VHF radios with repeaters) that can reach first responders. p) The ERP should have an alternate evacuation plan for employees and visitors. Thealternate evacuation method should consider evacuation of people upwind, via the Columbia River. q) The ERP should have a system of siren blasts with voice announcements that clearlylet anyone onsite know whether there is a potential problem or an actual emergency.PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT10
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTIf there is an actual emergency, the warning system should indicate whether an employee or visitor should evacuate or shelter in-place. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar should contact chemical plants and other industrial plants that may have the same type of hazards, in order to review their warning systems.. r) The functional (or full-scale) exercises should be evaluated by a third party observer that is not Clatsop County, Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas, or the developer of the ERP. The third-party observer will ensure the exercises meet the stated objectives, and will develop corrective actions if it is found that the objectives have not been met. The corrective actions developed by the third-party observer should detail outstanding issues, deficiencies and/or gaps, then conduct briefings about these for local officials from the affected counties and Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas personnel. s) A third party should conduct a review of the ERP annually to ensure all corrective actions have been captured in the ERP. 5.2Recommendations for Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to Provide Financial and Equipment Support for Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia,Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties (Cost Share: Bradwood 100 percent and Counties 0percent) a) Due to the long response times for first responders, Bradwood LandingLLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should hire a full time EMT with an ambulance and have it stationed onsite. This will be accomplished by having a full-time staff member that is cross-trained and certified as an EMT. Bradwood should also have a medical/trauma clinic onsite with a registered nurse (RN) or physician’s assistant(PA) to treat minor injuries and care for an injured employee until they can be safely transported to appropriate medical facilities. The EMT and RN or PA must meet allcertification and licensing requirements of the State of Oregon. b) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct two helispot(helipad) (one at the terminal and one at the intersection of Highway 30 and Clifton PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT11
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTRoad) to accommodate life-flight helicopters for transport of seriously injured peopleto trauma centers. c) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should have two to four trained firefighters onsite to operate fire equipment (brush truck and a dry chemical trailer) and respond to fires or other emergencies (e.g., confined space, HazMat, etc.). This will be accomplished by having full-time staff members that are cross-trained and certified as firefighters. The firefighters must meet all meet all certification and licensing requirements of the NFPA and the State of Oregon. d) The Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should install a Reverse 911 system in Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties to communicate an emergency onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should be a designated user of the Reverse 911 system. In addition, Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties should work with Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas to develop a site-specific call-down list for site emergencies. e) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase and maintain a mobile command center that includes the following components and requirements: 1. Satellite phones; 2. Eight to ten 800-MHz multi-channel radios or VHF radios for first responders to use onsite during an event;3. A base station (VHF or 800-MHz radios) with repeaters to communicate withthe handheld radios referenced in Point 2 (above); and,4. The mobile command vehicle should be stationed onsite, remainoperationally ready, and should be used to run the incident. f) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should purchase an all-weather boat capable of holding 7 to 14 people. This boat is in addition to the three tugs PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT12
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTrequired for operations. The boat should be permanently stored onsite. The tugs are only onsite when they are bringing an LNG vessel to the Terminal.g) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should construct a reverse-pressurized, self-contained (separate power, communication lines and Heating Ventilation and Cooling (HVAC)) facility that is upwind of the prevailing winds. The facility should be used to allow employees or visitors to shelter in-place if a gas release occurs onsite. h) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide joint emergencytraining for local first responders and Bradwood Landing, LLC staff on ERP implementation, LNG hazards and protocols. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should also provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the training session. Clatsop, Wahkiakum, Columbia, Pacific, and Cowlitz Counties and the surrounding fire districts have limited budgets to meet the current required training. As such, they will not have sufficient funds to pay for any additional training that is required by the Terminal. i) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop multi-agencytabletop exercise(s) to flush out issues that could occur when responding to anincident, emergency, or disaster onsite. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the tabletop exercise. j) Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should develop and conduct anannual functional exercise with all of the first responders. The objective of the exercise would be to test and validate all of the response procedures for an emergency onsite and to provide continuity for changes in staff and the communication of new standards, technology, and procedures. Bradwood Landing LLC/NorthernStar Natural Gas should provide funding to pay for first responders’ time during the functional exercise. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT13
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTk) The resource list previously provided by Clatsop County emergency responders (titled, “Discussion of Resources of Existing LNG Receiving Facilities as Relates to Clatsop County Joint Report of November 2006”) should be cross-referenced with PBS&J’s recommendations in this report to avoid duplication of services and equipment. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT14
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix A – Water Safety Report On February 28, 2007, the USCG completed a review of the WSA for Bradwood Landing LNG Terminal project submitted by NorthernStar Natural Gas, LLC, in May of 2006. The following items are a list of specific mitigation measures that must be put into place to responsibly manage the safety and security risks of this project. Navigational Measures: Safety/Security Zone • A moving safety/security zone of 500 yards around the vessel, but ending at the shoreline. No vessel may enter the zone without USCG permission. • Escort resources will be used to contact and control vessel movements in order that the LNG Carrier is protected. • A moored LNG vessel at the facility shall have a 200-yard security zone around the vessel. • A 50-yard security zone around the LNG facility shall be observed when there is not a vessel at the dock. Escort resources (three 60-ton pull tugs) are addressed on page 10 of the ERP. The ERP does not specifically address the security and safety zones. The Declaration of Security is mentioned on page 6E. A moored vessel will be located approximately 350 yards from the west of the Columbia River Channel. I see no issues for the County. Bradwood Landing would provide and operate the tug boats. Vessel Traffic Management • A Transit Management Plan will be developed in coordination with the River Pilots, Bar Pilots, Escort Tug Operators, Security Assets and the USCG, prior to the first transit. • A Vessel Transit Management Plan must be approved by the COTP at least 30 days prior to the first arrival. The issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County would likely need to attend the meetings. Vessel Traffic Information System/Vessel Traffic System • The current Vessel Traffic Information System on the Columbia River is limited to AIS receivers and a handful of cameras. In order to ensure vessel safety and security, this capability will need to be augmented with a robust camera system capable of monitoring the entire transit route. Due to weather concerns, these cameras must be equipped with PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT15
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTdetectors capable of monitoring vessel traffic in wind, rain, and fog conditions common on the river. In addition, this capability may need to be augmented in the future with additional command and control capability and the establishment of a full Columbia River VTS. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The issue of who would pay for and operate it has not been addressed. This could be an issue for the County or the State. Tug Escorts and Docking Assist • Each LNG Carrier must be escorted by two tugs; at least one of which must be a tractor tug, which join the vessel as soon as it is safe to do so. The primary tug will be tethered at the direction of the pilot. A third tug will be required to assist with turning and mooring. • All three tugs will be at least 60-ton Astern Bollard Pull or larger and equipped with Class 1 firefighting equipment. Vessels will be limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less. Extreme wind or weather conditions may require a third tug to escort the LNG vessel. While unloading, all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departure procedures. Annex E – Emergency LNG Carrier Departure and Unexpected Disconnects does mention the use of Tug Boats and pilots in an emergency (page 7E). The Annex, however, does not specifically state that all three tugs will remain on standby to assist with emergency departures. The ERP does not address vessels being limited to transiting during periods of 25 knots of wind or less or that a third tug would have to be used during extreme wind or weather conditions. The ERP does address having three 60-ton tugs available for escorting operations. I do not see these issues affecting the County. Navigational Aids LNG Carrier Familiarization Training for Pilots and Tug Operators Dynamic Under-keel Clearance System • An immersion study of deep draft LNG vessels transiting the bar during summer and winter conditions is required within the first 12 months. Not sure who would be responsible for these items. They are not addressed in the ERP. Safety Measures Vessel and Facility Inspections • LNG tankers and facility subject to annual inspection by the USCG. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT16
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT• LNG vessels and facilities are typically required to undergo a pre-arrival inspection, and transfer monitoring. The USCG states that they would need an additional USCG Facility and Vessel Inspectors. I believe the USCG request for an additional facility asks a bit much. Under MTSA, regulated facilities and vessels undergo annual compliance audits. I am not sure why the USCG would need to inspect every LNG vessel and LNG facility before each arrival. I can see doing so on the first few deliveries. I can’t see the USCG conducting such inspections (123 LNG vessels and the same facility 123 times per year). The USCG used the phrase “typically required to conduct pre-arrival inspections.” I am not sure what the USCG means by “typically.”Shore-side Fire Fighting • Firefighting capability is extremely limited along the entire transit route. Shore-side firefighting resources and training need to be augmented in order to provide basic protection services to the facility, as well as the communities along the transit route. The ERP discusses onsite firefighting equipment and detectors 6H, 6I, 6J, 6K, 6L, 6M, 6N, 6O, 6P. Facility and Offsite Fire Plan is shown on page 4. The tug boats will also have firefighting capability. The ERP does not discuss firefighting for other communities. The County could be impacted by sharing costs associated with developing adequate emergency response capability. Prior to the approval of the Emergency Response Plan, adequate cost-sharing arrangements for project-related training, equipment, maintenance, and staffing will need to be addressed for all of the communities impacted by the project. In-transit Firefighting • Significant resource and jurisdictional issues exist in any marine fire incident on an underway vessel in the Columbia River. Current planning and preparedness efforts focus on a shore-based response to a vessel moored at the facility. The USCG will require a concrete plan for managing underway firefighting, including provisionsfor command and control of tactical firefighting decisions, as well as financial arrangements for provisions of mutual aid and the identification of suitable locations for conducting firefighting operations that are critical to ensuring the safety of the port and securing the waterway. These costs could greatly impact the County. The assets and resources to meet the issues described above are currently not available. The ERP primary discusses onsite fires and offsite fires (outside the fence) in the Facility and Offsite Fire Plan Section. In-transit firefighting is not addressed. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT17
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTPublic Notification System and Procedures • Adequate means to notify the public along the transit route (including ongoing public education campaigns, emergency notification systems, and adequate drills and training) are required. Education programs must be tailored to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Annex A – Warning and Notifications (page 5A) seem to focus on facility-based emergencies. It does not appear to consider in-transit emergencies. The ERP does not address tailored educational programs to meet the various needs of all river users, including commercial and recreational boaters, local businesses, local residents, and tourists. Current public notification capabilities vary greatly, and as part of the ERP process, a comprehensive notification system (including the deployment of associated equipment and training) will need to be developed. Bradwood Landing, in its Warning and Notifications Annex, depends heavily on the Reverse 911 systems. The local counties may have to come up with the resources to update their 911 systems. Gas-detection Capability • Emergency response personnel (both police and fire) require appropriate gas-detection equipment, maintenance, and training. This issue is not addressed in the ERP. The County could be stuck with the cost. Communication System and Protocols • Inter-agency communication poses a significant obstacle to joint operations. Deployment of a Regional Communication Plan and associated equipment is required to ensure that the facility, associated command centers, emergency responders, USCG, tug operators, escort vessels, and pilots communicate in an effective manner. The system must provide for monitoring and communicating on both secure and unsecure channels, as well as sending and receiving both speech and data. Interoperability of communication systems does not currently exist in the area. There are significant costs involved in building the system that USCG describes. The ERP’s Annex B – Communications does not address the USCG concerns regarding inter-agency communications. Significant cost to the community to up-build an inter-agency communication system. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT18
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTSecurity Measures Security Boardings, Waterway Monitoring, Shoreline Patrols, and Vessel Escorts • Extensive security measures will be required to provide adequate protection for LNG vessel while transiting the Columbia River and being moored at the facility. This information is SSI. The local counties could have significant short- and long-term law enforcement and security costs associated with this project. Additional Measures While a Cruise Ship is in Port • While cruise ships are moored or anchored at the Port of Astoria, cruse ships will also be required to have separate waterside security, during the LNG Transit. The USCG and local law enforcement would have to be sufficient to provide adequate and independent security for both vessels. These services would add significant costs to the County. This is not addressed in the ERP. According to the USCG, in the absence of the measures described by the USCG, the Columbia River would be considered unsuitable for the LNG marine traffic associated with the Bradwood LNG terminal. PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT19
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix B – Gap Analysis Discussion Meeting Attendees Name AgencyPaul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Ed Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works and Community Development Scott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Deanna HenryOregon Dept of EnergyMitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Garry Coppedge Bradwood Landing, LLC David Glessner Bradwood Landing, LLC Michelle Rudd Bradwood Landing, LLC Michael Sparks Bradwood Landing, LLC PROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT20
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PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTAppendix C – ERP Data Collection Meeting Attendees Name AgencyDeanna HenryOregon Department of EnergyChristine LolichColumbia Memorial Hospital Rich MaysCity of Cannon Beach Gene Halliburton City of Cannon Beach Duane MullinsMedix Ambulance Paul Olheiser Knappa Fire District Mike Jackson Astoria Fire Department Lenard Hansen Astoria Fire Department Dan BardsleyWahkiakum County Sheriff’s Office Duane Stanton Oregon State Police Richard Long Clatskanie Rural Fire District Ted Ames Warrenton Fire Department Rob Deu Pree Astoria Police Department Paul Benoit City of Astoria, City Manager Gene Strong Clatsop County, Emergency MgrEd Wegner Clatsop County, Public Works/CDScott DericksonClatsop County, Manager Mitch Rohse Land Use Consultant Kurt AmundsonPBS&J Neil Daniell PBS&J Saundra Hinsley PBS&J Kari Sutton PBS&J Ed Hauer Clatsop County, EMA Bill Davidson AFD/CERT Dorthy Davidson AFD/CERT Bob Maxfield Warrenton Police Department Jeff Holwege Seaside (Providence Seaside Hospital volunteer) Paulina CockrumProvidence Seaside Hospital Brad Guileff Providence Seaside Hospital Lt. Mark Heussner Group AIRSTA/Astoria Lt. Bryan Burkhalter Group AIRSTA/Astoria Cal Brady9-4-9 / AM 840 Cleve Roper Cannon Beach RFPD Hal Nauman Clatsop County Health and Human Services Deb Treusdale City of Seaside / Tsunami Professor Tom Bergin Clatsop County Sheriff’s Department Margo Lalich RN MPH Clatsop County Public Health Patrick CorcoranOregon State University Clatsop County Extension Tad Pedersen Office of the State Fire Marshal Ron Tyson Olney Walluski Fire and RescuePROPOSED BRADWOOD LANDING LLC/NORTHERNSTAR NATURAL GAS LNG PROJECT21